Coggeshall v. State
| Decision Date | 13 November 1925 |
| Docket Number | 4936. |
| Citation | 131 S.E. 57,161 Ga. 259 |
| Parties | COGGESHALL v. STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Rehearing Denied Dec. 18, 1925.
Syllabus by the Court.
The charges set out in divisions 2, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 13 of the opinion are not erroneous for any reasons assigned.
The law of involuntary manslaughter in the commission of an unlawful act not being applicable to the facts of the case, the court did not err in failing to instruct the jury on that subject.
Error is assigned in the fourth and fifth grounds of the motion for new trial because the court failed to charge the jury, in effect, that if they should find and believe from the evidence that one of the other defendants jointly indicted with this movant, was the actual perpetrator of the homicide of the deceased, W. C. Wright, and there was no conspiracy or plan or agreement between such actual perpetrator of said homicide and this movant to commit said crime, and this movant did not aid or abet in the commission of the crime but was merely present at the commission of the crime, he would not be guilty of the offense of murder. This principle of law was not adjusted to the facts of the case.
The court below did not err in failing to instruct the jury on the principles of law applicable to the offense of assault with intent to murder. Such a charge would not be adjusted to the facts of the case, as assault with intent to murder was not involved.
Under the evidence in this case the court did not err in failing to charge the law of assault and battery, as such a charge would not be applicable.
In the absence of a timely request it is not error for the court to fail to charge the law on the subject of impeachment of witnesses.
On the trial of one charged with murder, it was not error for the court to admit in evidence, over objection, a card which one of the state's witnesses testified he took from the person of the defendant, the card containing the names of certain cities, on the ground that it was merely a pencil entry, and that it did not appear in whose handwriting it was, who made it, when it was made, or under what circumstances, and that it was immaterial and irrelevant etc., where it appears from the evidence that the card contained the names of cities along the route traveled by the defendant from Florida to and beyond the place where the homicide occurred. The evidence was admissible as tending to show that the cities of Atlanta and others, through which the defendant claimed to have traveled at the time of the homicide were not included in his itinerary.
The evidence authorized the verdict, and the court did not err in refusing a new trial.
Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff.
Where three defendants were charged with murder, charge on law of principals in first and second degree, in language of Pen Code 1910, § 42, held not erroneous because there was no evidence justifying part charging that presence need not be immediately standing by, but there may be constructive presence where one keeps watch and another commits the crime.
In murder prosecution, it was not error to charge in general terms the law of principals in the first and second degree, under Pen. Code 1910, § 42, because court did not in such charge or elsewhere instruct that mere presence at commission of crime by one jointly indicted, and where actual perpetration thereof was committed by one other than defendant, would not of itself render such person, who was merely present, guilty either as principal in first or second degree.
In murder prosecution, charge in general terms on law of principals in the first and second degree, under Pen. Code 1910, § 42, held not erroneous on ground that, without further explanation and instruction, it was calculated to mislead jury into believing that one who was merely present at crime would be guilty as principal in second degree, even though there was no conspiracy and he did not participate in crime.
Charge on defendant's right to make statement held not prejudicial or calculated to mislead jury because court used words "statement is not required to be under oath," instead of identical words of Pen. Code 1910, § 1036, that defendant's statement "shall not be under oath."
Where court charged on effect of defendant's statement, under Pen. Code 1910, § 1036, that jury had right to accept or reject it, and had right to believe it in preference to sworn testimony, it was not erroneous because court failed to instruct that they might believe part of it and reject a part.
In murder prosecution, contention that court's reading of Pen. Code 1910, § 1018, as to defense of alibi, was not equivalent to instructing jury that the statute referred to was given to them as law applicable to the case, or charging that they were to apply that principle in the trial, held without merit.
In murder prosecution, where court charged that, under Pen. Code 1910, § 1017, jury could not convict defendant on testimony of accomplice alone unless it was corroborated by other evidence or circumstances, and corroboration must be sufficient to connect defendant with crime, criticism thereto that charge entirely omitted essential element that corroborating evidence must be sufficient, independently of testimony of accomplices, to prove corpus delicti, held without merit.
