Coker v. Thaler

• Decision Date: 16 November 2009
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 3:03-CV-2146-N.
• Citation: 670 F.Supp.2d 541
• Parties: Thomas Lane COKER, Petitioner, v. Rick THALER, Director, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas

670 F.Supp.2d 541

Thomas Lane COKER, Petitioner, v. Rick THALER, Director, Respondent.

Civil Action No. 3:03-CV-2146-N.

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division.

November 16, 2009.

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Thomas Lane Coker, Rosharon, TX, pro se.

Jason D. Hawkins, Federal Public Defender, Dallas, TX, for Petitioner.

Carole S. Callaghan, Melissa L. Kelly, Office of the Texas Attorney General, Austin, TX, for Respondant.

ORDER

DAVID C. GODBEY, District Judge.

This Order addresses the objections to the Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendation ("F & R").

I. RESPONDENT'S OBJECTION

Respondent objects to the Magistrate Judge's failure to conduct a hearing on Petitioner Coker's claim for equitable estoppel, and instead dismissing on the merits. The F & R stated in pertinent part:

As part of his answer, respondent reurges his affirmative defense that petitioner's claims are barred by the AEDPA statute of limitations. (See Resp. Ans. at 4-10). The court need not decide this procedural issue as petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief in any event. See Mack v. Quarterman, No. 3-60-CV-0903-L, 2007 WL 241373 at *2 n. 1 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 26, 2007), COA denied, No. 07-10285 (5th Cir. Feb. 19, 2008) (declining to address affirmative defense of limitations where petitioner was not entitled to relief on the merits).

F & R at 549 n. 2. Respondent objects to the Magistrate Judge's failure to address limitations before proceeding to the merits as being both contrary to law and disobedient to the mandate of the Fifth Circuit in the earlier appeal in this case. Coker v. Quarterman, 270 Fed.Appx. 305 (5th Cir. 2008) (unpub.).

A. Case Law Does Not Require a Hearing First

Footnote 2 cites Mack v. Quarterman (Kaplan, M.J.), which in turn cites Wheat v. Dretke, 2005 WL 1667832, at *1 n. 1 (N.D.Tex.2005) (Kaplan, M.J.), which in turn cites Davis v. Dretke, 2003 WL 23174750, at *1 n. 1 (N.D.Tex.2003) (Kaplan, M.J.), which in turn cites Davis v. Johnson, 158 F.3d 806, 811 (5th Cir.1998) for the proposition that the AEDPA statute of limitations is not a jurisdictional bar that divests a federal court of habeas jurisdiction. While Davis v. Johnson may suggest that the Court can address the merits without addressing limitations, it does not expressly hold that. The Court has searched diligently for authority in the Fifth Circuit on whether the Court is required to address limitations before denying relief on the merits, and found none. Indeed, the Court has found no circuit court opinion anywhere addressing this question.¹

Respondent cites Allen v. Siebert, 552 U.S. 3, 5-6, 128 S.Ct. 2, 169 L.Ed.2d 329 (2007), for the proposition that all time limitations are conditions that go to a court's ability to consider a petition for habeas corpus. From that Respondent concludes that this Court must address limitations prior to the merits. Respondent also cites Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 389, 114 S.Ct. 948, 127 L.Ed.2d 236 (1994),² for the proposition that because limitations is a threshold issue, it must be addressed prior to the merits. The short answer is that Respondent's argument would make sense if the Court had granted relief, because the Court cannot grant relief if Coker's claims are barred by limitations, but it makes no sense given that the Court has denied relief.

Allen simply has nothing to do with this question. Allen held that a state postconviction petition that was untimely was not "properly filed" for purposes of AEDPA's tolling provisions, regardless whether the state considered its time limitation jurisdictional or an affirmative defense. Proper filing is not an issue in this case. Likewise, in Caspari the Supreme Court held that "if the State does argue that the defendant seeks the benefit of a new rule of constitutional law, the court must apply Teague before considering the merits of the claim." 510 U.S. at 389, 114 S.Ct. 948 (emphasis in original). This is a matter of common sense: until the Teague analysis is done, the court does not know what substantive rule will apply to the merits. That is not the case with limitations, and Caspari does not purport to speak to limitations.

