Coffin v. State

• Decision Date: 12 October 1994
• Docket Number: No. 832-93,832-93
• Citation: 885 S.W.2d 140
• Parties: Christopher COFFIN, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Page 140

885 S.W.2d 140

Christopher COFFIN, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 832-93.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas En Banc.

Oct. 12, 1994.

Luis C. Labrado (Court-appointed), Dick Stengel, David C. Guaderrama, Bruce W. Weathers, El Paso, for appellant.

Steve W. Simmons, Former Dist. Atty., Debra Morgan, Asst. Dist. Atty., El Paso, Robert Huttash, State's Atty., Austin, for the State.

Before the court en banc.

OPINION ON APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

CLINTON, Judge.

Appellant, a minor at the time of the offense, was certified to stand trial as an adult, and convicted of murder. The jury assessed his punishment at forty years confinement in the penitentiary. At the punishment phase of trial the State sought to introduce a transcript of testimony adduced at the juvenile certification hearing from a psychologist, Dr. Richard Walker, who had died in the interim. To appellant's hearsay objection, the State interposed Tex.R.Cr.Evid., Rule 804(b)(1), arguing that Walker's prior testimony was admissible because he was no longer available. ¹ The trial court ruled that appellant had been afforded an opportunity, and had had a similar motive to cross-examine Walker at the certification hearing, and allowed the prior testimony.

On original submission on direct appeal the court of appeals held that use of Walker's prior testimony at the punishment phase did not violate appellant's Sixth Amendment confrontation rights because it met the requisites

of Rule 804(b)(1). Coffin v. State, (Tex.App.--El Paso, No. 08-87-00294-CR, delivered May 23, 1990). In so holding, however, the court of appeals did not explicitly address whether appellant had had a "similar motive" to cross-examine Walker at the certification hearing. This Court therefore granted appellant's first petition for discretionary review, and summarily remanded the cause to the court of appeals to consider that question. Coffin v. State, (Tex.Cr.App., No. 1011-90, delivered June 24, 1992). Unhappy to have the cause before it again, the court of appeals nevertheless expressly decided the issue of similar motive, concluding--this time in a published opinion--that appellant "would have the same interest in challenging" Walker's testimony at the punishment phase as he had had at the certification hearing. Coffin v. State, 850 S.W.2d 608, at 610 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1993). Again it affirmed appellant's conviction. We granted appellant's second petition for discretionary review to examine the issue of similar motive in some detail. Tex.R.App.Pro., Rule 200(c)(2).

I.

A.

Appellant's certification hearing occurred on September 29, 1986. At that time the juvenile court was authorized to waive its exclusive original jurisdiction and transfer appellant to the district court for criminal proceedings if, inter alia, "the juvenile court determines that because of the seriousness of the offense or the background of the child the welfare of the community requires criminal proceedings." V.T.C.A. Family Code, § 54.02(a)(3). Among the non-exclusive statutory considerations that may inform the juvenile court's decision are "the prospects of adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of rehabilitation of the child by use of procedures, services, and facilities currently available to the juvenile court." V.T.C.A. Family Code, § 54.02(f)(6).

At the certification hearing the State first presented its evidence that appellant murdered one Jaime Alvarez by striking him in the forehead with a crowbar while Alvarez was incapacitated by alcohol. Appellant committed this wantonly random killing in concert with other youths. Then the State called Dr. Walker to the witness stand. His testimony was relatively brief. Walker had interviewed appellant three weeks before the hearing, on September 9, 1986. From a complete battery of psychological tests Walker concluded that appellant showed no evidence of psychotic thinking. Walker testified appellant could distinguish right from wrong, was capable of comprehending the proceedings against him, and was age-appropriate in his functioning. Finally the State asked Walker the following:

"Q. Now, if in fact this boy was found guilty of the offense of murder, what is your opinion as to what length of time would be needed to rehabilitate this boy for that crime?

A. It would be lengthy, and maybe at this point in time perhaps complicated by a number of factors, but it would be lengthy at this point, assuming what you said in evidence I would say change in this young man's life does not come easily for him.

