COFFEE v. HENRY
| Decision Date | 26 January 2010 |
| Docket Number | 839.,No. 106,106 |
| Parties | Glenn COFFEE, President Pro Tempore of the Oklahoma State Senate and Chris Benge, Speaker of the Oklahoma House of Representatives, Petitioners, v. Brad HENRY, Governor of the State of Oklahoma, Respondent. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
¶ 0 Proceeding to assume original jurisdiction to resolve a dispute between the Legislature and Governor over use of the line item veto provided by Okla. Const. Art. 6, § 12.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION ASSUMED, OKLA. CONST. ART. 7, § 4; DECLARATORY RELIEF GRANTED, HOLDING GOVERNOR MAY USE LINE ITEM VETO IN REVIEW OF BILLS THAT ADD CONDITIONS OR RESTRICTIONS TO PREVIOUSLY APPROPRIATED FUNDS.
Fred Morgan, Cheryl Ann Purvis, Staff Counsel, Oklahoma State Senate, Lee Slater, Amy L. Alden, General Counsel, Oklahoma House of Representatives, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Petitioners.
D. Kent Meyers, Harvey D. Ellis, Molly H. Tolbert, Crowe & Dunlevy, P.C., Stephen Cortes, General Counsel, Governor Brad Henry, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Respondent.
¶ 1 The President Pro Tempore of the Oklahoma Senate and the Speaker of the Oklahoma House of Representatives have petitioned this Court to assume original jurisdiction.
They ask this Court to resolve their dispute with the Governor over use of the line item veto provided by Okla. Const. Art. 6, § 12. The Legislative Leadership specifically complains about two instances in the last Legislative session where the Governor used the line item veto to reject provisions in two bills-S.B. 1323 and H.B. 2286. The Legislative Leadership characterizes these bills as “general bills.” They contend that use of the line item veto is limited to “appropriation bills.” The Legislative Leadership asks this Court to issue a declaratory judgment that interprets Art. 6, § 12 as limiting the Governor's use of the line item veto to “appropriation bills,” that is, bills that deal exclusively with appropriations. While the distinction between “general bills” and “appropriation bills” may be determinative in other contexts, the language of Art. 6, § 12 is determinative of the controversy at hand.
¶ 2 The text of Okla. Const. Art. 6, § 12 reads as follows:
Every bill passed by the Legislature, making appropriations of money embracing distinct items, shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the Governor; if he disapproves the bill, or any item, or appropriation therein contained, he shall communicate such disapproval, with his reasons therefor, to the house in which the bill shall have originated, but all items not disapproved shall have the force and effect of law according to the original provisions of the bill. Any item or items so disapproved shall be void, unless repassed by a two-thirds vote, according to the rules and limitations prescribed in the preceding section in reference to other bills: Provided, That this section shall not relieve emergency bills of the requirement of the three-fourths vote.
Nothing in the language of this provision reflects that it is limited to bills that deal exclusively with appropriations; rather, the language plainly indicates it applies to “ Every bill ... making appropriations ... embracing distinct items.” (Emphasis added.)
¶ 3 The term “every” ordinarily means “any” or “all” and suggests a broad expansive meaning, Christianson v. City of Bismarck, 476 N.W.2d 688 (N.D.1991); it is considered a term of inclusion. See Rockfield v. First Nat. Bank of Springfield, 77 Ohio St. 311, 83 N.E. 392 (1907). Clearly, the scope of Art. 6, § 12 goes well beyond just bills that deal exclusively with appropriations and extends to any and all bills that “mak[e] appropriations ... embracing distinct items.”
¶ 4 Examination of S.B. 1323 and H.B. 2286 reveals that each of these bills “mak[e] appropriations ... embracing distinct items.” That is, S.B. 1323 added conditions and restrictions for the expenditure of funds previously generally appropriated to the Department of Corrections, while H.B. 2286 added a restriction on the use of funds previously appropriated to the Ethics Commission to purchase computer software. These additions “mak[e] appropriations” because they materially change the predicate authorization for such funds to be paid out of the State treasury as provided in Okla. Const. Art. 5, § 55. This constitutional provision commands, in pertinent part, that “No money shall ever be paid out of the treasury of this State ... except in pursuance to an appropriation by law.” The restrictions in S.B. 1323 and H.B. 2286 necessarily affect the payment of funds out of the State treasury for the items embraced, because the funds in question cannot be paid out contrary to the restrictions. Stated another way, these restrictions supplement the original general appropriations and govern the payout of funds on the items they embrace.