In murder prosecution, criticism of charge on credibility of all witnesses, that court by use of words that jury could take into consideration manner and demeanor of witnesses, their knowledge of facts or want thereof, their intelligence or want of it, their opportunities of knowing facts or want thereof, and their prejudice or bias or want thereof, their interest in result, instructed that it was mandatory to take such matters into consideration instead of instructing they might consider them, thereby invaded province of jury, held without merit.
In murder prosecution, where court in general charge instructed jury to consider evidence as to each of defendants separately, and jury returned separate verdicts, charge on jury's duty if they believed beyond reasonable doubt that defendants were guilty, to convict them, held not subject to criticism that it instructed jury they must convict both defendants or acquit both.
Error from Superior Court, Putnam County; James B. Park, Judge.
T. L. Coggeshall was convicted of murder, and he brings error. Affirmed.
See, also, 33 Ga.App. 613, 126 S.E. 568.
Allen & Pottle, of Milledgeville, and Branch & Howard, of Atlanta, for plaintiff in error.
Jos. B. Duke, Sol. Gen., and M. F. Adams, both of Eatonton, Clement & Campbell, of Monticello, Geo. M. Napier, Atty. Gen., and T. R. Gress, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
T. L Coggeshall was jointly indicted with F. W. McClellan and S. J. Scarborough on a charge of having murdered W. C. Wright, in Putnam county, on March 4, 1925. Coggeshall and McClellan were put upon trial, but Scarborough was not tried with them. The jury returned a verdict against Coggeshall and McClellan, finding both of them guilty of murder, without recommendation, and they were sentenced to be electrocuted. Each made a separate motion for new trial, on the usual general grounds, and 16 special grounds. The motion of Coggeshall was overruled by the court, and he excepted. The state's theory of the case was that Coggeshall, McClellan, and Scarborough left Tampa, Fla., a few days before the commission of the crime for which they stand charged, and went as far as Lake City, Fla., in a stolen automobile, which broke down at Lake City, and they abandoned the car and walked to Macon, Ga., and from there through Eatonton and Putnam county, where the homicide occurred. The evidence for the state tended to show that all three of those indicted passed through Eatonton in Putnam county, and on March 3, 1925, spent the night in a vacant house near Eatonton, and on the morning of the 4th of March, the day of the crime, started on their way along the highway leading from Eatonton towards Athens, Ga., and traveled a distance of some 7 or 8 miles north of Eatonton, at which place, on the suggestion of the defendant McClellan, the defendants Coggeshall and Scarborough turned back towards Eatonton and caught a ride in an automobile with one Hallman, riding with him towards Eatonton to a point within 2 miles of that place, where they left Hallman's car and started back up the road towards Athens; that they were then picked up by Prof. W. C. Wright, the deceased, who was traveling in the same direction in a Dodge touring car; that McClellan had waited by the said of the road at a point 7 or 8 miles north of Eatonton, and when Coggeshall and Scarborough, who were riding in the car with Wright, reached the point where McClellan was, Coggeshall struck Wright over the head with a piece of an automobile spring, which he had been carrying since the day before. This blow stunned Wright, and then the car was driven off from the main highway into the edge of some woods, and McClellan pulled Wright out of the car and dragged him into some bushes and there robbed and struck him a number of blows with the same piece of automobile spring, inflicting wounds on his head from which he died a few days later. After this occurrence the three defendants took Prof. Wright's car and proceeded in it to Athens, Ga., near which place the automobile was abandoned. Coggeshall and McClellan denied upon the trial that they were in any way connected with the murder, but asserted that they were not in Putnam county at the time of the commission of the crime, or at any time, claiming that when they reached Macon, Ga., they traveled along the highway leading from Macon through Forsyth and Barnesville to Atlanta, and thence to Athens by way of Stone Mountain, Grayson,...
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