Coeur D'Alene Tribe v. Denney (In re Verified Petition for Writ Mandamus)
Decision Date | 20 November 2015 |
Docket Number | No. 43169.,43169. |
Citation | 387 P.3d 761,161 Idaho 508 |
Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Parties | In the Matter of the Verified Petition for Writ of Mandamus. COEUR D'ALENE TRIBE, Petitioner, v. Lawerence DENNEY, Secretary of State of the State of Idaho, in his official capacity, Respondent. |
Ferguson Durham, PLLC, Boise, for petitioner. Deborah A. Ferguson argued.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Brian Kane argued.
David H. Leroy, Boise, argued for amicus curiae Coeur d'Alene Racing, Ltd.
Greener Burke, Shoemaker Oberrecht, P.A., Boise, for amicus curiae Intermountain Racing and Entertainment, LLC.
David F. Hensley and Cally A. Younger, Boise, for amicus curiae Honorable C.L. "Butch" Otter, Governor of Idaho.
Barker Rosholt & Simpson, LLP, Boise, for amicus curiae Treasure Valley Racing, LLC.
SUBSTITUTE OPINION
THE PREVIOUS OPINION ISSUED SEPTEMBER 10, 2015 IS HEREBY WITHDRAWN.
This case comes before this Court pursuant to a Writ of Mandamus. The Coeur d'Alene Tribe (Tribe) petitioned the Court for a Writ of Mandamus compelling the Secretary of State to certify Senate Bill 1011 (S.B. 1011) as law. The Tribe alleges that the Governor did not return his veto for S.B. 1011 within the five-day deadline under the Idaho Constitution. The Tribe argues that because the veto was untimely, the bill automatically became law and the Secretary of State had a non-discretionary duty to certify it as law. We agree.
On March 30, 2015, both the Senate and the House of Representatives passed S.B. 1011 with supermajorities. S.B. 1011 had one purpose: to repeal Idaho Code section 54–2512A, a law which allowed wagering on "historical" horse races. In the afternoon of March 30, 2015, the bill was presented to the Governor, who then had five days to veto the bill pursuant to the Idaho Constitution.
On April 2, 2015, the legislature adjourned temporarily for the Easter weekend. Around that time, the media reported that the Governor intended to wait until Monday, April 6, to announce his decision on whether to sign S.B. 1011 into law.
The Senate reconvened Monday, April 6, 2015. That morning, the Governor returned S.B. 1011 and a veto message1 to the Senate President Pro Tempore's office, along with a letter addressed to the President of the Senate. The President Pro Tempore and two other Senate officials filed official letters in the Senate Journal regarding S.B. 1011. The President Pro Tempore's letter notified the Senate that the Governor returned the veto to the President Pro Tempore's office at 8:52 a.m. on April 6, 2015, which was past the constitutional deadline. The letter further stated that "such deadline having passed, the provisions of Article IV, § 10 of the Idaho Constitution and Idaho Code § 67–504 and 505 appear to apply."
The Secretary of the Senate also filed a letter indicating that the Governor failed to return S.B. 1011 to the Secretary of the Senate's Office by the April 4 deadline. That letter also indicated that the Governor's office returned other communications to the Secretary of the Senate's Office over the weekend, but nothing relating to S.B. 1011.
Finally, Michelle Stennett, the Senate Minority Leader, filed a letter with the Secretary of the Senate, which also advised the Senate that the Governor's veto of S.B. 1011 was untimely and invalid. Stennett's letter stated that "[t]o the best of my knowledge no earlier return was attempted or effectuated to the Senate, nor was anyone asked to receive such a return at an earlier time."
Despite these notifications, the President of the Senate proceeded to call a vote during the April 6 session to override the veto. A majority, but less than two-thirds of the Senate, voted to override the veto. Consequently, the President of the Senate sustained the Governor's veto and declared that S.B. 1011 failed to become law.
The Tribe, believing that S.B. 1011 automatically became law when the Governor failed to return the veto within five days, subsequently requested the Secretary of State to certify it as law. The Secretary of State refused, asserting that he lacked the authority to certify the bill as a law because "the requisite gubernatorial authentication under Idaho Code § 67–505 [was] absent." The Tribe then petitioned this Court for a Writ of Mandamus ordering the Secretary of State to certify S.B. 1011, deposit it with the laws of the State, and assign it a chapter number in the Idaho Code. The Governor, Treasure Valley Racing, LLC, Intermountain Racing and Entertainment, LLC, and Coeur d'Alene Racing, Ltd. all filed amicus briefs with this Court opposing the petition for a writ of mandamus.
