Cohen v. The King Knob Club.
| Decision Date | 23 February 1904 |
| Citation | 55 W.Va. 108 |
| Parties | Cohen v. The King Knob Club. |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
Under section 18, chapter 32, Code, an allegation in a bill in equity charging that intoxicating liquors are sold and vended by the defendant, at a certain described house, building or place "contrary to law" is insufficient for uncertainty. It should further allege in what manner such liquors are sold and vended contrary to law; as, without having a State license therefor, (p. 111).
A corporation claiming to be a social and literary club, which requires no qualifications for membership except the payment of an initiation fee of one dollar, for which fee there is issued to the applicant a membership card and a coupon with twenty tickets attached each, "good for five cents for games and supplies" which tickets are received by the general manager of the club in exchange for drinks, one ticket for a g'ass of beer, and two tickets for a drink of whisky, and the members are permitted to buy such coupons with five, ten, or twenty tickets attached at twenty-five cents, fifty cents, and one dollar each, respectively, to be so exchanged for such drinks at such club. Held: To be a fraudulent device to evade the revenue laws of the State, and the house, building or place where such sales are made will be held, taken and deemed to be a common and public nuisance, and will be abated as such, (p. 113).
Appeal from Circuit Court, Barbour County.
Bill by H. Cohen against the King Knob Club. Decree for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.
Reversed.
Fred 0. Blue and John Bassel, for appellant. II. E. Tyson, for appellee.
A. N. Humphreys and four others obtained a charter from the Secretary of State and organized a corporation by the name of The King Knob Club, to be located in the town of Berryburg, in Barbour county. Its objects set forth in its charter are as follows:
The corporation adopted by-laws providing that the membership should be limited to seven hundred and fifty persons. A person to become a member was required to pay $1.00 which had to accompany his application for membership. For this $1.00 he received a book of coupons with tickets attached. These coupons were twentyfive cents, fifty cents and one dollar, with tickets attached, stamped or printed, "Club Boom King Knob Club. Good for 5 cents for games and supplies. Not good if detached.
No......" These tickets were to be used for buying drinks or
other supplies, one ticket, five cents, for a glass of beer, two tickets for a drink of whisky. The corporation employed a general manager at $75 per month to keep the club in order and to issue drinks to the club members. It rented a house of five rooms, including a cold storage room for which it paid, or was to pay $-3, 000 per annum; sub-renting one of the rooms for a barber shop at $2.00 per month. The general manager paid $1.50 per month for another room. The house used by the club for its headquarters is by the evidence variously estimated to be worth from $250 to $1,000 and is located within some twentyfive feet of the business house of H. Cohen, who is engaged in the mercantile business. The club commenced business in the summer of 1902. On the 27th day of September of that year H. Cohen presented his bill in equity to the judge of the circuit court of Barbour County alleging that the defendant corporation had been guilty, and was then guilty of selling and vending in said building so occupied by it, intoxicating liquors contrary to law and that by reason of the sale of such intoxicating liquors in said building it had become and was a common nuisance under section 18, chapter 32, Code, and praying that the same might be abated or closed up as a place for the sale of such liquors contrary to law, and for an injunction against said defendant corporation to restrain and abate such nuisance, and for general relief, upon which the judge granted an injunction as prayed for. Defendant filed its demurrer and answer denying that it was selling intoxicating liquors contrary to law. Depositions were taken and filed for plaintiff and defendant. On the 10th day of October, 1902, the cause was submitted to the court upon the bill and the answer and general replication and upon the depositions taken in the cause, and the court perpetuated the injunction and gave judgment for costs against the defendant, from which decree the defendant appealed, and says that it was error for the court below to enter the decree of October 10, 1902, in the cause for plaintiff and making perpetual the injunction awarded the plaintiff. Appellant does not argue in its brief the question of demurrer but says: Thus relying upon its defense upon the merits of the case. In State v. Boggess, 36 W. Va. 713, (Syl. pt. 3): "It is generally sufficient in an indictment to allege a statutory offense in the...
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