Coffman v. Spokane Chronicle Pub. Co.
Decision Date | 06 September 1911 |
Citation | 65 Wash. 1,117 P. 596 |
Parties | COFFMAN et al. v. SPOKANE CHRONICLE PUB. CO. et al. |
Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Department 2. Appeal from Superior Court, Spokane County; D. H. Carey Judge.
Action by Elizabeth L. Coffman and another against the Spokane Chronicle Publishing Company, in which Thomas Hooker and another intervened as defendants. From a judgment for plaintiffs, the corporation and interveners appeal. Affirmed.
H. M. Stephens, for appellants.
Graves Kizer & Graves, Reese H. Voorhees, F. M. Dudley, and W. E Cullen, for respondents.
Action by Elizabeth L. Coffman and Thomas J. Coffman, her husband, against the Spokane Chronicle Publishing Company, a corporation, to recover damages arising from a libelous article published by the defendant. The defendant, being the owner of the Spokane Chronicle, a daily newspaper, published certain articles on September 18, 1908, January 9, February 27, and May 8, 1909, as follows:
After pleading the above articles, the complaint in substance alleges that notwithstanding the knowledge the defendant company had with reference to the breach of promise suit it on May 28, 1909, printed in a conspicuous place on the first page of its newspaper, with heavy leaded display lines, a further article reading as follows: 'Coffman Marries Woman Who Sued Him.
It is further alleged the publication last mentioned was wanton, malicious, libelous, and defamatory. By its amended answer the defendant, after making denials and admitting the publication, affirmatively alleged that, by mistake and inadvertence, plaintiff's name was inserted instead of the name of the plaintiff in the breach of promise suit, that the publication was made without intent to wrong the plaintiffs or either of them, and that the defendant in its next issue of May 29, 1909, published on the third page of its paper a correction article, reading as follows:
'He Didn't Marry Woman Who Sued.
During the progress of the action and before trial, Thomas Hooker and Henry Rising filed a motion asking that they be substituted as parties defendant, or that, if the motion be denied, they be permitted to intervene. They also filed a complaint in intervention and answer. The motion was based upon a showing that they had succeeded to all property, rights, and franchises of the defendant; that the defendant was proceeding to disincorporate; that the property to which they had succeeded might become liable for the satisfaction of any judgment entered herein; that they would give security for any judgment obtained; and that they are the only persons other than plaintiffs now interested in the event of the action. In their complaint in intervention they made similar allegations, and by their answer they pleaded the identical defenses theretofore pleaded by the defendant corporation. Their motion was denied, and upon plaintiffs' motion their complaint in intervention was stricken. On a trial of the issues between the plaintiffs and the defendant corporation, a verdict for $5,000 was returned in plaintiffs' favor, upon which judgment was entered. The defendant corporation has appealed. The interveners Thomas Hooker and Henry Rising have also appealed.
The appellants Hooker and Rising contend the trial court erred in striking their complaint in intervention. The controlling question thus raised is whether they were entitled to intervene under sections 202, 203, Rem. & Bal. Code. An examination of the authorities pertaining to this right make it apparent that the doctrine of intervention now embodied in the Code of this state was originally enacted in the Code of Louisiana, from which it has since been substantially adopted by Washington, California, Iowa Minnesota, South Dakota, and other states. What interest in the matter in litigation will authorize an intervention was considered in Gasquet v. Johnson, 1 La. 425, 431. The court said: 'This we suppose must be a direct interest by which the intervening party is to obtain immediate gain, or suffer loss by the judgment, which may be rendered between the original parties; otherwise the strange anomaly would be introduced into our jurisprudence of suffering an accumulation of suits in all instances where doubts might be entertained, or enter into the imagination of subsequent plaintiffs, that a defendant against whom a...
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...v. Traber, 49 Md. 460, 33 Am. Rep. 277; Negley v. Farrow, 60 Md. 158, 45 Am. Rep. 715; Devaughn v. Heath, 37 Ala. 595; Coffman v. Pub. Co., 65 Wash. 1, 117 P. 596, Ann. Cas. 1913B, 636. (2) Even where the publication is admitted libelous and without mitigating circumstanc es, the jury is ve......
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Duncan v. Record Pub. Co.
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