Q. Could you be a little more specific with lengthy?

A. Lengthy? I wouldn't want to attempt to take this kind of psychological pattern and try to change it under a period of several years. I would be a couple of years of extensive therapy and some gradual decrease in follow-up."

On cross-examination, appellant touched only briefly upon the subject of rehabilitation:

"Q. You're not really able to say anything about rehabilitation, isn't that correct?

A. In terms of rehabilitation, you're placing me in a double bind in the sense that I don't have, you know, what are going to rehabilitate? That is the question, and I don't know. I can tell from the pattern here that this is not an easy young man to change. He tends to be rigid, he tends to--unfortunately, he'll listen mostly to his own voice.

Q. Is this taken from the testing?

A. Yes, you can see it on the tests."

This is the testimony later offered by the State at the punishment phase of trial, Dr. Walker having died in the interim.

Next the State presented the testimony of Dr. David Briones, a psychiatrist, who had examined appellant some four or five days before Walker did, and testified in far greater detail. Briones confirmed that appellant was not psychotic, but that "perhaps with severe stress [he] can become psychotic." He diagnosed appellant as suffering from:

"... dysthymic disorder with a lot of depressive symptomatology which I feel is due to long-standing stress with a severe family, parental and intrapersonal turmoil, and this gone on for at least three or four years. He fits the criteria for conduct disorder, socialized and aggressive. This is superimposed, as I mentioned, on a developing character structure with isolated schizoid features and perhaps impulsive features. He has a substance abuse problem, marijuana and alcohol; I think he drinks alcohol sporadically to the point of excess drinking. There is a possible attention deficit disorder evidenced by ... neuropsychological testing...."

Asked whether, should it prove appellant did commit the murder in this cause, "the likelihood of rehabilitation of" appellant, Dr. Briones replied:

"A. Well, in my opinion, that's given the data that we have and the longstanding nature of the problems, I think we are dealing with several years. I would say at least four years in a strictly supervised and long-term highly structured settings [sic]. I think there is a possibility that--two things have to be present: one, the availability of this kind of case, residential care, and number two, he has to make an attitudinal change. His idea is that it's really not his personal problems so much as circumstances, and that's not including prognosis. He has not accepted internally a lot of responsibility for his behavior, his psychological behavior, his psychological problems, the nature of his problems. It's going to take a long time for him to look at that and deal with it."

On cross-examination, Briones testified, inter alia:

"Q. When you said that he needed a highly structured setting what did you mean?

A. To me the ideal would be a residential treatment center that deals with adolescents, mid-adolescents or late adolescents, and this is a daily contact with therapists, a daily contact with counselors who restructure his role model, daily contact with school and other organizations that gives him a very good sense of tranquility and organization in his life. And if he receives this for many years it may have an impact. As I said, he has to turn that corner somewhere along the line and become aware of the problems he has.

Q. Are there residential treatment centers in Texas?

A. Yes, there are. I think most of them are private, although there are some that are public funded, but not too many.

Q. Would you be recommending a place where he's under lock and key and--

A. Well, he--

Q. --not allowed to go out in the community?

A. Well, if you're saying from the legal aspect he has to have that available for society's sake, I guess, because of the nature of the crime, but from a psychiatric viewpoint, at the beginning he might need to be in a close environment because of his reluctance to admit to treatment, but later on he probably wouldn't.

* * * * * *

Q. It [appellant] were placed in a situation where he is not getting any sort of therapy, what would be the prognosis?

A. Well, it would be pretty negative for any restructuring of the problems--restructuring of the personality problems that he has. I certainly don't think it would help his dysthymic disorder; I don't think he would get any better if he doesn't get any treatment. I think he should get it even if he is incarcerated somewhere along the line.

* * * * * *

Q. When you talk about residential treatment center, how long a period of time are we talking about, more or less?

A. Well, I would say at least four years in a residential treatment center and then Q. So you are saying that he should not be in society or in the community for several years?

perhaps--well, it's hard to say how many years for all of this, but several years in that type of center and then a follow-up in a perhaps less intensive, like a boys' ranch or something like that might be indicated. I don't think he should be capable of going back to the open environment before several years.

A. Not given what I know, the circumstances.

* * * * * *

Q. In a residential treatment center, he...