Cohoon v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railway Co.
Decision Date | 31 January 1894 |
Citation | 57 N.W. 727,90 Iowa 169 |
Parties | CHAS. COHOON, Appellant, v. THE CHICAGO, BURLINGTON & QUINCY RAILWAY COMPANY |
Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 31, 1895.
Appeal from Adams District Court.--HON. H. M. TOWNER, Judge.
ACTION to recover damages for personal injuries, and for damages to horses and wagon. Jury trial. Verdict, by order of court, for defendant. Plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
James G. Bull and Thomas L. Maxwell for appellant.
Smith McPherson and H. T. Granger for appellee.
I.
The petition charges the defendant with negligence in running its train, which struck defendant's wagon and caused the injuries, on the depot grounds in the city of Villisca, at a greater rate of speed than eight miles per hour. It is averred that by reason thereof the accident happened, and that by reason thereof the accident happened, and that plaintiff did not contribute thereto. It is also claimed that defendant was guilty of negligence in the speed at which it ran its train, regardless of the statutory negligence pleaded. The answer was a general denial. The court, at the close of plaintiff's testimony, and on defendant's motion, directed the jury to return a verdict for defendant which was done.
II. The first question raised for our consideration is as to whether defendant was guilty of statutory negligence in running its train at a greater rate of speed than eight miles an hour within the depot grounds of defendant. There is no dispute as to the facts touching this matter. All the evidence showed that the train, at the time of the accident, was running at a speed of from twenty-five to thirty-five miles an hour upon depot grounds necessarily used by the company and the public. The statute relied upon by appellant is Code section 1289. In order to present the matter intelligently, it is necessary to set out this section, as the particular clause in controversy is so connected with the balance of the section that, to properly construe it, it should be read in connection therewith. The section reads: The original of this section was enacted in 1862. See chapter 169, section 6, Acts of Ninth General Assembly. As originally passed, the act did not contain any provision limiting the speed of trains upon depot grounds. That provision first appears in the Code of 1873, and in its present form. The section, as it now reads, contains a provision making railway companies liable for killing stock running at large, at all points where they have a right to fence, and have not done so, if the damage or injury resulted from a want of such fence. It contains a provision making such companies liable for damages by fire set out or caused by them in the operation of their roads, and also the provision in controversy, relating to the rate of speed upon depot grounds.
We think the provision in controversy has no relation to a case like that at bar. Before this speed-limit clause was inserted in this section, the section fully provided for liability for damages to live stock running at large, at all points where the company had a right...
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