Coe v. Washington Mills
Decision Date | 26 June 1889 |
Citation | 149 Mass. 543,21 N.E. 966 |
Parties | COE v. WASHINGTON MILLS et al. |
Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
E.T. Burley and C.N. Bell, for Ladies' Union Charitable Society.
C.K Cobb, for Washington Mills.
The Washington Mills Relief Society was a voluntary association formed, as its "regulations" state, "for the purpose of extending aid to the sick, and to those who may meet with accident while employed here." By its "regulations," which were the only articles of association, The corporation was to pay "three dollars weekly to its funds," and each member was to pay "four weeks' contributions on entering, and three cents a week thereafter," the contributions of the members to be "made every pay-day, at the time of receiving their wages, to the pay-master, who shall forthwith hand over the same to the treasurer of the society." The regulations further provide that "the weekly allowance to sick members shall be two dollars;" that the allowance may be continued 10 weeks. It shall then be reduced one-fourth, and may be extended 20 weeks longer; provided that no member shall receive more than $50 in any one year, except by a vote of the board of government. No member was entitled to aid "who shall not have regularly contributed for at least eight weeks, and been employed by the Washington Mills for the same length of time." We have stated enough of the regulations to show the purpose of the association. It was a voluntary association for the mutual benefit of its members, and cannot be held to be a public charitable institution. To constitute a public charity there must be an absolute gift to a charitable use for the benefit of the public. In this case the contributions of the members were not gifts for a charitable use for the benefit of the public, but they were payments for their own advantage, and were in the nature of premiums for insurance against sickness and accidents. Each member paid a regular fee or assessment, and in consideration thereof he became entitled to a certain benefit, in case of sickness or accident, as a personal right. He could enforce this before the tribunal provided in the regulations, viz., the directors of the Washington Mills; and, if no such tribunal had been provided, he could enforce it in a court of law. Dolan v. Court, Good Samaritan, 128 Mass. 437; Bauer v. Samson Lodge, 102 Ind. 262, 1 N.E. 571. No private person can maintain an action to enforce the exercise of a public charity in his favor. As is stated in Attorney General v. Proprietors, 3 Gray, 1-50, See Society v. Crocker, 119 Mass. 1-24; Saltonstall v. Sanders, 11 Allen, 446-464. The contributions of the members were not in their nature, and were not intended to be, gifts for a general public use, but were for the advantage of the members only. Swift's Ex'rs v. Society, 73 Pa.St. 362; Bangor v. Rising Virtue Lodge, 73 Me. 428; Donohugh's Appeal, 86 Pa.St. 306. It is true that the contributions by the corporation were of a different character, but they did not change the general scheme or purpose, and were, we think, gifts to a private use, and not to a public charity.
We are for these reasons of the opinion that this is not a case of a public charity, in which, under the doctrine of cy pres, we can by a decree devote the funds which have accumulated to a public charitable use. The society was in operation for about 17 years, and a fund amounting to about $10,000 had accumulated, when it came to an end by the dissolution of the Washington Mills corporation. The next question is, in whom is the title to this fund? It was a voluntary association of peculiar character. The corporation was not a member, but practically it had, by virtue of its right to change its employés, the power to...
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