Coddington v. Langley
| Decision Date | 15 March 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 99-CV-70393.,99-CV-70393. |
| Citation | 202 F.Supp.2d 687 |
| Parties | Mitchell CODDINGTON, Petitioner, v. Sally LANGLEY, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
John F. Royal, Detroit, MI, for Mitchell Coddington, petitioner.
Mitchell Coddington, Coldwater, MI, pro se.
Vincent J. Leone, Michigan Department of Attorney General, Habeas Corpus Division, Lansing, MI, for Carol Howls, respondent.
Petitioner Mitchell Coddington is currently incarcerated at the Florence Crane Facility in Coldwater, MI. He filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus stating five grounds for relief: 1) malicious prosecution and abuse of process, 2) insufficient factual basis for the guilty plea, 3) involuntary guilty plea, 4) denial of motion to withdraw guilty plea, and 5) ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. The Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation (R & R) denying all five grounds of relief sought by petitioner. Petitioner filed objections to the R & R.2 He did not object to dismissal of the first ground, but he objected to dismissal of grounds two through five.
After review of the R & R and the petitioner's objections, the Court appointed an attorney for Mr. Coddington. On January 10, 2002, and continued on February 15, 2002, the Court held an evidentiary hearing on the voluntariness of the plea and ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. After testimony on the matter, the Court finds Mr. Coddington received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel and the plea was involuntary. Counsel's failure to raise meritorious issues, including the involuntariness of the guilty plea, the insufficient factual basis, and the denial of the withdrawal of the guilty plea prejudiced Mr. Coddington. Therefore, the Court GRANTS Mr. Coddington's petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
In March 1991, Petitioner Mitchell Coddington was charged with two counts of Criminal Sexual Conduct in the first degree and three counts of Criminal Sexual Conduct in the second degree. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.520c(1)(a). On July 13, 1992, Mr. Coddington pled no contest to three counts, one in the first degree and two in the second degree, with the agreement that the other two charges would be dismissed. After the plea, he went to the probation department and asserted his innocence. At sentencing on August 17, 1992, Mr. Coddington moved to withdraw his no contest plea based on his assertion of innocence. The judge allowed Mr. Coddington to withdraw his plea, and the case went to trial in March 1993. At trial, the jury could not reach a unanimous verdict. The court declared a mistrial.
A new date was set for trial. However, at an appearance before the judge on October 15, 1993, Mr. Coddington's attorney, Charles Novelli, advised the court that the defendant wanted to plead guilty. Under the plea agreement, Mr. Coddington would plead to five counts Criminal Sexual Conduct in the second degree in exchange for dismissal of both first degree charges.
During the plea colloquy, the judge asked Mr. Coddington if he could "read, write and understand the English language." Mr. Coddington answered, "No, I can't read and write that good." The judge recited all of the constitutional rights Mr. Coddington would be relinquishing by pleading guilty. The judge also asked Mr. Coddington if anyone was forcing him to waive his rights, whether there had been "an undue influence, compulsion or duress used against [him] to plead guilty," whether anyone had made any promises to him to induce a guilty plea, or whether anyone had threatened him. Mr. Coddington answered "no" to all four questions.
After being assured that Mr. Coddington understood his rights, the judge asked him a series of questions to establish a factual basis for his plea. The first exchange went as follows:
(Plea Tr., 10/15/93 at 11-12).
After a short recess, the Court tried again to elicit a factual basis:
THE COURT: Now I asked you what did you do.
THE DEFENDANT: I touched her thighs and her butt with my hands.
THE COURT: Did you do so for the purpose of sexual gratification?
THE DEFENDANT: Pardon?
THE COURT: Did you do so for the purpose of sexual gratification?
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.
MS. MOSS: Well, I believe he indicated before it was a sexual touching.
(assistant prosecutor)
THE COURT: It wasn't an accident, was it? ... Did you deliberately do it?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: Why did you deliberately do it?
THE DEFENDANT: Uh—I don't know. I—
THE COURT: Was it under her clothes or on top of her clothes?
...
THE DEFENDANT: On top of the clothes.
THE COURT: I'm going to pass this.
(Plea Tr., 10/15/93 at 13-14).
After the conference in the hall between defense counsel and the petitioner, the Court tried to elicit a factual basis a third time. The judge did not revisit any of the questions regarding whether Mr. Coddington had been threatened or pressured by anyone.
THE COURT: Okay, when you touched her, did you do so because you were a
little bit sexually aroused?
MR. NOVELLI: He's telling me that he doesn't know what you mean by that ...
Did you touch her for sexual purposes—for a sexual reason?
THE DEFENDANT: No.
MS. MOSS: Your Honor, the statute requires that it either be for a sexual
purpose or it can reasonably be construed to be for a sexual
purpose ... and the defendant, at this point in time, has indicated
that he's touching the buttocks and the upper thighs of this child.
If it's not for a spanking or if it's not for—
MR. NOVELLI: In the original inquiry he said for a sexual fashion.
THE COURT: You weren't spanking her, were you?
MR. NOVELLI: You weren't spanking her, were you?
THE DEFENDANT: No. Just tapping her you know.
THE COURT: But it wasn't—you weren't disciplining her?
THE DEFENDANT: No.
THE COURT: All right, and when you touched her on the thighs, show me
where?
THE DEFENDANT: Here and here (indicating), you know. On the leg and butt like.
MS. MOSS: May I make just one inquiry?
THE COURT: Go ahead.
MS. MOSS: I believe when the judge was initially asking questions, you said
that this was a sexual touch, is that right?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. Yes.
THE COURT: Are you sure about that in your mind?
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah.
THE COURT: Mr. Coddington, this Court is convinced and I might add somewhat
reluctantly—that the plea of guilty is understanding, voluntary
and accurate, therefore, the Court's going to accept the plea
of guilty to these five counts.
(Plea Tr., 10/15/93 at 15-18).
At the sentencing hearing on November 15, 1993, Mr. Coddington tried to withdraw his plea. He told the judge:
the only reason I took this plea is because I was ascared that my mother couldn't appear in Court and I wanted to enter my plea. Because my mother just had a heart attack and she said that she will come to Court if she has to. And everybody was forcing me and saying this and saying that, and I didn't even want to say what I said. That's it.
(Sentencing Tr., 11/15/93 at 24). The prosecutor then reminded the judge that Mr. Coddington had already withdrawn his plea once. The judge would not allow Mr. Coddington to withdraw his guilty plea, and he was given five concurrent prison terms of five to fifteen years.
Mr. Coddington's sentence was incorrectly calculated. Mr. Coddington's appellate attorney, Jennifer Pilette asked the Michigan Court of Appeals to remand the case to trial court. The Michigan Appeals Court agreed to remand the case to the trial court. The trial court ruled the range was incorrect and lowered the sentence on July 11, 1994. Mr. Coddington was then sentenced to five concurrent prison terms of three to fifteen years.
After the new sentence, appellate counsel filed a motion for guidance with the Michigan Appeals Court. In her motion for guidance,...
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