Coffey v. Land

• Decision Date: 06 April 1936
• Docket Number: 32187
• Citation: 176 Miss. 114,167 So. 49
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: COFFEY v. LAND

167 So. 49

176 Miss. 114

COFFEY v. LAND

No. 32187

Supreme Court of Mississippi

April 6, 1936

Division B

(Division B. Suggestion of Error Overruled May 4, 1936.)

1. CHATTEL MORTGAGES.

Unplanted crop could not be mortgaged at common law.

2. CHATTEL MORTGAGES.

Mortgages on crops to be produced in subsequent years on land owned by mortgagor or in which he has an interest in possession are good in equity.

3. CHATTEL MORTGAGES.

Mortgage on crop to be produced during year in which trust deed is executed is enforceable at law, notwithstanding trust deed antedates planting of crop for that particular year or before beginning of such year, if so closely connected therewith that preparations were then being made for planting and production of crop.

4. CHATTEL MORTGAGES.

Deed of trust executed March 1, 1932, securing note due October 1 1932, on all crops to be produced by mortgagor on lands owned by him during 1932, held valid at law as against chattel mortgage executed in 1930 on all crops to be grown by mortgagor on land owned by him during 1930, 1931, and 1932 statute being inapplicable (Code 1930, sec. 2130).

Suggestion Of Error Overruled May 4, 1936.

APPEAL from circuit court of Leake county.

HON. D. M. ANDERSON, Judge.

Action by Thomas Land against J. F. Coffey. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed and remanded, with directions.

Reversed and remanded.

F. E. Leach, of Carthage, for appellant.

The court will observe that the chattel mortgage executed to appellee on February 17, 1930, was due on November 1, 1930, and that the crops of the debtor for three years were included as security for same, and in view of section 2130 of the Code of 1930, appellant is such a party as is designated by this statute as a "creditor."

We submit that, but for the execution of the deed of trust in 1932 to appellant herein, the deed of trust given by the debtor, O. J. Truss to appellee in February, 1930, would cover the crops for each of the years 1930, 1931 and 1932, but this statute was designed primarily to limit or restrict deeds of trust executed on after acquired property to a period of twelve months as against subsequent creditors, and surely had such intention not been the primary cause of the, enactment of chapter 243 of the Laws of 1920, then no purpose for said enactment then existed and the incorporation of this statute as section 2130 o,f the Code of 1930, would have been a vain thing and this statute would now stand as utterly meaningless as it would not change the law as it had existed in Mississippi under former decisions of this court for many years.

Prentiss Mercantile Co. v. Thurman, 161 So. 746, 173 Miss. 6; Coffeeville Bank v. Stone, 121 So. 816; Tabb v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 133 So. 137; Union Indemnity Co. v. Shirley, 150 So. 825.

In view of the reasoning of the statute under review, and the holdings of this court in the cases referred to in this brief, we respectfully submit that, in our humble opinion, if appellee's chattel mortgage is a prior lien to that of appellant, then section 2130 of the Code of 1930, has no significance or meaning, and does not in any way change the long established rule in Mississippi as to subsequent creditors. We, therefore, respectfully submit that the judgment of our learned and able circuit judge was erroneous, and this cause should be reversed and judgment entered for appellant.

R. B. Walker, of Carthage, for appellee.

J. D. Guyton, of Kosciusko, for appellee, on suggestion of error.

The question arises in this case, what effect has section 147 of the Constitution on the consideration of this case in the Supreme Court? This section prohibits the Supreme Court from reversing a case solely because it was a case in equity tried in a court of law, or, vice versa, a case in law tried in a court of equity.

Rankin v. Ford, 134 So. 178; Moore v. Moore, 141 Miss. 795, 105 So. 850.

In the case at bar, we respectfully submit, the plaintiff Land as trustee for Rimmer Bros. went into a court of law with a case in equity. It is true that their procedure was according to a court of law; but, under Rankin v. Ford, supra, this was proper, It was, as shown in the agreed statement of facts, nevertheless a case of equity. It was tried and decided in a court of law without objection on the part of either party or the court. It may be, as this court said in Rankin v. Ford, supra, this case should have been transferred by the circuit court to the chancery court of its own motion; but the fact remains that it was not transferred.

Therefore, under section 147 of the Constitution, if the circuit court proceeded to hear and try and decide this case of equity filed in this court of law, and does decide the case correctly on principles of equity, this court cannot reverse its decision.

Goyer Cold Storage Co. v. Wildberger, 71 Miss. 438, 15 So. 235.

We have no quarrel to make on the opinion of the court as one announcing correct principals of both law and equity. We do say, however, that the court has made a mistake in considering this case as a case of law and not a case of equity. It always was a case of equity. It was tried in the circuit court as a case of equity. It is correctly decided by the circuit court as one of equity. And this being true, this case should be affirmed.

OPINION

Griffith, J.

On February 17, 1930, O. J. Truss and wife executed a chattel mortgage to appellee as trustee for a mercantile firm to secure an indebtedness therein named and which indebtedness was due November 1, 1930. This deed of trust was filed for record February 19, 1930, and was actually recorded the following day. In addition to other property, the said deed of trust included all crops to be grown by Truss, on the lands owned by him, during the years, 1930, 1931, and 1932.

On March 1, 1932, Truss and wife executed a deed of trust to appellant to secure a note due October 1, 1932, and this deed of trust included also all crops to be produced by Truss, on the lands owned by him, during 1932. The crop for the year 1932 was delivered to appellant, and appellee instituted an action of replevin to recover the property so delivered. The cause proceeded to final judgment before the justice of the peace, who decided the case in favor of the possession under the second deed of trust. An appeal was taken, and in the circuit court the case was submitted to the judge without a jury, and the judgment there was in favor of the holder of the first deed of trust.

The entire proceedings being at law, the question has been directly and sharply presented whether a deed of trust given in 1930 on a crop to be produced in 1932 has any validity at common law; and this precise question we shall answer in the negative; but in what we shall say here we must be understood as confining our decision strictly to annual crops, those which must be annually planted, and not to those which annually recur in the ordinary course of nature without annual planting, as, for instance, the fruit of orchards and the like. And, moreover, we must be understood as dealing with crops and with no other class of property.

The authorities all agree that under the strict and ancient common law an unplanted crop was not the subject of a valid deed of trust or mortgage, even as between the parties thereto. This rule was well understood in this state; so that to meet the necessities of our people in regard to this question there was enacted a statute, section 7, chap. 465, Laws 1867, providing: "That it shall be lawful to convey by way of mortgage or deed of trust any crop of cotton, corn or agricultural product, being produced or to be produced, within fifteen months from the date of such mortgage." This provision was brought forward in subsequent Codes, until it was expressly by chapter 77, Laws 1886, since which time no such statute has existed in this state.

Most of the decisions of our courts dealing with mortgages and deeds of trust on annual crops were made during the years when the quoted statute was in existence; but when we take those decisions, and those before the enactment of the statute and those since its repeal, we find that, when the precise facts in each case and the points necessary to decision are considered, all the cases in reference to annual crops may be grouped into three classes: (1) Those where the deed of trust or mortgage was given during the year and upon crops to be produced during that year, or when the deed of trust or mortgage was executed within a time so close to the beginning of the year that it could be held...