Coggins v. State
| Citation | 101 So.2d 400 |
| Decision Date | 13 March 1958 |
| Docket Number | No. 57-322,57-322 |
| Parties | Walter Peter COGGINS, III, Appellant, v. STATE of Florda, Appellee. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Florida (US) |
Ellis S. Rubin, Miami, for appellant.
Richard W. Ervin, Atty. Gen., and John C. Reed, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
The appellant, a twenty-year-old service man stationed in Miami, Florida, was indicted for first degree murder, tried and convicted. Upon the jury's recommendation of mercy, the appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment. This appeal is from the judgment and sentence below.
The facts that led up to the crime are as follows: The appellant became friendly with the decedent and the decedent's wife several weeks prior to the homicide and had, at the time of the homicide, been staying in the decedent's home. On December 20, 1956, and during the early morning hours of December 21, 1956, the deceased and the appellant had been drinking intoxicants intermittently. About 2:00 a. m. on December 21, 1956, the appellant, after an unsuccessful attempt to have the deceased accompany him away from the home for further drinking, went to the kitchen, got a paring knife and returned to plunge the knife into the deceased's body.
Thereafter, the appellant removed a ring from the deceased's finger, lowered the blinds and windows in the deceased's house, tore the telephone wires from the wall, obtained the keys to deceased's automobile and took the automobile and proceeded to Flint, Michigan, where he was subsequently apprehended by the Michigan State Police. At the Michigan State Police barracks in Flint, the appellant was questioned by an assistant prosecuting attorney regarding the death of the decedent and at that time, the appellant admitted that he had effected the decedent's death by plunging a paring knife into the decedent's body because the decedent would not accompany him away from the home. He admitted the details of the crime, including the fact that he had taken a ring from decedent's finger and had taken the decedent's car and driven it to Flint, Michigan. The appellant gave as his reason for stabbing the decedent: 'I got mad and wanted to hurt him.'
Numerous assignments of error-seventeen in number-have been made by the appellant, but he has elected to argue only eight of such assignments. However, we have considered all of the assignments of error.
Among the many arguments advanced by the appellant for a reversal of the conviction in the lower court is the fact of his alleged intoxication to such a point that he was unable to form a premeditated design to effect the death of the decedent. Consequently, it becomes necessary to examine the record and particularly the testimony, to ascertain, if possible, whether the acts of the appellant were such as to warrant the jury in concluding, as it did, that he was in sufficient possession of his faculties to have intended the consequence of the crime which he committed. The record adequately supports the jury's conclusions. There was no plea, or at least the record does not disclose the same, of temporary insanity on the part of the appellant due to intoxication. The actions of the appellant, which are not disputed, at the time of the commission of the offense are such that we can not say with any degree of certainty that the jury was not authorized in concluding that there existed a premeditated design to effect the death of the decedent.
It is further urged by the appellant that the court erred in admitting into evidence a purported confession that was unsigned, unsworn and unapproved by the appellant. This confession was admitted after the testimony of the Michigan assistant prosecutor who interrogated the appellant shortly after his apprehension in Flint. It is not contended that the confession was involuntary or that it did not speak the truth. As a matter of fact, on the record as a whole the jury could well have concluded the guilt of the appellant without considering the confession. See Finley v. State, 153 Fla. 394, 14 So.2d 844; Melton v. State, 159 Fla. 106, 30 So.2d 916. The two state troopers who apprehended the appellant, as well as the assistant prosecutor who interrogated him, testified as to the substance and content of the confession and there is very little, if any, conflict between their testimony and that of the alleged confession. Consequently, we conclude that although it may have been that the lower court did not require the proper predicate for the introduction of the confession, it nevertheless appears to have...
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Songer v. Wainwright
...the defense of voluntary intoxication would only operate to mitigate the degree of the unlawful homicide. Coggins v. State, 101 So.2d 400, 402 (Fla.App. 1958) (intoxication may eliminate premeditation which is necessary element of first-degree murder); see Russell v. State, 373 So.2d 97, 98......
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Porter v. State
...2d DCA 1969); Simpson v. State, 211 So.2d 862 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968); Tennant v. State, 205 So.2d 324 (Fla. 1st DCA 1967); Coggins v. State, 101 So.2d 400 (Fla. 3d DCA 1958). If the admission of a confession attacked as being involuntary in violation of the defendant's self-incrimination privil......
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...227 (Fla.1968); Gregory v. State, 181 So.2d 547 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966); Morgan v. State, 177 So.2d 60 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965); Coggins v. State, 101 So.2d 400 (Fla. 3d DCA 1958). For the above stated reasons, the petition for a writ of certiorari is granted, the final order under review is quashed,......
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...227 (Fla.1968); Gregory v. State, 181 So.2d 547 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966); Morgan v. State, 177 So.2d 60 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965); Coggins v. State, 101 So.2d 400 (Fla. 3d DCA 1958). Id. at 1254-55. See also J.B., 705 So.2d 1376 (holding that admission into evidence of confession where the state had no......