More on point is Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 126 S.Ct. 1675, 164 L.Ed.2d 376 (2006). The Court there observed: "A statute of limitations defense, the State acknowledges, is not `jurisdictional,' hence courts are under no obligation to raise the time bar sua sponte." Id. at 205, 126 S.Ct. 1675 (emphasis in original). The Court also noted that "should a State intelligently choose to waive a statute of limitations defense, a district court would not be at liberty to disregard that choice." Id. at 210 n. 11, 126 S.Ct. 1675. That would not be the case, of course, if limitations were jurisdictional.³ Given that limitations is not jurisdictional, it follows that the Court is not required to address it prior to denying relief on the merits.

This is a sensible result. Otherwise, the Magistrate Judge and the parties would have been put to the expense and effort of an evidentiary hearing for no reason. It doesn't matter whether Coker was diligent—he would not get relief in any event. And the issue is not merely avoiding an unnecessary hearing. Habeas petitioners are typically incarcerated felons; moving them from prison to the courtroom and back to prison is not a simple undertaking and presents risks to public safety.⁴ Moreover, this result is consistent with the common practice of courts finding habeas barred by limitations and then, in the alternative, finding relief is also unavailable on the merits.⁵ If Respondent were correct, those courts would have been precluded from reaching the merits in the alternative once they found the claims barred by limitations. The Court therefore overrules Respondent's objection to the extent it argues case law prohibited the Magistrate Judge from reaching the merits.

B. The Fifth Circuit's Mandate Did Not Preclude Reaching the Merits

Respondent additionally argues that the mandate rule requires the Court to address limitations prior to the merits. The opinion of the Court of Appeals concluded:

Therefore, we remand for the district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing regarding Coker's claim that he diligently pursued habeas corpus relief and meets the standard for equitable tolling of the federal limitations filing period for his § 2254 petition.

IV. CONCLUSION

The judgment of the district court is REVERSED and REMANDED. 270 Fed.Appx. at 310-11. Respondent argues that because the opinion of the Court of Appeals remands for an evidentiary hearing, this Court has no discretion to address the merits before limitations.⁶

The Court notes that there is nothing it desires judicially more than to comply with the direction of the Court of Appeals. Here the direction from the Court of Appeals is silent with respect to addressing the merits.

When further trial-court proceedings are appropriate after remand, the appellate mandate commonly leaves the trial court free to decide matters that were not resolved on appeal. A court of appeals ordinarily cannot effectively consider matters that are not presented to it, and should be free to manage its own process of decision by refusing to decide some of the matters that are presented.

18B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 4478.3, at 750 (2d ed. 2002); accord United States v. Lee, 358 F.3d 315, 324 (5th Cir.2004) (on remand for resentencing to determine whether offense was crime of violence, district court did not violate mandate rule by imposing discretionary upward departure where first court of appeals opinion said "nary a word on the possibility of imposing a discretionary upward departure"); Topalian v. Ehrman, 954 F.2d 1125, 1140 (5th Cir.1992) (district court not in contempt of mandate where earlier appeal reversed finding of no personal jurisdiction and ordered reinstatement of defendant, and on remand court granted summary judgment for defendant on the merits); Newball v. Offshore Logistics Int'l, 803 F.2d 821, 826 (5th Cir.1986) ("A mandate controls on all matters within its scope, but a district court on remand is free to pass upon any issue which was not expressly or impliedly disposed of on appeal.") (citing Gulf Coast Bldg. & Supply Co. v. Local No. 480, 460 F.2d 105, 107 (5th Cir.1972)).

Here the opinion of the Court of Appeals is silent regarding the merits, no doubt because nothing regarding the merits was at issue in the appeal. Obviously the opinion does not completely preclude considering the merits; otherwise, there would be no point in addressing equitable tolling if this Court could never address the merits. Moreover, the Court of Appeals knows how to direct the district court first to consider equitable tolling, and reach the merits only if it finds equitable tolling applicable, when that is what it actually intends. United States v. Botello, 196 F.3d 1258 (table), 1999 WL 800314, at *3 (5th Cir.1999) (unpub.) (directing district court on remand first to consider equitable tolling, and "[i]f the district court answers this question in the affirmative it should then consider the merits of Botello's petition."). Also, finding that Coker is not entitled to relief on the merits in no way undermines or subverts the Court of Appeals' ruling that his equitable tolling claim cannot be resolved without an evidentiary hearing. Finally, although a hearing is necessary to resolve Coker's equitable tolling claim, a hearing is not necessary to resolve this case. The Court overrules Respondent's mandate rule objection.

II. COKER'S OBJECTIONS

Coker, pro se, filed a 49 page objection, much of which is difficult to follow. A substantial portion is devoted to either personal criticism of the Magistrate Judge or argument of Coker's equitable tolling claim. To the extent Coker actually objects to the F & R, the...