Codekas v. Dyna-Lift Co.

• Decision Date: 07 May 1975
• Docket Number: DYNA-LIFT
• Citation: 121 Cal.Rptr. 121,48 Cal.App.3d 20
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Ernest J. CODEKAS et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v.COMPANY, a Division of Bliss & Laughlin Industries, Inc., Defendantand Appellant. Civ. 13891.

Page 121

121 Cal.Rptr. 121

48 Cal.App.3d 20

Ernest J. CODEKAS et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. DYNA-LIFT COMPANY, a Division of Bliss & Laughlin Industries, Inc., Defendantand Appellant.

Civ. 13891.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 2, California.

May 7, 1975.

Kinkle, Rodiger, Graf, Dewberry & Spriggs and John C. McNamara, Riverside, for defendant and appellant.

Thomas T. Anderson, Indio, for plaintiffs and respondents Ernest J. Codekas and Tellis Codekas, dba Codekas Bros. Date Gardens.

Hector J. Rosso, San Bernardino, for plaintiffs and respondents Angel Estrada Hernandez and Luis Coronado Malacara.

Parker & Dally and Ross C. Irwin, Pomona, for plaintiff and respondent Continental Cas. Co.

OPINION

KERRIGAN, Associate Justice.

The hydraulic cylinder of a date picking machine failed a few days after being repaired, resulting in severe personal injuries to two ranch hands, damages to the machine, and three lawsuits. The three actions were consolidated for the purpose of trial. From adverse judgments, the repairer appeals on the ground the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the doctrine of strict liability in tort.

FACTS

The date picking machine was owned and operated by the plaintiffs Ernest J. Codekas and Tellis Codekas, dba Codekas Bros. Date Gardens--Coachella Valley date ranchers. On or about October 24, Codekas Brothers sent the hydraulic cylinder to Dyna-Lift Company's machine and hydraulic shop in the City of Commerce for repair. Dyna-Lift repaired the cylinder and returned it to Codekas Brothers about November 1. On November 4, the cylinder came out of its collar while the machine was in operation. The cylinder held a cage and platform in place. Two of Codekas' male employees, Hernandez and Malacara, were standing high in the air on the platform when the failure occurred sending them plummeting to the ground below.

Codekas filed an action for the damage to, and the loss of use of, the machine; Continental Casualty Company, Codekas' workmen's compensation carrier, sued to recoup the benefits it had paid upon behalf of the injured employees; and Hernandez and Malacara sought damages for the injuries they sustained.

While each of the complaints espoused several theories of recovery, the main counts sounded in negligence and strict liability in tort. In the joint trial, the court instructed the jury In extenso on both doctrines. The jury returned the following general verdicts in favor of the plaintiffs: (1) Codekas Brothers--$14,000; (2) Malacara--$112,650; (3) Hernandez--$10,500; and (4) Continental Casualty--$32,328.79.

ISSUE

Dyna-Lift appeals on the basis that the trial court erred as a matter of law in rendering jury instructions on the doctrine of strict liability in tort. ¹ Dyna-Lift claims that it was only a repairer and the doctrine just does not apply to a repairer.

LAW

The trial court instructed the jury that a repairer is strictly liable when an article the repairer places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, has a defect that causes injury to a person. (BAJI No. 9.00, as modified, with the word 'repairer' substituted for the words 'manufacturer' or 'seller.')

A Manufacturer is strictly liable in tort for a defective product which causes injury to another. (Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,59 Cal.2d 57, 27 Cal.Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897.) Similarly, a Seller of a defective product may be hald strictly liable; the seller's liability extends to any person engaged in the business of selling products for use or consumption; therefore, it applies to any manufacturer of such a product as well as any wholesaler, retailer, or distributor. (Comment, Rest.2d, Torts, § 402A, p. 348; Cronin v. J. B. E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal.3d 121, 130, 104 Cal.Rptr. 433, 501 P.2d 1153.) And in a recent decision, a manufacturer who was also in the business of repairing was held strictly responsible for defects in repairing. (Young v. Aro Corp., 36 Cal.App.3d 240, 111 Cal.Rptr. 535.)

Both sides concede that Dyna-Lift was only a repairer of the cylinder--as distinguished from a manufacturer-repairer. And both also concede that there are no cases determining whether the doctrine applies to one engaged only in the repair business.

However, on the basis of the record before us, it would be impossible to determine whether the strict liability in tort doctrine applies to a repairer only.

The consolidated actions were tried on at least two distinct theories: negligence and strict liability in tort. Special verdicts were not requested for the purpose of requesting the jury to state its findings on the liability issue and the jury returned general verdicts in each case. Since Dyna-Lift has provided us with no means for determining the jury's reasons for arriving at its determination, suffice it to say that the jury could have found on the basis of substantial evidence that Dyna-Lift's negligence proximately caused the plaintiffs' injuries and damages.

On a clerk's transcript appeal, the appellate court must conclusively presume that the evidence is ample to sustain the findings. (Finney v Lockhart, 35 Cal.2d 161, 164, 217 P.2d 19; Gin S. Chow v. City of Santa Barbara, 217 Cal. 673, 680, 22 P.2d 5; Kompf v. Morrison, 73 Cal.App.2d 284, 286, 166 P.2d 350.)

A general verdict implies a finding in favor of the prevailing party of every fact essential to the support of his action; all inferences and intendments favor such a verdict. (See Timbrell v. Suburban Hospital, Inc., 4 Cal.2d 68, 71, 47 P.2d 737.) Where there are several causes of action (several counts), a general verdict will be sustained if the evidence supports it on any one sufficient count; the general verdict 'implies' a finding in favor of the prevailing party on the count which is supported by the evidence; thus, where there are inconsistent counts, one sounding in negligence and the other for an intentional tort, the judgment will be upheld on either theory, providing there is substantial evidence to support it. (Wells v. Brown, 97 Cal.App.2d 361, 364, 217 P.2d 995; see also Gillespie v. Rawlings, 49 Cal.2d 359, 369, 317 P.2d 601; 4 Witkin, Cal.Procedure (2d ed. 1971), § 270, pp. 3078--3079.).

Where a...