Coffin v. Bowater Inc.
| Decision Date | 02 September 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV. 03-227-B-C.,CIV. 03-227-B-C. |
| Citation | 385 F.Supp.2d 38 |
| Parties | Artemis COFFIN, George Baker, Darrell Flanders, James Mingo, Terrence Lyon, Harold Smith, Robert Dewitt, Duane L. Hanscom, Joseph Gagliardi Jr., Trina Vaznis, Raymond Macdonald, Robert P. Healey, Barry Bryant, Lee Wheaton and Galen M. Lander, Individually and as Representatives of a class of all persons similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. BOWATER INCORPORATED, Group Protection for Employees of Bowater Incorporated — Great Northern Paper, Inc. Division, Bowater Incorporated Point of Service Medical Benefits Plan, Bowater Incorporated Benefit Plan and Bowater Life Insurance Plan, Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maine |
Abigail Carter, Leon Dayan, Douglas L. Greenfield, Bredhoff & Kaiser, P.L.L.C., Washington, DC, Jonathan S.R. Beal, Law Office of Jonathan, S.R. Beal, Portland, ME, Rufus E. Brown, Brown & Burke, Portland, ME, Diane A. Khiel, Law Office of Diane A. Khiel, Orono, ME, for Artemis Coffin, Darrell Flanders, James Mingo, Terrence Lyon, Harold Smith, Robert Dewitt, Duane L Hanscom, Joseph Gagliardi, Jr., Trina Vaznis, Raymond Macdonald, Robert P Healey, Barry Bryant, Lee Wheaton, George Baker, Galen M Lander, Plaintiffs.
Reginald R. Goeke, Richard J. Favertto, Robert P. Davis, Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw, Washington, DC, Eric J. Uhl, Richard G. Moon, Moon, Moss, & Shapiro, P.A., Portland, ME, for Bowater Incorporated, Bowater Life Insurance Plan, Group Protection for Employees of Bowater Incorporated Great Northern Paper Inc Division, Bowater Incorporated Point of Service Medical Benefits Plan, Bowater Incorporated Point of Service Medical Plan, Bowater Incorporated Benefit Plan, Defendants.
This action was commenced by fifteen retirees from Great Northern Paper, owned at one time by Defendant Bowater, Inc., in which the retirees seek redress for their loss of health and welfare benefits. Plaintiffs' claims are brought on behalf of themselves, their beneficiaries, and a class of persons similarly situated, under sections 502(a)(1)(B), 502(a)(2), and 502(a)(3) of the Employee Retirement Income and Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1001, et seq. (Count I), and section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 141, et seq. (Counts II and III).1
On June 21, 2005, the Court certified Counts I, II, and III for class action treatment. See Memorandum of Decision and Order Granting in Part Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification (Docket Item No. 115). The Court modified the class definition language on July 15, 2005, to reflect a stipulation between the parties concerning exhaustion of administrative remedies. See Order Amending Class Definition (Docket Item No. 135). The class is now defined as follows:
General Class. All persons who:
(1) were receiving company-paid health coverage from Great Northern Paper, Inc. ("GNP") prior to its 2003 bankruptcy, because (i) they had retired on pension when GNP was under the ownership of Bowater between January 1, 1992, and August 17, 1999, or in a short window period after the sale of GNP, extending to October 1, 1999; (ii) they were eligible spouses or dependents of such retirees; or (iii) their former spouse had died as an employee at GNP when it was under Bowater ownership — and any individuals who became eligible spouses or dependents of such retirees after the bankruptcy, and
(2) submitted a claim for benefits to Bowater on or before June 21, 2005, unless that person received at least one denial letter from Bowater prior to December 23, 2004, and did not file at least one appeal with Bowater within 180 days of receiving such a pre-December 23, 2004, denial letter.
Subclass A: Those individuals who meet the criteria of paragraph (1) of the general class by reason of a retirement or a death of a union-represented employee that occurred before August 17, 1999.
Subclass B: Those individuals who meet the criteria of paragraph (1) of the general class by reason of a retirement or a death of a union-represented employee that occurred after August 17, 1999.