¶ 5 In summary, the framers of the Oklahoma Constitution provided a classic system of checks and balances for the expenditure of public funds. The framers first required expenditures to be based on bills that make appropriations and made any and all such bills subject to the scrutiny and line item veto of the Governor, including bills that materially change prior appropriations by adding conditions or restrictions that affect the payout of the funds from the State treasury. The framers clearly intended the Governor to play a critical role at every stage of the appropriations process. As a counter-check or balance on the exercise of line item veto power by the Governor, the framers authorized the Legislature to repass a “bill, or any item or appropriation therein” that the Governor may have disapproved.
¶ 6 Accordingly, this Court assumes original jurisdiction of this dispute between the Legislature and the Governor over the exercise of their respective constitutional powers in regard to the making and approval/disapproval of appropriations of public funds. We enter a declaratory judgment that (1) rejects the challenge by Legislative Leadership to the Governor's use of line item veto power in review of bills that add conditions or restrictions to funds that have been previously appropriated and (2) holds the Governor may use the line item veto provided in Art. 6, § 12 in review of bills by the Legislature that add conditions or restrictions to previously appropriated funds, because such bills form a part of the predicate appropriation for the payout of funds from the State treasury as provided in Art. 5, § 55.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION ASSUMED, OKLA. CONST. ART. 7, § 4; DECLARATORY RELIEF GRANTED, HOLDING GOVERNOR MAY USE LINE ITEM VETO IN REVIEW OF BILLS THAT ADD CONDITIONS OR RESTRICTIONS TO PREVIOUSLY APPROPRIATED FUNDS.
¶ 1 I fully concur with the majority. It holds that every bill making appropriations is subject to the Governor's line-item veto. Although our previous cases may not be written in the clearest language, when they are clearly analyzed there is no question that the Governor vetoed appropriation bills.
¶ 2 However, there is another rationale for reaching this conclusion. Because H.B. 2286 and S.B. 1323 supplement and amend appropriations made in the general appropriations bill HB 2276, the appropriations were incorporated into the subsequent bills, thus subjecting them to the Governor's line-item veto. In Opinion of the Justices to the Governor, 373 Mass. 911, 370 N.E.2d 1350 (1977), the State of Massachusetts reached the same result in a similar case. The opinion provides at p. 1352:
Each new item sets apart from the public revenue a certain sum of money for a specified object, in such manner that the executive officers of the government are authorized to use that money, and no more, for that object and for no other. It is therefore an appropriation.... The Legislature cannot narrow the Governor's power to disapprove such an item by stating it in words and phrases rather than in figures.
If the Governor could not veto such a new item the way would be open for evasion of the item veto by a two-step process. The Legislature could first make a noncontroversial appropriation. Once that was enacted, it could then insert the controversial restriction as a separate section in an essential supplementary appropriations bill. 1
(Citations omitted.)
This should be the end of the discussion. However, I am compelled to write further to address our precedents.
¶ 3 Here's what happened. On April 29, 2008, the Governor of the State of Oklahoma approved House Bill No. 2276, a general appropriation bill which appropriated money for the expenses of various agencies of the executive, legislative, and judicial departments of the state. Included in the money appropriated by H.B. No. 2276 were appropriations to the Ethics Commission and the Department of Corrections. 2 Subsequently, the Legislature, in House Bill 2286 and Senate Bill 1323, sought to define the object of the appropriation by purporting to impose detailed constraints regarding the funds previously appropriated by H.B. 2276.
¶ 4 The Governor vetoed the legislative mandate within H.B. 2286 for the Ethics Commission which required it to use a specified amount of its appropriation to purchase particular computer software, and he vetoed the legislative mandate within S.B. 1323 for the Department of Corrections to “budget” specified amounts of its appropriation for delineated purposes. The petitioners, the President Pro Tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House, brought this original proceeding in this Court to challenge the Governor's ability to exercise such a line-item veto.
¶ 5 The Petitioners argue that H.B. 2286 and S.B. 1323 are not appropriation bills subject to the Governor's veto authority as provided by the Oklahoma Constitution art. 6, § 12 which provides:
Every bill passed by the Legislature, making...
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