Colangelo v. Heckelman

• Decision Date: 18 July 2006
• Docket Number: No. 17276.,17276.
• Citation: 279 Conn. 177,900 A.2d 1266
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Brian COLANGELO v. David HECKELMAN.

900 A.2d 1266

279 Conn. 177

Brian COLANGELO v. David HECKELMAN.

No. 17276.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued September 8, 2005.

Decided July 18, 2006.

William F. Gallagher, with whom, on the brief, were Hugh D. Hughes, Garrett M. Moore and Christopher J. Flood, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Louis A. Annecchino, for the appellee (defendant).

SULLIVAN, C.J., and BORDEN, KATZ, PALMER and ZARELLA, Js.^*

PALMER, J.

This appeal requires us to decide whether the exception to the exclusivity provision of General Statutes § 31-293a¹ of the Workers' Compensation Act (act) for injuries sustained by one employee due to the negligent operation of a motor vehicle by a fellow employee is applicable when the motor vehicle accident that resulted in those injuries bears a distinct relationship to the special hazards of the workplace. The plaintiff, Brian Colangelo, an automotive technician, commenced this action against the defendant, David Heckelman, a fellow employee, seeking damages for injuries that he sustained when a vehicle that he was inspecting lurched forward and struck him, allegedly as a result of the defendant's negligent operation of that vehicle. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, concluding that, because the motor vehicle accident that caused the plaintiff's injuries was a special hazard of the plaintiff's employment, those injuries fell outside the motor vehicle exception of § 31-293a, and, therefore, the plaintiff's exclusive remedy is his right to compensation under the act. On appeal,² the plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment because there is no special hazard exception to the liability created under § 31-293a for injuries sustained by an employee as a result of another employee's negligent operation of a motor vehicle. We agree with the plaintiff and, therefore, reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The record reveals the following relevant facts and procedural history. On February 21, 2001, the plaintiff and the defendant were employed as automotive technicians by Torrington Honda, a car dealership in Torrington. On that day, the plaintiff and the defendant were assigned to conduct a "30 point" inspection³ of a 2001 Honda Accord. The defendant, who was responsible for inspecting the interior of the vehicle, drove it into a service bay, while the plaintiff, who was responsible for inspecting the exterior, waited inside the bay. The vehicle came to rest on a skid plate designed to prevent the vehicle from moving forward. The engine remained running with the transmission in neutral, and the emergency brake was not engaged. Shortly after the inspection commenced, and just as the plaintiff was raising the hood of the vehicle to check the engine fluids, the vehicle lurched forward,⁴ pinning the plaintiff, who had been standing in front of the vehicle, between the vehicle and a workbench located against the back wall of the garage. As a result of the accident, the plaintiff sustained injuries to both knees, requiring multiple surgeries. The plaintiff subsequently received compensation under the act for lost wages and medical expenses.

The plaintiff filed the present action seeking damages from the defendant for the injuries that he sustained as a result of the defendant's allegedly negligent operation of the 2001 Honda Accord.⁵ The defendant denied the plaintiff's claims and raised two special defenses: first, that the plaintiff's injuries were caused by his own negligence; and, second, that the plaintiff's action is barred by the exclusivity provision of § 31-293a. Thereafter, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that the motor vehicle exception of § 31-293a does not apply when, as in the present case, the motor vehicle accident is a special hazard of the injured employee's employment. The defendant also claimed that the plaintiff's injury did not fall within the exception because it did not result from the defendant's "operation" of the vehicle.

