Koras v. Robinson
| Decision Date | 06 May 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 00-71178.,00-71178. |
| Citation | 257 F.Supp.2d 941 |
| Parties | David Michael KORAS, Petitioner, v. Kenny ROBINSON, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
Craig A. Daly, Detroit, MI, for David Koras.
Jeffrey W. Caminsky, Wayne County Prosecutor's Office, Detroit, MI, Laura G. Moody, Mich. Dept. of Atty. Gen., Habeas Corpus Div., Lansing, MI, for Kenny Robinson.
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner David Michael Koras's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation recommending that the petition be denied. Because the Court concludes that Petitioner was deprived of the effective assistance of trial and appellate counsel, the Court rejects the report and recommendation and conditionally grants a writ of habeas corpus.
Petitioner's conviction arises out of the stabbing death of Dwayne Tindell on February 16, 1994, in Inkster, Michigan. Paul Craig Harris testified that, at approximately 9:30 a.m. on that date, he was walking to a barber shop when he saw a car parked in the parking lot of a barbecue restaurant. He observed two men inside the car. At some point, the car was started. Mr. Harris then saw the passenger punch the driver in the face three or four times. Mr. Harris testified that the driver was attempting to steer the car with one hand, while trying to ward off the punches with the other. Mr. Harris testified that he saw the car being driven out of the parking lot and saw it head toward the barber shop. Mr. Harris then heard a loud crash. He walked toward the barbershop and observed that the car had been driven through the front of the barbershop. Mr. Harris saw a man he identified as Petitioner get out of the passenger side of the car. Mr. Harris testified that Petitioner stated, "someone needs to tend to him," referring to the car's driver. Petitioner began walking away slowly, and then began to jog. Mr. Harris and one of the barbers ran after Petitioner. When they caught up to him, he stopped, showed them a cut on his left wrist, and said that he had cut his own wrist and that he was tired of living. Police arrived shortly thereafter and arrested Petitioner.
David Latham and Jimmie Clark, employees at the barbershop, corroborated Mr. Harris's testimony that Petitioner requested help for the driver before leaving the scene.
The driver of the vehicle was identified as Dwayne Tindell. The parties stipulated to admission of the medical examiner's report finding that Mr. Tindell died of a stab wound to the chest which punctured the aorta.
City of Inkster Police Officer Darryl Tubbs testified that he took statements from Petitioner on February 16 and 17, 1994. Officer Tubbs testified that, in the February 16 statement, Petitioner started telling Officer Tubbs how Petitioner and Mr. Tindell came to be in the vehicle together in Inkster. However, before completing his statement, Petitioner told Officer Tubbs that he was tired and needed to get some rest. Officer Tubbs terminated the interrogation. He questioned Petitioner again the next day. Officer Tubbs testified that in his statement on February 17, Petitioner stated that he and Mr. Tindell were in Mr. Tindell's car in a restaurant parking lot on the morning of February 16. Petitioner stated that they stopped in the parking lot so that he could smoke crack, which, earlier in the morning, Mr. Tindell had driven Petitioner to purchase. Petitioner stated that he and Mr. Tindell began arguing because Petitioner wanted Mr. Tindell to drive him back to the crack house and Mr. Tindell refused. The argument became more heated and Petitioner pulled out a knife. He stated that he did not intend to stab Mr. Tindell, he just took the knife out and was waving it around and yelling at Mr. Tindell to take him back to the crack house.
Petitioner did not testify in his defense.
Following a bench trial in Recorder's Court for the City of Detroit, Petitioner was convicted of second-degree murder. On March 25, 1995, he was sentenced to twenty to fifty years imprisonment.
Petitioner, through his appointed appellate attorney, Mercedes Mueckenheim, filed an appeal of right, raising the following claims:
I. The trial court created reversible error when it denied defendant's motion to suppress his statements to police on the grounds that they were involuntary, or coerced and that defendant was not competent to voluntarily waive his Miranda rights.
II. The sentencing judge violated the principle of proportionality when she sentenced defendant to 25 to 50 years in prison on the second degree murder conviction.
The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner's conviction and sentence. People v. Koras, No. 185209 (Mich.Ct.App. Feb. 27, 1997).
Petitioner then filed a pro se application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court, presenting the same claims presented to the Michigan Court of Appeals and the following additional claim:
III. Defendant's 6th Amendment right to counsel was violated, and any statement given to the police should be suppressed due to the fact that defendant communicated a request for an attorney to be present on February 16, 1994. This request was not honored, rendering any subsequent statements inadmissible as evidence.
The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. People v. Koras, 456 Mich. 917, 573 N.W.2d 617 (Mich.1997).
Petitioner then filed a motion for relief from judgment in the trial court, raising the following claims:
I. Was defendant Koras denied his right to due process when his statement to the police was introduced at trial in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel?
II. Was defendant Koras deprived of his liberty without due process of law, under both the United States and Michigan Constitutions, by the failure of the trial court to articulate on the record at the time of sentencing any reasons for imposition of the sentences?
III. Is resentencing required because the court failed to respond to the defendant's challenge to the presentence report regarding the facts of the incident and his prior drug use?
IV. Was defendant Koras denied his right of due process to be sentenced on accurate information when the trial judge erroneously scored the sentencing guidelines?
V. Was defendant Koras deprived off his right to the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the United States and Michigan Constitutions, by the deficient performance of trial counsel that denied him of a fair trial?
VI. Was defendant Koras denied due process when the court failed to consider the requested lesser offense of involuntary manslaughter, which was supported by the evidence?
VII. Has defendant Koras established good cause for failure to raise the present claims on direct appeal due to the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel and actual prejudice in that his guilty plea was involuntary [sic] and his sentence invalid?
The trial court denied the motion. People v. Koras, No. 94-5006-01 (Third Judicial Circuit Court March 9, 1999). Petitioner filed delayed applications for leave to appeal the trial court's denial of his motion for relief from judgment in the Michigan Court of Appeals and Michigan Supreme Court, both of which denied leave to appeal. People v. Koras, No. 219252 (Mich.Ct.App. Aug. 3, 1999); People v. Koras, 461 Mich. 968, 609 N.W.2d 189 (Mich. 2000).
On March 3, 2000, Petitioner, through his attorney Craig Daly, filed the pending petition for a writ of habeas corpus, presenting the following claims:
I. Petitioner Koras was denied his right to due process when his statement to the police was introduced at trial in violation of his request for counsel during custodial interrogation.
II. Petitioner Koras was deprived of his liberty without due process of law at his sentencing when the trial court (A) sentenced Petitioner on inaccurate information regarding the guideline scores; (B) failed to respond to Petitioner's challenge to inaccurate information in the presentence report; and (C) failed to articulate on the record reasons for the imposition of the sentence.
III. Petitioner Koras was denied due process when the court failed to consider the requested lesser offense of involuntary manslaughter, which was supported by the evidence.
IV. Petitioner Koras was deprived of his right to the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the United States Constitution, by the deficient performance of trial counsel that denied him a fair trial.
V. Petitioner Koras did not procedurally default his claims because he has established good cause for failure to raise the present claims on direct appeal due to the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel and actual prejudice.
The Court referred the petition to Magistrate Judge Donald A. Scheer for a Report and Recommendation. Magistrate Judge Scheer issued a Report and Recommendation recommending that the petition be denied. Petitioner filed timely objections to the Report and Recommendation.
This Court conducted an evidentiary hearing on March 21, 2003. The parties have filed supplemental briefs and the case is now ready for decision by this Court.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) imposes the following standard of review for habeas cases An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim —
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of...
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