Article V, section 9 of the Idaho Constitution and Idaho Code section 1–203 confer original jurisdiction on this Court to issue writs of mandamus. Pursuant to Idaho Code section 7–302, a writ of mandamus "may be issued by the Supreme Court ... to any ... person, to compel the performance of an act which the law especially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station." This Court has repeatedly held that mandamus is not a writ of right and the allowance or refusal to issue a writ of mandate is discretionary. Hunke v. Foote, 84 Idaho 391, 398, 373 P.2d 322, 325 (1962) ; Kerley v. Wetherell, 61 Idaho 31, 48, 96 P.2d 503, 511 (1939) ; Reynard v. City of Caldwell, 53 Idaho 62, 81, 21 P.2d 527, 534 (1933) ; Logan v. Carter, 49 Idaho 393, 403, 288 P. 424, 427 (1930) ; State v. Malcom, 39 Idaho 185, 190, 226 P. 1083, 1085 (1924) ; State v. Banks, 37 Idaho 27, 34, 215 P. 468, 470 (1923).
In Utah Power & Light Co. v. Campbell, 108 Idaho 950, 953, 703 P.2d 714, 717 (1985), this Court stated that "[m]andamus will lie if the officer against whom the writ is brought has a ‘clear legal duty’ to perform the desired act, and if the act sought to be compelled is ministerial or executive in nature." If the act sought to be compelled of the public officer is ministerial, the Court must find the party seeking the writ has a clear legal right to have the act performed. Kolp v. Bd. of Tr. of Butte Cnty. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 111, 102 Idaho 320, 323, 629 P.2d 1153, 1156 (1981). Furthermore, Idaho law requires that a writ must be issued in those cases where there is not a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. I.C. § 7–303.
The Tribe seeks a writ of mandamus from this Court compelling the Secretary of State to certify S.B. 1011 as law. There are several discrete issues involved here. First, we must address the amici's arguments that the Tribe does not have standing in this matter. Second, we must determine whether the Governor's veto was valid. Third, if the Governor's veto was invalid, we must then determine whether the Secretary of State has a non-discretionary duty to certify S.B. 1011 as law. Fourth, we must determine whether a writ of mandamus is an appropriate remedy in this case. Finally, the Tribe requests attorney fees on this writ of mandamus. We will address each issue in turn below.
"Concepts of justiciability, including standing, identify appropriate or suitable occasions for adjudication by a court." State v. Philip Morris, Inc., 158 Idaho 874, 881, 354 P.3d 187, 194 (2015). Standing focuses directly on whether a particular interest or injury is adequate to invoke the protection of judicial decision. Id. When determining whether a party has standing, this Court has looked to United States Supreme Court decisions for guidance. Koch v. Canyon Cnty., 145 Idaho 158, 161, 177 P.3d 372, 375 (2008). In fact, the origin of Idaho's standing is a self-imposed constraint adopted from federal practice, as there is no "case or controversy" clause or an analogous provision in the Idaho Constitution as there is in the United States Constitution. See U.S. Const. art. III. § 2, cl. 1. Consequently, in a recent decision from this Court, we set forth the test for standing pursuant to United States Supreme Court jurisprudence:
[T]o establish standing a plaintiff must show (1) an injury in fact, (2) a sufficient causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of, and (3) a like[lihood] that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. An injury sufficient to satisfy the requirement of an injury in fact must be concrete and particularized and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.
Philip Morris, Inc., 158 Idaho at 881, 354 P.3d at 194, (citations omitted)(internal quotation marks omitted).
In that opinion, we also clarified that the "allege or demonstrate" standard so often repeated in our opinions is an incomplete statement of requirements for standing. Id. We explained that consistent with the federal standard, standing "requires a showing of a ‘distinct palpable injury’ and ‘fairly traceable causal connection between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct.’ " Id. (quoting Young v. City of Ketchum, 137 Idaho 102, 104, 44 P.3d 1157, 1159 (2002) ). This Court has defined palpable injury as "an injury that is easily perceptible, manifest, or readily visible." Id. at 881, 354 P.3d at 194. Moreover, the injury cannot be one suffered alike by all citizens in the jurisdiction. Troutner v. Kempthorne, 142 Idaho 389, 391, 128 P.3d 926, 928 (2006).
The Tribe alleges standing in this proceeding on the basis that, as a lead proponent of S.B. 1011, it has a concrete and discrete interest in this case and contends that it has been injured by the Secretary of State's refusal to certify the bill as law. The Tribe claims that it is particularly harmed due to its distinct rights under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act ("IGRA"). See 25 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq. Although the Tribe has established a unique and protected right towards gaming in the state, it fails to present sufficient facts as to how S.B. 1011 impacts the Tribe's ability to benefit from gaming going forward. The Tribe correctly...
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