The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the action did not fall within the motor vehicle exception of § 31-293a because the plaintiff's injuries arose out of the special hazard of "working in an automotive repair bay performing 30 point test inspections on vehicles" and because the plaintiff therefore "was not facing the hazards encountered by the general public as motorists ...."⁶ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In reaching its conclusion, the trial court relied primarily on Fields v. Giron, 65 Conn.App. 771, 783 A.2d 1097, cert. denied, 258 Conn. 936, 785 A.2d 230 (2001), a case in which the Appellate Court, relying in part on dictum from this court's decision in Dias v. Adams, 189 Conn. 354, 456 A.2d 309 (1983), held that the exception to the exclusivity provision of § 31-293a for injuries sustained by one employee due to an accident resulting from a fellow employee's negligent operation of a motor vehicle does not apply when, as in Fields, the accident arises out of the "special hazards of the workplace ...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fields v. Giron, supra, at 775, 783 A.2d 1097. The plaintiff contends that the court in Fields wrongly concluded that motor vehicle accidents involving a special hazard of the workplace fall outside the purview of the motor vehicle exception of § 31-293a and, therefore, that he is entitled to recover against the defendant upon proof that his injuries were caused by the defendant's negligent operation of the 2001 Honda Accord. We agree with the plaintiff that, contrary to the Appellate Court's holding in Fields, the liability created under § 31-293a for injuries resulting from an accident caused by a fellow employee's negligent operation of a motor vehicle admits of no general exception for accidents that bear a distinct relationship to the special hazards of the workplace. Because the trial court's judgment was predicated on that exception, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

Before commencing our analysis of the plaintiff's claim, we set forth the well established principles that govern our review of the claim. "Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.... The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and that the party is, therefore, entitled to judgment as a matter of law.... Our review of the trial court's decision to grant the defendant's motion for summary judgment is plenary." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Monk v. Temple George Associates, LLC, 273 Conn. 108, 113-14, 869 A.2d 179 (2005). Furthermore, because our resolution of the plaintiff's claim requires us to construe § 31-293a as it applies to a particular factual scenario, our review of that issue of law is plenary. See, e.g., Dark-Eyes v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 276 Conn. 559, 570, 887 A.2d 848 (2006) (statutory interpretation gives rise to issue of law over which this court's review is plenary).

We begin our review with the text of the pertinent statutory provision, § 31-293a,⁷ which originally was enacted in 1967 as part of a bill making comprehensive changes to our workers' compensation statutes. General Statutes § 31-293a provides in relevant part that, "[i]f an employee... has a right to benefits or compensation under [the act] on account of injury... caused by the negligence or wrong of a fellow employee, such right shall be the exclusive remedy of such injured employee... and no action may be brought against such fellow employee unless such wrong was wilful or malicious or the action is based on the fellow employee's negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle as defined in [General Statutes § ]14-1.⁸..." Thus, under § 31-293a, if an employee suffers injuries, which otherwise would be compensable under the act, due to the negligence of a fellow employee, the injured employee is barred from recovery against that fellow employee unless the injuries were caused by the fellow employee's negligent operation of a motor vehicle.

The limited legislative history of § 31-293a reveals that the legislature enacted the provision to shield negligent employees from the cost of judgments that may be borne more readily by the employer under the act. See 12 H.R. Proc., Pt. 9, 1967 Sess., p. 4035, remarks of Representative Paul Pawlak, Sr.⁹ That legislative history, however, does not indicate what motivated the legislature to carve out the motor vehicle exception from the general rule of fellow employee immunity created by § 31-293a.¹⁰ See 6 A. Larson & L. Larson, Workers' Compensation Law (2005) § 111.03[1], p. 111-12 (noting that, in contrast to other states, "Connecticut has created a special exception to the [fellow employee] immunity rule").

In Dias v. Adams, supra, 189 Conn. at 354, 456 A.2d 309, however, this court had occasion to discuss the general purpose of that exception. In Dias, the plaintiff, Virginia Dias, brought a wrongful death action on behalf of the estate of her husband, who was killed when he was struck by a shovel attached to a backhoe operated by the defendant, Joseph Adams, a coworker. Id., at 354-55, 456 A.2d 309. By way of special defense, Adams alleged that the action was barred by the exclusivity provision of § 31-293a. Id., at 355, 456 A.2d 309. In her reply to Adams' special defense, Dias acknowledged that the accident was covered under the act but claimed that the action could be maintained under the exception in § 31-293a for actions against a fellow employee "for negligence in the operation of a...