Coffman v. Huck
| Citation | 19 Mo. 435 |
| Parties | COFFMAN & HORINE, Respondent, v. HUCK, Appellant. |
| Decision Date | 31 March 1854 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Missouri |
1. Where a court, by its decree, rescinds a sale and conveyance of land, at the instance of the vendee, a mortgage given for the purchase money is rescinded, as a necessary consequence; and it is error in the decree to award a special execution against the mortgaged property, to satisfy damages allowed to the vendor for the vendee's use of the land.
2. Where there is no bad faith, a vendor cannot be made liable for improvements put by the vendee on land, the title to which fails. The measure of damages is the purchase money and interest.
3. A party who enters upon land as a vendee, cannot, upon a subsequent rescision of the contract of sale, be made liable for the rent of the land as a tenant. He is only liable to the extent of the benefit actually derived by him from the use of the land, in ascertaining which, he may be allowed for all outlays in improvements, including those put upon a portion of the land represented, by mistake, to have been embraced in the conveyance to him, but which, in reality, was not.
Petition to foreclose a mortgage given to secure the purchase money of land sold and conveyed by Coffman & Horine to Huck. The mortgage covered not only the land, the purchase money of which it was given to secure, but also another tract owned by Huck, known as the “Grand Marais tract.”
The defense set up was, that when Huck purchased the land, the plaintiffs fraudulently represented that it all lay in a body, and that it included certain improved land, whereas it consisted of four separate tracts, only two of which were contiguous, and did not include the improved land, which was necessary to the enjoyment of a mill, situated upon one of the tracts; that before defendant discovered that the improved land was not covered by his conveyance, he built upon it a new dwelling house at a cost of $1000, and made other improvements upon it, and also expended $800 in repairing the mill; that after the discovery, he offered in writing to rescind the sale upon just terms, which the plaintiffs declined to do; that since their refusal, he had expended $900 in repairs upon the mill necessary to preserve the same from destruction. He prayed for a decree rescinding the conveyance, and compelling the plaintiffs to enter satisfaction of the mortgage and deliver up the bonds; for a special judgment against the property conveyed to him by plaintiffs, for his expenditures in improvements, and for a perpetual injunction.
The cause was heard by the court, but the record contains no finding of the facts, other than a statement in the decree that the court found that, at the time of the sale from plaintiffs to defendant, a mistake was made in regard to the location of one of the tracts conveyed, which materially affected the enjoyment of the property, and greatly impaired its value.
It appeared in evidence that the land which was erroneously supposed to have been included in the conveyance to the defendant had been improved by the owners prior to plaintiffs, and had been treated by all of the owners as a part of the land described in the deed, and that the plaintiffs so represented to the defendant, when he purchased; but when the lines were afterwards run by a surveyor, it turned out that it was public land at the time of defendant's purchase, and has since been entered by a coal company. The conveyance to defendant was made in March, 1843. In 1849, after the discovery of the mistake, the defendant notified the plaintiffs of his readiness to rescind the contract, but they could not agree on the terms. A witness testified that the property conveyed to defendant, included the mill, was worth an annual rent of $500. There was evidence to sustain the answer as to the value of defendant's improvements. This suit was commenced in October, 1851, and a decree rendered in May, 1853.
The court decreed a rescision of the conveyance, but awarded to the plaintiffs, as damages for the defendant's use and occupation, “after deducting the cost of necessary repairs,” the sum of $2,966, and decreed that the “Grand Marais” tract should be held as security for the payment of this sum, and should be sold under a special execution, as in case of the foreclosure of a mortgage, unless the same was paid on or before a specified day.
From a motion for a review filed by the defendant, it appears that the court found that there was no fraud in the sale from Coffman & H. to Huck; that the rent of the mill and land, during the occupation of the defendant, were of the value of $3,666, and the value of the repairs made by defendant was $700. It appeared also, that the court refused to allow the defendant for his improvements on the land erroneously supposed to be included in his purchase. The defendant appealed.
Noell and Young, for appellant.
The court below erred in making the defendant liable as a tenant for the annual value of the land, during his possession under the purchase. Sugden on Vendors, 249, and authorities there cited. He was at most only liable for what he actually received, and not for what the property is reasonably worth. Richardson v. McKinson, Litt's Select Cases, 321--22; Smith v. Babcock, 2 Wood. & Minot, 297; Edwards v. McLeary, 1 Cooper, 208, 218. And he should be allowed for his improvements and all damages he sustained by the failure of the contract. No fraud in fact was necessary to the liability of the plaintiffs to this extent. The falsity of their representations was a fraud in law. Litt. Selec Cases, 323; 3 J. J. Marsh. 257; Craig v. Martin, 3 J. J. Marsh. 55 Griffith v. Depew, 3 A. K. Marsh. 181-2; 3 Cranch, 281-2; 8 Mees. & Wels. Ex. Rep. 118. The judgment should be reversed for want of a sufficient finding of the facts.
Hill, Grover & Hill, for respondent.
When the title of real estate fails, after an executed contract of sale, the measure of damages, in an action on the covenants of seizin and for quiet enjoyment, is the consideration money paid, with interest, for so long a time as the vendee may be...
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