Cokley v. People
| Decision Date | 27 January 1969 |
| Docket Number | No. 22706,22706 |
| Parties | William Henry COKLEY, alias James Leo Williams, Plaintiff in Error, v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Defendant in Error. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Leonard P. Plank, John A. Kintzele, Denver, for plaintiff in error.
Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., Frank E. Hickey, Deputy Atty. Gen., George E. DeRoos, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant in error.
Cokley was convicted by a jury of the crimes of aggravated robbery and conspiracy and as a result thereof was sentenced to a term in the State Penitentiary. By writ of error Cokley, hereinafter referred to as the defendant, seeks reversal of the judgment and sentence thus entered. Inasmuch as the defendant's main argument concerns the sufficiency of the evidence tying him into the robbery with which he was charged, the evidence as adduced upon trial will be summarized in at least a bit of detail.
On December 11, 1965 the Crest Drug Store, located at 20th and Broadway in Denver, was held up by three, or possibly four, negroes who were armed with a 'silver barreled' shotgun. At the time of the robbery there were two employees of the drug store on duty and also in the store were several customers who were themselves assaulted and robbed by the bandits. The robbers then effected a successful escape from the scene of their crime.
About one week later the defendant was arrested at midnight at 32nd and Champa in Denver. In connection with the arrest, the defendant was first observed standing on the street corner. According to the arresting officer, he then saw the defendant take a shotgun from under his coat and pitch it (the shotgun) into a nearby snowbank. The officer thereupon took into his possession the aforesaid shotgun and placed the defendant under arrest.
Several witnesses testified that the shotgun which the defendant had in his possession at the time of his arrest 'looked like' the shotgun used in the Crest Drug Store robbery, although all agreed that the shotgun used in the robbery had a stock on it, whereas the shotgun pitched into the snowbank by the defendant did not have any stock on it. One witness went a bit further than simply saying that the shotgun introduced into evidence 'looked like' the shotgun used in the robbery. She testified that the shotgun had been 'stuck right at me' and that it 'looked exactly the same, except it wasn't in half.' Also there was testimony to the effect that a 'silver barreled' shotgun was 'out of the ordinary,' as most were said to be 'blue barreled.'
Two victims of the robbery 'identified' the defendant as being one of the robbers, although both candidly admitted that they were not 'real sure' in their identification. Each testified that the defendant 'looked like' one of the robbers, and both testified that they had thus 'identified' the defendant in a police line-up conducted a week or so after the robbery.
The foregoing is, in essence, the extent of the evidence tending to link the defendant to the drug store robbery. The defendant elected to exercise one of his constitutional rights and did not testify. His only witness offered 'alibi' testimony, i.e., that the defendant was in the Crystal Bar at the time the robbery took place. Then, by way of rebuttal, the People offered the testimony of a police officer who had questioned the defendant shortly after his arrest. The gist of his testimony was that the defendant had first told the officer that she was working in the Crystal Bar on the night of the robbery. When the defendant was later advised by the officer that 'his story' didn't check out, the officer testified that the defendant then stated that he was in a malt shop on the night of the robbery. And when the officer later told the defendant that he couldn't verify that 'story' either, the defendant then declined to discuss the matter further.
At the conclusion of the People's evidence, and again at the conclusion of all the evidence, counsel for the defendant moved for a directed verdict of not guilty on the ground that the evidence tying the defendant to the robbery was legally insufficient to warrant submission of the matter to the jury. These motions were both denied and the jury thereafter found defendant guilty of both aggravated robbery and conspiracy.
As above indicated, the central issue in this case, at least as we view it, is whether there is sufficient evidence to support the verdicts of the jury. It is not enough for the evidence to merely show the commission of a crime by some one. The evidence must also 'inculpate the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.' Ortega v. People, 161 Colo. 463, 423 P.2d 21. However, as was also stated in Ortego, in connection with the recognition and identification of a person, if a witness has the capacity 'to observe, recollect and communicate,and has some sense of moral responsibility,' his testimony should be left for the jury to evaluate. Also, as we have repeatedly held, in order for his testimony to be admissible, it is not necessary that a witness be able to make 'positive' identification of the accused, and that, within ...
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