Public Service Commission of Missouri v. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company

• Decision Date: 20 November 1923
• Parties: PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF MISSOURI, Appellant, v. ST. LOUIS-SAN FRANCISCO RAILWAY COMPANY
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

256 S.W. 226

301 Mo. 157

PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF MISSOURI, Appellant, v. ST. LOUIS-SAN FRANCISCO RAILWAY COMPANY

Supreme Court of Missouri

November 20, 1923

Appeal from St. Louis City Circuit Court; Hon. Robert W Hall, Judge.

Affirmed.

L H. Breuer, General Counsel, and James D Lindsay, Assistant Counsel, for appellant.

(1) The order required no more of respondent, and other like carriers, than that they should not discontinue a portion of the essential service to the public in this State, voluntarily undertaken by them, without a determination upon the facts in each instance, by the proper administrative body of the State, that public welfare and convenience -- the conjoint interests of the carrier and of the public -- justified the discontinuance. (2) The Public Service Commission has authority to make reasonable general regulations, or orders, applicable to railroad common carriers of passengers, adapted to promote public convenience and welfare, and conducive to orderly procedure by the carriers, in making important changes in the essential service undertaken by them in this State. R. S. 1919, sec. 10412, subdivs. 1, 3, 9; Sec. 10425; Secs. 10436, 10450, 10456, 10457, 10460, 10534, 10538. (3) The order was made upon due notice given; after a hearing in which respondent and other carriers appeared and were fully heard; was subject to review in a direct proceeding, and it does not violate the due process clauses of the Federal and State constitutions. State ex rel. M. K. & T. Ry. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 277 Mo. 175; Vandalia R. R. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 242 U.S. 255; Chicago & N.W. R. Co. v. Dougherty, P. U. R. 1917 F, 617. (4) The compulsory continuance of performance of form or portion of an essential service to the public, voluntarily undertaken by a public utility, pending a determination by competent authority of the question whether the service is a reasonable one to require, is not a taking of property without just compensation, nor a denial of due process of law, within the State and Federal constitutions. State ex rel. M. K. & T. Ry. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 277 Mo. 175; State ex rel. Pub. Serv. Comm. v. Ry. Co., 279 Mo. 455; Mo. So. Ry. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 281 Mo. 52; State ex rel. v. Postal Tel. Co., 96 Kan. 298, 150 P. 544; Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co. v. N. C. Corporation Comm., 206 U.S. 1. (5) The order was designed to require and promote adequate and reasonable passenger service to the public, within this State, by respondent and other carriers, and is not violative of the interstate commerce clause of the Federal Constitution or of Federal legislation. Sec. 10549, R. S. 1919; Article X Amendments, Const. United States; Atlantic Coast Line v. N. C. Comm., 206 U.S. 651; Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Larabee Mills, 211 U.S. 612; Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 262; Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 411; Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U.S. 317; Cleveland C. C. & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 177 U.S. 516; Vandalia Railroad Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 242 U.S. 255; Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Georgia, 234 U.S. 290; Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. Wisconsin Railroad Comm., 237 U.S. 226. (6) The State through the Public Service Commission, may provide regulations adapted to compel the respondent and other like carriers to meet the requirements of adequate passenger service within the State. Lake Shore Railroad Co. v. Ohio, 173 U.S. 285; Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 262; Mississippi Railroad Comm. v. Illinois Central, 203 U.S. 335; State ex rel. v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 60 Fla. 465. (7) The Public Service Commission Act, and orders made thereunder, are to be "liberally construed with a view to the public welfare, efficient facilities, and substantial justice between patrons and public utilities." R. S. 1919, sec. 10538; State ex inf. Baker v. K. C. Gas Co., 254 Mo. 515; State ex rel. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 259 Mo. 704; State ex rel. M., K. & T. Ry. v. Comm., 277 Mo. 175. (8) Where a party whose interests are affected in an inquiry before the Public Service Commission, appears, participates in the inquiry, and makes full defense, he cannot complain of lack of notice of action taken within the scope of the inquiry. Baltimore & Ohio v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 110 S.E. 475; P. U. R. 1922D, 270. (9) Grounds of objection to an order of the commission must be specifically set forth in the application for a rehearing, and grounds not so set forth may not be urged or relied on thereafter in any court. R. S. 1919, sec. 10521; State ex rel. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Atkinson, 269 Mo. 634; State ex rel. Buffum Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 272 Mo. 627. (10) The order does not undertake to regulate unduly the management and operation of the railroads of the State. The order, in its general nature, merely provides that an essential service, undertaken by the carriers, or a certain part of it, presumably necessary, shall not be discontinued without a showing that the discontinuance is just and reasonable. The opportunity to make that showing is given. The showing made, it must be presumed that the permission will be given. (11) The order is not an attempt to directly regulate interstate commerce, nor does it impose an undue burden thereon. Congress has not acted upon this subject. It is one within the police power of the State. The interstate commerce clause does not of its own force, and without legislation by Congress, impair the authority of the states to establish reasonable regulations for the promotion of the safety, convenience and welfare of their people. Chicago Ry. Co. v. Arkansas, 219 U.S. 465; New York Railroad v. New York, 165 U.S. 631; W. U. Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 27; M., K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Haber, 169 U.S. 627; Chicago Ry. Co. v. Solan, 169 U.S. 133. The order does not in any manner forbid, or hamper by conditions, the carriers' right to continue to pursue their intestate commerce operations as heretofore. Buck Stove Co. v. Vickers, 226 U.S. 205; Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U.S. 47; Bowman v. Chicago Ry. Co., 125 U.S. 465; Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100. If a train is an interstate train operating within the State of Missouri, the order does not undertake to make it continue to operate interstate or to cease to do so. (12) This suit is based upon Section 10473, Revised Statutes 1919, and the ordinary rules applicable to mandamus are not applicable here. The section gives character to the procedure.

