Codie v. State, 81-330
| Decision Date | 25 November 1981 |
| Docket Number | No. 81-330,81-330 |
| Citation | 406 So.2d 117 |
| Parties | Levie CODIE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Peter D. Ringsmuth of Smith, Carta & Ringsmuth, Fort Myers, for appellant.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and David T. Weisbrod, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.
Appellant, Levie Codie, raises several points in challenging his conviction for carrying a concealed weapon, but only one merits discussion. He contends that the trial court erred in refusing to suppress certain evidence seized by an officer who detained him for the purpose of obtaining his identification. Since we conclude the trial court correctly determined the officer had a well-founded suspicion to detain appellant, we affirm its denial of his motion to suppress.
The facts in this case as revealed at the hearing on the motion to suppress are undisputed. Deputy Charles Clifton of the Lee County Sheriff's Department was on road patrol in North Fort Myers on May 23, 1980. At approximately 12:15 a. m. he observed a Camaro and a Cadillac stopped in the side parking lot of a gas station which was closed. The Camaro was parked facing U. S. Highway 41 and the Cadillac was parked nearby facing in the opposite direction so that the drivers' doors were adjacent to each other. The parking lot was not enclosed and the cars were some twenty to thirty feet from U. S. 41 and twelve feet from a public road that runs perpendicular to U. S. 41. As Deputy Clifton drove in behind the Camaro, he observed two people, one in each car.
Deputy Clifton left his car and approached the Camaro on the passenger side. At this point, the Cadillac backed out and drove away. The deputy walked up to the open passenger window of the Camaro and asked the occupant, appellant, for identification. Clifton stated that he was standing behind the passenger door of the vehicle for safety reasons. It was at this point that he detained appellant for the purpose of determining his identity. The deputy then walked around the back of the Camaro to the driver's side and asked appellant for his driver's license. While appellant retrieved his license, the deputy shined his flashlight into the car and observed a canvas gun case on the floor. He then asked appellant to step out of the car and frisked him for weapons. Upon finding no weapon, the deputy asked appellant where his gun was. Appellant responded, "What gun?" or "What?" Without asking appellant's permission, the officer reached into the vehicle for the pistol case and saw a pistol stuck between the seat and the console of the Camaro. The wooden grips and about two inches of the pistol were visible. The officer testified that he recognized the pistol for what it was. He stated that prior to that time he was unable to see the pistol, because appellant's body and the seating arrangement of the vehicle blocked his view.
Deputy Clifton testified that while crimes had been committed in the area recently, he had received no reports of criminal activity on that particular night. He said that because he was personally acquainted with the owner of the filling station, he knew that neither of the vehicles belonged to him.
Only Deputy Clifton testified and, after hearing his testimony and arguments of counsel, the court denied appellant's motion to suppress. A jury subsequently found Codie guilty of carrying a concealed firearm. The trial judge placed him on probation for five years with a condition that he serve fifteen days in jail. He also ordered him to pay a $2,000 fine. This appeal ensued.
Our "stop and frisk" law, Florida Statute 901.151(2) (1979), provides:
Whenever any law enforcement officer of this state encounters any person under circumstances which reasonably indicate that such a person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a violation of the criminal laws of this state or the criminal ordinances of any municipality or county, he may temporarily detain such person for the purpose of ascertaining the identity of the person temporarily detained and the circumstances surrounding his presence abroad which led the officer to believe that he had committed, was committing, or was about to commit a criminal offense.
The law applies to vehicle stops and the court has held that to stop and briefly detain a vehicle, an officer must have a "well-founded suspicion" that its occupants might be involved in illegal activity. State v. Payton, 344 So.2d 648 (Fla.2d DCA 1977). The officer's suspicion must be based on observed facts interpreted in light of the officer's knowledge and experience. State v. W. O. R., 382 So.2d 763 (Fla.2d DCA 1980). Thus, the legality of each stop is dependent upon the facts within the detaining officer's knowledge. This standard does not require that there be a high probability of guilt; however, a mere suspicion is not enough. State v. Spurling, 385 So.2d 672 (Fla.2d DCA 1980). Reasonable men can differ as to whether the circumstances witnessed by an officer give a foundation to his suspicion. Then certain factors such as the time, location, physical appearance of the suspect,...
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