Coe v. Bd. of Educ. of The Town of Watertown
| Decision Date | 07 June 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 18433.,18433. |
| Citation | 19 A.3d 640,301 Conn. 112,267 Ed. Law Rep. 747 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | Sarah COE et al.v.BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the TOWN OF WATERTOWN et al. |
301 Conn. 112
19 A.3d 640
267 Ed. Law Rep. 747
Sarah COE et al.
v.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the TOWN OF WATERTOWN et al.
No. 18433.
Supreme Court of Connecticut.
Argued March 16, 2011.Decided June 7, 2011.
[19 A.3d 641]
John R. Logan, Torrington, for the appellants (plaintiffs).Joseph M. Busher, Jr., with whom was Kathryn M. Cunningham, Hartford, for the appellees (named defendant et al.).ROGERS, C.J., and NORCOTT, PALMER, ZARELLA, McLACHLAN and VERTEFEUILLE, Js.PER CURIAM.
[301 Conn. 114] The plaintiffs, Sarah Coe (Coe) and Mary Ellen Coe, brought this action against the defendants,1 the board of education of the town of Watertown (board), the town of Watertown (town), and Theresa Gregoire and Mary Jean Mangione, teachers employed by the board, claiming that, as the result of the defendants' negligence, Coe had severely injured her foot at a school dance sponsored by the board. The defendants filed a motion to strike the claims against them on the ground that the negligence claims against the town and the board were barred by the doctrine of governmental immunity and did not come within the scope of the statutory waiver of governmental immunity set forth in General Statutes § 52–557n; the claims against Gregoire and Mangione were barred because § 52–557n does not create a cause of action against individual municipal employees; and in the absence of a common-law negligence claim against Gregoire and Mangione, there was no basis for an indemnification claim pursuant to General Statutes § 7–465.2 The trial court granted the motion to strike and rendered judgment in favor of the defendants. The plaintiffs then appealed,3 claiming that the
[19 A.3d 642]
trial court improperly granted the motion to strike. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
[301 Conn. 115] As stated in the trial court's memorandum of decision, “[o]n February 29, 2008, [the plaintiffs] filed a three count complaint ... alleging [in count one] negligence pursuant to ... § 52–557n against [the defendants], and [in count two] requesting indemnification from the town and [the] board ... for the torts of their employees, Mangione and Gregoire. Specifically, the complaint alleges that: (1) on June 16, 2006, the town, through the board ... sponsored an eighth grade graduation dance at ... a private catering facility ... (2) during the course of the evening, a glass goblet fell and broke, leaving pieces of glass on the floor; and (3) after shedding her footwear while walking from her table to the dance floor, [Coe] stepped on a shard of broken glass and severely injured her left foot. Additionally, the plaintiff[s] [allege] that ... Gregoire and Mangione, who are both teachers at the Swift Middle School and were chaperones at the dance, were negligent in their supervision of the students.”
The trial court granted the defendants' motion to strike count one of the complaint on the ground that the town and the board were entitled to governmental immunity because they were performing governmental acts involving the exercise of judgment and discretion. See General Statutes § 52–557n (a)(2)(B). The trial court also granted the motion to strike count one as to Gregoire and Mangione because § 52–557n does not create a cause of action against individual government employees and because “no common-law negligence claim was pleaded....” With respect to count two of the complaint, the trial court determined that, in the absence of a common-law negligence claim against Gregoire and Mangione, there was no basis for a statutory indemnification claim pursuant to § 7–465.
The plaintiffs claim on appeal that the trial court improperly determined that: (1) the town and the board were not liable pursuant to § 52–557n (a)(1)(A) for [301 Conn. 116] their alleged negligent acts because the acts required the exercise of discretion and, therefore, liability was barred by § 52–557n (a)(2)(B); (2) if § 52–557n (a)(2)(B) applies to the plaintiffs' claims, the claims do not come within the exception to that provision for claims involving identifiable persons who are subject to imminent harm; (3) § 52–557n does not provide that individual municipal employees are liable for damages caused by certain negligent acts or omissions, but only that political subdivisions are liable; and (4) the plaintiffs were not entitled to relief under § 7–465 because they did not allege common-law negligence against Gregoire and Mangione.
With respect to the first three claims, our examination of the record and briefs and our consideration of the arguments of the parties persuades us that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. As the trial court noted in its well reasoned memorandum of decision,4 “[i]t is
[19 A.3d 643]
fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant's motion to [301 Conn. 117] strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted.... Violano v. Fernandez, 280 Conn. 310, 318, 907 A.2d 1188 (2006). The role of the trial court in ruling on a motion to strike is to examine the [complaint], construed in favor of the [plaintiff], to determine whether the [pleading party has] stated a legally sufficient cause of action.... Dodd v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 242 Conn. 375, 378, 698 A.2d 589 [859] (1997).” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
The trial court explained that in ruling on the motion in the present case, “the court must consider the doctrine of governmental immunity. By the passage of § 52–557n the legislature abandon[ed] the common-law principle of municipal sovereign immunity and establish[ed] the circumstances in which a municipality may be liable for damages. Doe v. Petersen, 279 Conn. 607, 614, 903 A.2d 191 (2006). [Section 52–557n] provides in relevant part: (a)(1) Except as otherwise provided by law, a political subdivision of the state shall be liable for damages to person or property caused by: (A) The negligent acts or omissions of such political subdivision or any employee, officer or agent thereof acting within the scope of his employment or official duties.... (2) Except as otherwise provided by law, a political subdivision of the state shall not be liable for damages to person or property caused by ... (B) negligent acts or omissions which require the exercise of judgment or discretion as an official function of the authority expressly or impliedly granted by law....
“Indeed, while a municipality is generally...
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