Coke v. Long Island Care at Home, Ltd.
| Decision Date | 23 May 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 02-CV-2010(TCP)(ARL).,02-CV-2010(TCP)(ARL). |
| Citation | 267 F.Supp.2d 332 |
| Parties | Evelyn COKE, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. LONG ISLAND CARE AT HOME, LTD. and Maryann Osborne, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
Leon Greenberg, New York City, for Evelyn Coke, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiff.
Arnold S. Klein, Meltzer, Lippe & Goldstein, LLP, Mineola, NY, for Long Island Care at Home, Ltd., Maryann Osborne, Defendants.
Defendants Long Island Care At Home, Ltd. ("LIC") and Maryann Osborne ("Osborne")(collectively "Defendants") move for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff Evelyn Coke ("Coke" or "Plaintiff) opposes the motion and also moves for the circulation of a Notice of Pendency and a Consent to Joinder to similarly situated persons pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). This Court heard oral arguments on April 2, 2003.
At issue is whether certain regulations promulgated by the Department of Labor ("DOL") pursuant to the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et. seq. (the "FLSA") are legally enforceable. At oral argument Plaintiffs counsel clarified that Plaintiff could not meet the requirements of the relevant regulations as written and that the purpose of this action was to determine the validity of such regulations.1 (Tr. at 2-5.) As set forth below, because the Court finds that the DOL's regulations are proper Defendants' Motion is GRANTED.
Plaintiff is a resident of the State of New York, County of Queens, and a former employee of Defendants. LIC is a corporation formed pursuant to the laws of New York State. Osborne is the owner and sole shareholder, as well as a director and officer of LIC.
The pleadings provide little factual background.2 According to the Complaint, Plaintiff has been employed by Defendant since 1997 and that "her occupations include, but are not limited to, work as a home healthcare attendant." (Compl. at 10.) Plaintiff contends that despite working more than 40 hours a week she never received overtime payments and that her hourly wage was less the minimum wage outlined in the FLSA.
Plaintiff has asserted two claims in her Complaint. The First Claim is brought under the FLSA on behalf of Plaintiff and any other persons who consent in writing to join this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Plaintiff contends that she was entitled to, but was not paid, minimum wages and an overtime hourly wage of time and one-half for all hours worked in excess of forty hours per week. Plaintiffs Second Claim is brought under the Labor Law of the State of New York and the New York Minimum Wage Act ("NYMWA"), on behalf of Plaintiff and all persons similarly situated. The nature of the claims are identical to those under the First Claim. As relief, Plaintiff requests a judgement for unpaid overtime wages and minimum wages, liquidated damages, attorney's fees, interest and costs as provided for by the FLSA.
Defendant has asserted nine affirmative defenses, including that, workers such as Plaintiff are exempt from eligibility for minimum wage and overtime compensation under the FLSA and the FLSA's implementing regulations.
At oral argument, the Court inquired of Plaintiffs counsel whether he could amend the Complaint to sufficiently allege a cause of action under the FLSA and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Counsel indicated that he could not. (Tr. at 2-5.)
Rule 12(c) provides that, [a]fter the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided by Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
Judgement on the pleadings, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c) is appropriate where material facts are undisputed and a judgment on the merits is possible merely by considering the contents of the pleadings. See Mennella v. Office of Court Admin., 938 F.Supp. 128, 131 (E.D.N.Y.1996) (Spatt, J.)(citing Sellers v. M.C. Floor Crafters, Inc., 842 F.2d 639, 642 (2d Cir. 1988)). "In considering a motion for a judgment on the pleadings, the Court must accept as true all of the non-movant's well pleaded factual allegations, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmovant." Id. (citing Davidson v. Flynn, 32 F.3d 27, 29 (2d Cir. 1994)).
The FLSA of 1938 was enacted for the purpose of regulating minimum wages maximum working hours, and child labor in industries within interstate commerce. While the FLSA sought to protect some of the nation's lowest paid workers, it did not apply to all employees. Since 1938, Congress has extended the FLSA's coverage to many other low-paying occupations through periodic amendments.
