Cohen v. Scola

• Decision Date: 17 May 1951
• Docket Number: No. A--818,A--818
• Citation: 13 N.J.Super. 472,80 A.2d 643
• Parties: COHEN v. SCOLA.
• Court: New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division

Page 472

13 N.J.Super. 472

80 A.2d 643

COHEN v. SCOLA.

No. A--818.

Superior Court of New Jersey

Appellate Division.

Argued March 12, 1951.

Decided May 17, 1951.

Irving Siegler, Newark, argued the cause for the appellant (Max Schomer, Newark, attorney).

Leon Sachs, Newark, argued the cause for the respondent.

Before Judges JACOBS, EASTWOOD and BIGELOW.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

JACOBS, S.J.A.D.

The defendant appeals from a judgment for brokerage commission obtained by the plaintiff in the Essex County District Court.

The defendant operates the Park View Restaurant, a luncheonette and restaurant business at 184 Elizabeth Avenue, Newark. His business includes customary stock and good will, fixtures and equipment, and a lease for the restaurant premises. The plaintiff describes himself as a business broker; he is not licensed as a real estate broker under Title 45, Chapter 15 of the Revised Statutes. In January, 1950 the defendant listed his luncheonette and restaurant business with the plaintiff for sale at the price of $6,500, the plaintiff to receive ten percent thereof as his brokerage commission. Thereafter the plaintiff interested Mr. Robert Klein in the purchase of the defendant's business and on March 28, 1950 he brought the prospective buyer and seller together.

The plaintiff testified that during the preliminary discussions on March 28, 1950 the defendant and Klein agreed upon a sale at the price of $6,500 and he reduced his commission to $500. Later that day they went to the office of Klein's attorney who suggested that the contract of sale include a provision as to the gross receipts of the seller's business and a further provision for a lease beyond the term of the lease held by the defendant. These suggestions were agreeable to the defendant and a written contract was prepared and executed. Paragraph 1 provides that the seller agrees to sell and the purchaser agrees to purchase the luncheonette and restaurant business including stock, fixtures, equipment, lease, good will, etc. Paragraph 5 provides that the seller represents his gross weekly receipts to average $525 and guarantees that the gross receipts from March 29, 1950 to April 5, 1950 will aggregate $525; it further provides that this shall be deemed a trial period during which the buyer will have opportunity to keep tally of the gross receipts and in the event they do not aggregate $525 the deposit under the contract will be returned to the buyer. Paragraph 8 provides that the seller agrees to procure and deliver to the purchaser a lease for the premises for an unexpired period not less than three years from April 15, 1950 and in the event of the seller's failure to do so the buyer will be entitled to return of his deposit. Paragraph 10 provides that the parties agree that the plaintiff is the only broker who brought about the sale and is entitled to commission of $500 to be paid by the defendant. The gross receipts did not aggregate $525 during the period from March 29, 1950 to April 5, 1950 and consequently the transaction fell through and the restaurant was not sold. Nevertheless, upon the defendant's refusal to pay the commission claimed by the plaintiff, he instituted his action and obtained the judgment from which the present appeal is taken.

Our courts have held that, in the absence of stipulation to the contrary, a broker earns his commission when he obtains a buyer on the seller's terms 'either as originally propounded or as settled by agreement between the seller and buyer.' Dickinson v. Walters, 100 N.J.L. 62, 65, 125 A. 235, 236 (Sup.Ct.1924); Houston v. Siebert, 129 N.J.L. 468, 472, 30 A.2d 35 (E. & A.1943). And where the agreement to sell is not consummated because of a default by the seller the right to commission is not defeated. See Louis Schlesinger, Inc., v. Burstein Realty Co., 123 N.J.L. 190, 192, 8 A.2d 327 (E. & A.1939). Thus, recovery by the broker was allowed where the seller failed to fulfill his covenant against encroachments (Klipper v. Schlossberg, 96 N.J.L. 397, 115 A. 345 (Sup.Ct.1921)), or his undertaking to obtain a mortgage loan for the buyer (Alpern v. Streiff, 136 A. 336, 5 N.J.Misc. 265 (Sup.Ct.1927)), or, as here, to meet the stipulated minimum gross receipts during a trial period. Gabriel v. Glickman, 51 A.2d 106, 25 N.J.Misc. 120, 123 (Sup.Ct.1947). See also Stevens v. Oschwald Realty Corp., 162 A. 619, 10 N.J.Misc. 1140 (Sup.Ct.1932), affirmed 111 N.J.L. 355, 168 A. 286 (E. & A. 1933), where a broker was held entitled to recovery from the lessor for renting his property despite the fact that the lease was voided at the lesses's option upon rejection of the lessor's application for a building permit.

We are satisfied that the authorities compel the view that the failure to consummate the sale of the luncheonette and restaurant in the instant matter did not of itself disentitle the plaintiff to his claimed commission. The important question remaining, however, is whether he was barred from recovery because he was not license under Title 45, Chapter 15 of the Revised Statutes. That act provides for the licensing of real estate brokers; it defines a real estate broker to include any person, among others, who negotiates a sale 'of real estate or an interest therein.' R.S. 45:15--3, N.J.S.A. In Kenney v. Paterson Milk & Cream Co., 110 N.J.L. 141, 164 A. 274, 88 A.L.R. 1416 (E. & A. 1933), the court held that an unlicensed broker was barred from recovering commission for negotiating the sale, as a going concern, of a business which included amongst its assets land, buildings, equipment and good will. See Solomon v. Goldberg, 11 N.J.Super. 69, 78 A.2d 118 (App.Div. 1950). In reaching its conclusion the court recognized fully the conflicting opinions by courts in other jurisdictions on the issue as to whether a licensing requirement for real estate brokers should be construed to be applicable to the sale of a going business which includes real and personal property. Cf. Weingast v. Rialto Pastry Shop, Inc., 243 N.Y. 113, 152 N.E. 693 (1926) with Nittler v. Continental Casualty Co., 94 Cal.App. 498, 271 P. 555 (1928), rehearing denied 272 P. 309 (Cal.App.1928). See Buschbaum v. Barron, 1 N.J.Super. 4, 6, 61 A.2d 512 (App.Div.1948). It is conceded that a leasehold is an interest in land within the statute (Kaplan v. Meranus, 136 N.J.L. 425, 426, 56 A.2d 589 (Sup.Ct. 1948) affirmed 1 N.J. 219, 62 A.2d 689 (1948)), and in Bierman v. Barthelmeus, 45 A.2d 820, 24 N.J.Misc. 35, 36 (Dist.Ct.1946) it was held that the sale of a business including a leasehold comes within the holding in the Kenney case. Although the pertinent statute has been since amended and supplemented in other respects (P.L.1948, c. 155; P.L.1949, c. 214, R.S. 45:15--16.1, 17, 20), there has been no legislative action towards expressly excluding the sale of a business including land or real estate lease from the orbit of the statute. Indeed, in Corson v. Keane, 4 N.J. 221, 227, 72 A.2d 314 (1950) the Supreme Court recently cited both the Kenney and Bierman cases without any suggestion of disapproval. In the light of the foregoing we have reached the conclusion that the statute in its present form is...