Now before the Court are Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket Item No. 119) and Plaintiffs' Amended Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Docket Item No. 129). Defendants move for summary judgment on all counts and Plaintiffs move for summary judgment on Count I only. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant in part and deny in part both Motions.
Summary judgment is appropriate only if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)." `In this regard, "material" means that a contested fact has the potential to change the outcome of the suit under the governing law if the dispute over it is resolved favorably to the nonmovant. By like token, `genuine' means that the evidence about the fact is such that a reasonable jury could resolve the point in favor of the nonmoving party.'" Navarro v. Pfizer Corp., 261 F.3d 90, 93-94 (1st Cir.2001) (quoting McCarthy v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 56 F.3d 313, 315 (1st Cir.1995)). "A trialworthy issue exists if the evidence is such that there is a factual controversy pertaining to an issue that may affect the outcome of the litigation under the governing law, and the evidence is `sufficiently open-ended to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the issue in favor of either side.'" De-Jesus-Adorno v. Browning Ferris Indus., 160 F.3d 839, 841-42 (1st Cir.1998) (quoting Nat'l Amusements, Inc. v. Town of Dedham, 43 F.3d 731, 735 (1st Cir.1995)).
Summary judgment is appropriate "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once the moving party has presented evidence of the absence of a genuine issue, the nonmoving party must respond by "placing at least one material fact into dispute." FDIC v. Anchor Props., 13 F.3d 27, 30 (1st Cir.1994).
When facing cross-motions for summary judgment under either Rule 56(c) or (d), "the district court must resolve all genuine factual disputes in favor of the party opposing each such motion and draw all reasonable inferences derived from the facts in that party's favor." Atlantic Fish Spotters Ass'n v. Evans, 321 F.3d 220, 223 (1st Cir.2003). "The court must mull each motion separately, drawing inferences against each movant in turn." Cochran v. Quest Software, Inc., 328 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir.2003); see also Wightman v. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co., 100 F.3d 228, 230 (1st Cir.1996) ( ) (citations omitted). However, there is "no room for the measured weighing of conflicting evidence such as the trial process entails, [and] no room for the judge to superimpose his own ideas of probability and likelihood." Greenburg v. P.R. Mar. Shipping Auth., 835 F.2d 932, 936 (1st Cir.1987). Bearing in mind the governing authorities on cross motions for summary judgment, the Court now turns to the facts of this case.
The original Great Northern Paper Company was incorporated in Maine in 1898 and in 1970 merged with Nekoosa Edwards Paper Company to form Great Northern Nekoosa Corporation (hereinafter "GNN"). Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (Docket Item No. 145) ¶ 5. In 1990, Georgia-Pacific Corporation acquired all of the assets of GNN. Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (Docket Item No. 120) ¶ 6. In the fall of 1991, GNN transferred all of its Maine assets — including approximately 2,100,000 acres of timberlands, paper mills in Millinocket and East Millinocket, Maine, a hydroelectric facility, and a sawmill known as "Pinkham Lumber Co." — to a newly formed entity also known as Great Northern Paper Company (hereinafter "GNP"). Id. ¶ 7. At that time, GNP was incorporated in the state of Delaware and was wholly owned by GNN. Id.
In late 1991, Bowater, Inc. purchased eighty percent of GNP's stock from Georgia-Pacific, Id. ¶ 10, and Bowater subsequently purchased the remaining twenty percent of GNP's stock. Id. Bowater owned GNP from the end of 1991 through August 1999. During this period of ownership, Bowater maintained employee welfare benefit plans for its employees — including those employees working for GNP. The Court briefly describes the major plans at issue.2
The Bowater Incorporated Point of Service Medical Benefits Plan (hereinafter "Bowater POS-A Plan") (Attached as Exhibit 4 to Plaintiffs' Statement of Material Facts (Docket Item No. 126) and Exhibit 103 to Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Material Facts) was a welfare benefit plan that provided health benefits to eligible participants. Plaintiffs' Statement of Material Facts ¶ 3. Effective January 1, 1996, the Bowater POS-A welfare benefit plan was described by a Summary Plan Description (hereinafter "SPD"). Id. ¶ 4. Participants in the Bowater POS-A Plan included...
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