Coffin v. Old Orchard Development Corp.
| Decision Date | 25 September 1962 |
| Citation | 186 A.2d 906,408 Pa. 487 |
| Parties | George F. COFFIN, Jr. and Claire E. Coffin, James Fritzo, Edwin Y. Thompson and June R. Thompson; Reuben E. V. Miller Jr. and Judith Dunn Miller; Lynwood J. Pearson and Helen R. Pearson; Jack H. LaBarre and Catherine M. LaBarre; Frank W. Mitman and Ruth M. Mitman, Frank A. Liebermann, Jr. and Dorothy D. Liebermann, Albert Bruschini and Irma H. Bruschini v. OLD ORCHARD DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION; Lester O. Kummer and Ruth N. Kummer; Eugene Tarlowski and Anna Mae Tarlowski, a partnership, Appellants. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Milton B. Riskin, Bethlehem, Louis J. Goffman, Burton Caine, Philadelphia, for appellants, Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, Philadelphia, McFadden, Riskin, McCarthy & Williams, Bethlehem, of counsel.
Raymond J. DeRaymond, Coffin, Grifo & DeRaymond, Easton, for appellees.
Before BELL, C. J., and MUSMANNO, JONES, COHEN, EAGEN and O'BRIEN, JJ.
The appellees-plaintiffs are property owners in the Old Orchard Development Corporation plan in Palmer Township, Northampton County. In early 1954, defendant began the sale of the lots in the plan, which was recorded about early May, 1954 by the defendant, Old Orchard Development Corporation, in the office for the recording of deeds in Northampton County, the recorded plan showing the lots by number and the owners at the time of recording. After placing the plan on record, the Old Orchard Development Corporation landscaped, graded and planted with ornamental shrubbery and trees, lots Nos. 44 45, 46 and 47, the subject of controversy herein. These four lots form a block or square of approximately one acre, bounded on the north by Heugel Street, on the east by Old Orchard Drive, on the south by Schaffer Street, and on the west by Kendon Drive. This area is referred to as the 'Park'. The majority of the plaintiffs herein are those who purchased property surrounding the so called park area or lots referred to. The four lots were not offered for sale. The surrounding lots were offered and purchased by the various owners. When the surrounding property had been sold, the defendant development corporation disposed of the four lots in question for building purposes and, in fact, the property was being prepared for the erection of houses by the other defendants, when suit was instituted in April, 1960 to restrain the defendants, Mr. and Mrs. Kummer and Mr. and Mrs. Tarlowski from proceeding with the erection of buildings on the lots and to declare the deeds from the defendant, Old Orchard Development Corporation, to the other defendants void, since the land was dedicated as a park and recreational area by a dedication to the plaintiffs and general public by Old Orchard Development Corporation.
The court in its decree nisi ordered the removal of all structures on the four lots and a return of the lots to the same condition as they were in May, 1958, including grading, seeding and shrubbing. The Chancellor made findings of fact and conclusions of law, in which he held that the evidence was not sufficiently clear and convincing to establish an offer of dedication by the defendant, Old Orchard Development Corporation, and that there was therefore no dedication of the lots for park or playground purposes. The Chancellor held, however, that the defendant orally represented to prospective purchasers that the adjoining real estate would always be a park or playground and that purchasers bought their lots in reliance upon these representations, whereby the seller is estopped from using the property for any other purpose than a park or for recreation purposes. The Chancellor concluded, as a matter of law, that the buyers of the adjoining land have a negative easement in the four lots, for park or recreation purposes.
Plaintiffs and defendants filed exceptions to the adjudication whereupon the court en banc entered a final decree determining the lots to have been dedicated to the public for use as a park or playground; this appeal followed.
The question presented for our determination is, has there been a dedication of the land for park or recreational purposes?
On appeal, a Chancellor's findings of fact, approved by a court en banc, have all the force and effect of a jury verdict, if they are supported by adequate evidence, and ordinarily will not be disturbed on appeal. In Sendick v. Matvey, 391 Pa. 286, at page 290, 138 A.2d 92 at page 94 (1957), Mr. Justice Jones, speaking for the Court said:
'Our scope of review in an appeal of this type was recently discussed by this Court in Commonwealth Trust Company [Admr.] v. Szabo, Pa. , 138 A.2d 85, wherein we said: 'In passing upon the questions raised on this appeal we must adhere to the well-established rule that a chancellor's findings of fact, approved by a court en banc, have all the force and effect of a jury's verdict if they are supported by adequate evidence and ordinarily will not be disturbed on appeal: Gagnon v. Speback, 389 Pa. 17, 20, 131 A.2d 619; Mann v. Mann. 387 Pa. 230, 233, 127 A.2d 666; Eways v. Reading Parking Authority, 385 Pa. 592, 601, 124 A.2d 92; Brightbill v. Boeshore, 385 Pa. 69, 79, 122 A.2d 38. However, the chancellor's 'conclusions whether of law or ultimate fact are no more than his reasoning from the underlying facts and are reviewable,' especially 'where the underlying facts themselves are not in esse but are matter of inference and deduction': Kelly v. Philadelphia, 382 Pa. 459, 465, 115 A.2d 238, 241; Eways v. Reading Parking Authority, supra, 385 Pa. at page 601, 124 A.2d at page 96; Peters v. Machikas, 378 Pa. 52, 56, 105 A.2d 708. Furthermore, a chancellor's findings of fact, even though approved by a court en banc, need not be accepted as conclusive if there is no evidence to support them or if they are based on an inference erroneously taken (Essick [et al.] v. Shillam [et al.], 347 Pa. 373, 32 A.2d 416, 146 A.L.R. 1399; Potter [et al.] v. Brown [et al.], 328 Pa. 554, 563, 195 A. 901, 118 A.L.R. 1415), or where the evidence, in order to prevail, must be clear, precise and indubitable or must meet some other prescribed standard (Stafford v. Reed, 363 Pa. 405, 407, 70 A.2d 345).''
Dedication of land results when a landowner offers property for public use and it is accepted by or in behalf of the public and the dedication largely depends on the intention of the owner of the land. There must be an offer and an acceptance, 11 P.L.E.Dedication, §§ 1 and 2.
Judge Ervin, speaking for the Superior Court, in Vendetti Appeal, 181 Pa.Super. 214, at page 220, 124 A.2d 448, at page 451 (1960) said:
A dedication is the devotion of land to a public use by an unequivocal act of the owner of the fee, manifesting the intention that it shall be accepted and used presently or in the future for such public purpose. 26 C.J.S. Dedication § 1, page 398. This court said in Peterson v. Marianna Borough, 310 Pa. 524, at page 528, 165 A. 838 at page 839 (1933):
...
To continue reading
Request your trial