Among these extensions of coverage were the amendments of 1974, in which Congress extended coverage to employees in "domestic service." Through the 1974 amendments Congress intended to "not only raise the wages of these workers but [to] improve the sorry image of household employment." H.R.Rep. No. 913, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted in, 1974 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News 2811, 2843. The 1974 amendments made domestic service employees subject to the minimum wage and maximum working hours requirements of the FLSA.
The 1974 amendments Congress do provide for a limited exemption from the FLSA for certain domestic service employees, as set forth in 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(15) ("Section 213(a)(15)"). Section 213(a)(15) provides, in pertinent part, that the provisions minimum wage and maximum hour requirements of Sections 206 and 207 of the FLSA shall not apply to,
(15) any employee employed on a casual basis in domestic service employment to provide babysitting services or any employee employed in domestic service employment to provide companionship services for individuals who (because of age or infirmity) are unable to care for themselves (as such terms are defined and delimited in the regulations of the Secretary). (emphasis added).
Pursuant to this Congressional delegation of authority, the DOL promulgated 29 C.F.R. § 552.6 ("Section 552.6") which defines "companionship services." It states, in pertinent part, the term companionship services shall mean those services which provide fellowship, care and protection for a person who, because of advanced age or physical or mental infirmity, cannot care for his or her own needs. Such services may include household work related to the care of the aged or infirm person such as meal preparation, bed making, washing of clothes, and other similar services. They may also include the performance of general housework: Provided however, that such work is incidental, i.e., does not exceed 20 percent of the total weekly hours worked.
In discussing the policy reasons for the "companionship services" exemption the Ninth Circuit has stated, "[w]e are informed that these critical services reach more elderly or infirm individuals than they otherwise would precisely because the care-providers are exempt from the FLSA". McCune v. Oregon Senior Services Division, 894 F.2d 1107, 1110 (1990).
"Domestic service" itself is not defined in the FLSA. However, the legislative history of the 1974 amendments state,
the generally accepted meaning of domestic service relates to services of a household nature performed by an employee in or about a private home of the person by whom he or she is employed. The domestic service must be performed in a private home which is a fixed place of abode of the individual or family ... [generally, domestic service in and about a private home includes services performed by persons employed as cooks, butlers, valets, maids, housekeepers, governesses, janitors, laundresses, caretakers, handymen, gardeners, footmen, grooms, and chauffeurs of automobiles for family use. H.R.Rep. No.93-913, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in (1974) U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 2811, 2845. The legislative history also "reveals that Congress used the term `domestic service employment' interchangeably with the terms `domestic service in households,' `private household workers,' and `household employment.'" Lott v. Rigby, 746 F.Supp. 1084, 1088 (N.D.Ga.1990)(citing H.R.Rep. No. 913, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted in, 1974 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News 2811, 2842-2843).
The DOL has incorporated the legislative history into 29 C.F.R. § 552.3 ("Section 552.3") which states that domestic service "refers to services of a household nature performed by an employee in or about a private home (permanent or temporary) of the person by whom he or she is employed." 29 C.F.R. § 552.3. Importantly however, through 29 C.F.R. § 552.109(a) ("Section 552.109(a)") the DOL extends the exemption to "[e]mployees who are engaged in providing companionship services, as defined by § 552.6, and who are employed by an employer or agency other than the family or household using their services." 29 C.F.R. § 552.109(a)(emphasis added.)
Plaintiff argues that both of these regulations are inconsistent with Congress's intent of extending coverage of the FLSA to domestic service employees. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the definition of "companionship services" in Section 552.6 is overbroad and that Section 552.109(a) improperly extends the exemption to employees who are employed by an agency.3
In regards to Section 552.109(a), Plaintiff asserts that prior to the 1974 amendments home healthcare employees employed by certain agencies would have been covered by "enterprise coverage" as...
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