Coia v. Eastern Concrete Products Co.
| Decision Date | 31 December 1956 |
| Docket Number | No. 9665,9665 |
| Citation | 127 A.2d 858,85 R.I. 128 |
| Parties | Arthur COIA v. EASTERN CONCRETE PRODUCTS CO., Inc. Ex. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Edward I. Friedman, Vincent J. Chisholm, Providence, for plaintiff.
Francis V. Reynolds, Richard P. McMahon, Providence, for defendant.
This is an action of trespass on the case for negligence brought by the plaintiff to recover for injuries sustained when he fell from a defective ladder while attempting arbitration of a labor dispute.
The case was tried before a justice of the superior court sitting with a jury. At the conclusion of the trial the court denied the defendant's motion for a directed verdict and submitted the case to the jury which returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the amount of $2,500. The plaintiff and the defendant each moved for a new trial, and the trial justice denied the defendant's motion and granted that of the plaintiff on the question of damages only unless the defendant filed an additur of $1,400. The case is before this court on the defendant's exceptions to the denial of its motion for a directed verdict, to the denial of its motion for a new trial, to the granting of plaintiff's motion for a new trial, and also to portions of the charge of the trial justice to the jury.
From evidence which is not substantially disputed it appears that during November 1952 the defendant corporation was engaged as a subcontractor constructing concrete roofs on warehouses located at the naval station in West Davisville. On November 21, 1952 defendant was engaged in roofing warehouse No. 3 and had several employees on the roof thereof. The means of access to this roof from the ground was a wooden ladder which was placed against a wall of the warehouse. The plaintiff described the ladder as one of a type that is customarily built by an employee of the contractor and used on construction jobs. As to the particular ladder, the stiles were described as timbers four inches by four inches and the rungs as pieces of wood four inches wide, fifteen inches long, and one inch thick.
The plaintiff is the business agent for a laborers' union, members of which were engaged in working for defendant on the warehouse roof. On November 21, 1952 plaintiff in the course of his business conferred with a representative of defendant and several of the members of his union on the roof of warehouse No. 3, having gone to the roof by means of the ladder above described. The testimony is that plaintiff was invited to confer with the men on the roof but there is a conflict on the matter of whether he was called by the general contractor or the defendant. According to plaintiff's testimony, at the close of the conference he descended the ladder until he reached the second rung from the ground, but when he stepped on that particular rung it broke and he fell the remaining distance to the ground.
The defendant took exception to the denial by the trial justice of its motion for a directed verdict. The defendant's first contention in support of this exception is based upon an assumption that there was no evidence introduced in the plaintiff's behalf from which a jury could find that plaintiff was an invitee to whom defendant owed a duty of exercising reasonable care. We cannot agree with this contention. An examination of the transcript makes it clear that there is evidence from which the jury could have found that this plaintiff was an invitee.
The defendant further contends that there is no evidence of negligence on its part and that for such reason a verdict should have been directed in its behalf. We do not agree with this contention. The defendant in substance is stating that unless a plaintiff establishes by direct evidence the negligence of the defendant, the case should be withdrawn from the jury. It is not always necessary to prove the negligence of a defendant by direct evidence. This court has recognized the rule that we will not presume negligence from the mere happening of an accident. Kilgore v. Shepard Co., 52 R.I. 151, 158 A. 720. But we have also recognized the proposition that a defendant's negligence may be established by proof that the instrumentality causing the injury was within the exclusive management and control of the defendant and that the accident was of such a nature that it would not have happened in the ordinary course of events without negligence. Eaton Realty Co. v. Petroleum Heat & Power Co., 77 R.I. 345, 348, 75 A.2d 178.
In the instant case there was evidence that the ladder involved was under the exclusive control of defendant; that its attention had been directed to the worn and damaged condition of the ladder; that it had made minor repairs to the ladder; that plaintiff was unaware of any defect; and that the rung in question broke under the plaintiff's weight when he stepped on it. In our judgment this does not constitute an application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to this case, the theory of exclusive control being clearly distinguishable from that doctrine. In view of our well-established rule that a trial justice on a motion for a directed verdict must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, we are of the opinion that the trial justice did not err in submitting the instant case to the jury. Hevey v. Vieira, R.I., 121 A.2d 657. The defendant's exception to the denial of its motion for a directed verdict is overruled.
The defendant also took exceptions to that portion of the charge of the trial justice wherein he instructed the jury with respect to defendant's liability and ownership of the ladder. Furthermore, it urges that his charges that it made no difference who owned the ladder, and whether defendant was the owner or not it was obligated to keep it in repair are prejudicial. The precise language of the trial justice in so instructing the jury is as follows: 'Now if this defendant provided that ladder--whether this defendant owned it or not--so that people could go to that roof and come down from that roof, and this plaintiff was one of the persons who was expected to use that ladder to get to the roof or come down from the roof then the defendant would be responsible for the condition of that ladder whether it owned it or not, and the defendant would--the defendant's responsibility is to use due care that that...
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