W. F. Evans, E. T. Miller and Frank H. Farris for respondent.

(1) The commission is an inferior tribunal, possessing limited powers, and it is essential to the validity of its orders that it proceed in conformity with the statute of its creation. Any material deviation therefrom makes void an order, though the subject-matter be within the commission's jurisdiction. State ex rel. v Comm., 270 Mo. 429; A. T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Comm., 192 S.W. 460; L. & N. Railroad Co. v. Commonwealth, 226 S.W. 113; State ex rel. v. Railway, 179 N.W. 378. (2) The order of the commission was made pursuant to an order to show cause which omitted the subject-matter of the order here involved, and was made without a sufficient evidentiary basis. The order deprived respondent of its property without due process of law in violation of Section 1, Article XIV, of the Federal Constitution. It is therefore void. Lusk v. Atkinson, 268 Mo. 109; S.W. Mo. Ry. Co. v. Comm., 281 Mo. 52; A. T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Comm., 192 S.W. 460; Wisconsin Ry. Co. v. Jacobson, 179 U.S. 287; I. C. Commission v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 222 U.S. 541; State ex rel. Navigation Co. v. Comm., 224 U.S. 510; I. C. Commission v. L. & N. Railroad Co., 227 U.S. 88; Florida Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 167; L. & N. Railroad Co. v. United States, 238 U.S. 1; Great Northern Ry. Co. v. State, 238 U.S. 340; Seaboard Air Line v. Comm., 240 U.S. 324; State ex rel. v. A. C. L. Railroad Co., 81 So. 489; In re Rutland Railroad Co., 64 A. 233; In re Coal Rates, 171 P. 506; Muskogee Gas Co. v. State, 186 P. 730. (3) The order is void because it does not show on its face the necessary jurisdictional facts to constitute a valid order. Leslie v. St. Louis, 47 Mo. 474; Chicago Ry. Co. v. Young, 96 Mo. 39; Seafield v. Bohne, 169 Mo. 537; State ex rel. v. Comm., 270 Mo. 547; State ex rel. v. Colbert, 273 Mo. 198; State ex rel. v. Gill, 220 S.W. 978; Eaton v. St. Charles, 8 Mo.App. 177; State ex rel. v. Page, 107 Mo.App. 213; Chandler v. Reading, 129 Mo.App. 63; Grant v. Suttlefield, 138 Mo.App. 555; Rogers v. Davis, 194 Mo.App. 378; New York Railroad Co. v. Croy, 127 N.E. 146; Sec. 10456, R. S. 1919. (4) The order is void because it is an assumption by the commission of a right to manage and operate the railroads of this State. Gustin v. Frisco, 1 Mo. P. S.Ct. 232; State ex rel. v. Bronson, 115 Mo. 271; State ex rel. v. Railroad, 50 So. 425. (5) The order violates Section 8, Article I, of the Constitution of the United States, in that it attempts to directly regulate interstate commerce or impose an undue burden thereon. State v. Railroad, 212 Mo. 658; State v. Railroad, 238 Mo. 21; Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U.S. 640; Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U.S. 47; W. U. Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1; Stuart v. Palmer, 74 N.Y. 183; State ex rel. v. Atlantic Coast Line, 60 Fla. 465. (6) The order of the commission is void and may be attacked directly or collaterally in any proceeding in any court wherein its validity is drawn in question. State ex rel. v. Colbert, 273 Mo. 198; Wells v. Wells, 279 Mo. 57; Thompson v. Pinnell, 199 S.W. 1011; Gray v. Clements, 227 S.W. 111; Ohio Valley Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287; Secs. 10434, 10473, 10535, R. S. 1919. (7) The burden of proof is on appellant and it has failed to meet the requirements to sustain that burden. State ex rel. v. Associated Press, 159 Mo. 410; State ex...