Coggins v. City of Asheville, 14

Decision Date14 April 1971
Docket NumberNo. 14,14
Citation180 S.E.2d 149,278 N.C. 428
PartiesGeorge B. COGGINS on behalf of himself and other taxpayers of the City of Asheville v. CITY OF ASHEVILLE and Ranger Construction Company.
CourtNorth Carolina Supreme Court

Bennett, Kelly & Long by E. Glenn Kelly, Asheville, for plaintiff-appellant.

Williams, Morris & Golding, by James N. Golding, Corp. Counsel, for City of Asheville.

Van Winkle, Buck, Wall, Starnes & Hyde by Herbert L. Hyde, Asheville, for Ranger Construction Co.

HIGGINS, Justice.

In this action the plaintiff asked the court, (1) to restrain the defendants from performing their contract inter se; and (2) to restrain the City of Asheville from issuing bonds or using the bond proceeds to finance the contract. The evidentiary facts are not in dispute. However, only the ultimate facts found by the court and its conclusions of law based thereon are challenged.

In cases involving a temporary rather than a permanent restraining order, the court's findings of fact are not binding on the appellate court which may make its own findings. McIntosh North Carolina Practice and Procedure, Vol. 2 § 2219; Board of Provincial Elders v. Jones, 273 N.C. 174, 159 S.E.2d 545, citing Huskins v. Yancey Hospital, 238 N.C. 357, 78 S.E.2d 116. However, a different rule applies when the purpose of the action is a permanent restraining order. In the latter case, the trial court's findings of fact are binding on appeal, if supported by the evidence. Whaley v. Broadway Taxi Company, 252 N.C. 586, 114 S.E.2d 254; Smith v. Rockingham, 268 N.C. 697, 151 S.E.2d 568.

In cases in which the trial court passes on the facts, the court is required "to do three things in writing: (1) To find the facts on all issues of fact joined on the pleadings; (2) to declare the conclusions of law arising on the facts found; and (3) to enter judgment accordingly.' * * * Where facts are found by the court, if supported by competent evidence, such findings are as conclusive as the verdict of a jury.' goldsboro v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 246 N.C. 101, 97 S.E.2d 486. Rule 52(a) Findings: Chapter 1A--1, General Statutes of North Carolina, 1969 Replacement.

The plaintiff does not controvert the evidentiary facts. However, he does contend the contract and plans for the use of the bond proceeds constitute a material diversion from the purposes specified in the ordinances authorizing the bonds and violates G.S. § 160--395. Specifically he argues the ordinances provide for new construction; and remodeling and the use of the old municipal auditorium are beyond the scope of the ordinances. G.S. § 160--395 provides: 'The proceeds of the sale of bonds under this subchapter shall be used only for the purposes specified in the ordinance authorizing said bonds * * *.'

The plaintiff, before Judge Ervin in the Superior Court, and on the review here, has insisted the contract between the defendants should be declared unlawful and its performance permanently restrained on the ground it contemplates the expenditure of bond money for purposes other than those authorized by the bond ordinances.

The plaintiff cites cases from a number of states which follow what is called the Strict Construction Rule. The rule is stated in the case of Tukey v. City of Omaha, 54 Neb. 370, 74 N.W. 613 (1898): 'That, when the governing body of a municipality is authorized by a vote of the people, and only thereby, to incur a debt for a particular purpose, such purpose must be strictly complied with, and the terms of the authority granted be strictly and fully pursued * * *.' Cases following this Strict Construction Rule are cited from Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, Colorado, Oklahoma, Washington and West Virgnia. Oklahoma, Washington and West Virginia. follow a more liberal rule in construing statutory limitations upon the use of bond money for public improvements. Emphasis is placed on the final result sought to be accomplished. Bond ordinances are passed authorizing indebtedness for certain stated purposes. When an authorizing vote is required, the bond money is earmarked for the stated purposes. However, in planning large permanent improvements the governing authorities look ahead to the future fulfillment of the construction plans. The authorities will inspect and examine the work as it progresses and minor changes from time to time are expected if conditions change and unforeseen developments occur.

In this case the bond resolutions were passed at the election held in 1967. Thereafter, the City authorities undertook the task of acquiring suitable lands upon which to erect the structures and to negotiate a contract for the completion of the projects. They were successful in acquiring a tract of land on Haywood Street adjoining the lot on which the City's auditorium was located. After the issues were approved, but before the construction plans were completed, land acquired and a contract entered into, the City authorities discovered that due to a period of rapid inflation (estimated to be 1 1/2% Per month) the proceeds from the bond issues would fall far short of financing the project.

When the danger of losing the contemplated improvement became manifest, the Council sought the advice of architects, civic organizations and individual citizens as to what course could then be pursued and the purposes contemplated by Bond Issues Nos. 1 and 3 be accomplished. After extensive hearings the City Council concluded that by combining the two projects into one complex and by using the City's lot on Haywood Street and so much of the auditorium as fitted into the plans for the whole, the complex could be built in a manner to take care of and accomplish the objects contemplated in both Bond Resolutions 1 and 3. The polans for the complex contemplated the outlay of nearly $600,000 in rebuilding and reconstructing the old auditorium, using only a part of it which could be fitted into the project. By using the property the City already owned and the grant of $1,500,000 from...

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