Monk v. Temple George Associates
Decision Date | 29 March 2005 |
Docket Number | (SC 17214). |
Citation | 273 Conn. 108,869 A.2d 179 |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Parties | NATEYSHA MONK ET AL. v. TEMPLE GEORGE ASSOCIATES, LLC, ET AL. |
Sullivan, C. J., and Norcott, Katz, Palmer and Vertefeuille, Js.
Steven D. Jacobs, for the appellants (plaintiffs).
Jonathan A. Beatty, for the appellees (named defendant et al.).
This certified appeal arises out of a vicious attack on the named plaintiff, Nateysha Monk,1 perpetrated by her husband's former girlfriend, Ayishea Denson,2 with whom the plaintiff was familiar, in a parking lot owned by the defendant Temple George Associates, LLC, and managed by the defendant Pro Park, Inc. (collectively defendants), where the plaintiff had parked her car for an evening. The primary issue is whether the Appellate Court improperly affirmed the decision of the trial court granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the ground that it is inconsistent with public policy to impose on parking lot owners and managers a duty of care to business invitees who are attacked intentionally on the premises by assailants with whom the invitees are acquainted. See Monk v. Temple George Associates, LLC, 82 Conn. App. 660, 665, 846 A.2d 933 (2004). The plaintiff claims that the Appellate Court improperly determined that the defendants did not owe her a duty of reasonable care in light of her familiarity with Denson, and asks this court to invoke its supervisory powers to consider whether the trial court improperly concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact with respect to the issue of causation. We reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.
The following relevant facts are undisputed. Id., 661-62.
The plaintiff alleges the following additional facts that are relevant to the resolution of her claims. On the evening that the plaintiff entered the defendants' lot and paid the attendant, she saw multiple signs posted around the premises. One of those signs stated that parking was not permitted if the lot was unattended.3 Later that evening, at the time of the attack, there was no attendant supervising the area.4 Additionally, according to a report prepared by the plaintiff's expert witness, Neil A. Sullivan,5 an expert in the field of security, the area surrounding the parking lot was known to have a high incidence of crime. The plaintiff alleges that her injuries were substantially caused by the negligence of the defendants in failing to: (1) have sufficient security personnel on the premises at all times; (2) keep the premises reasonably safe; (3) enact and/or enforce adequate safety measures; (4) warn persons authorized to be on the premises that they may be assaulted; (5) warn business invitees that a parking lot attendant would not be present at all times; and (6) adequately illuminate the parking lot.
The defendants denied those allegations and thereafter filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that (1) they did not have a legal duty to protect the plaintiff from such an attack, and (2) their conduct was not the proximate cause of the attack. The trial court granted summary judgment, concluding that, because the type of harm alleged was not reasonably foreseeable, the defendants did not have a legal duty to protect the plaintiff from such an attack, and, furthermore, that even if the defendants owed a duty to the plaintiff, she would fail on the issue of proximate cause. Id., 662.
The plaintiff thereafter appealed from the judgment to the Appellate Court. The Appellate Court did not consider the issue of proximate causation, but nevertheless affirmed the judgment of the trial court on public policy grounds, holding that 6 Id., 665. Thereafter, we granted the plaintiff's petition for certification to this court limited to the following question: "Did the Appellate Court properly affirm the decision of the trial court granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment?" Monk v. Temple George Associates, LLC, 270 Conn. 903, 853 A.2d 520 (2004).
The plaintiff claims that the Appellate Court improperly affirmed the judgment of the trial court on the basis of its determination that because the plaintiff was familiar with her assailant, the defendants did not owe the plaintiff a duty of reasonable care. Specifically, the plaintiff contends that the defendants did owe her a duty because: (1) such a determination is not inconsistent with public policy; and (2) creating an exception to duty in premises liability cases based on the relationship between a victim and her assailant is illogical. The plaintiff also asks this court to invoke its supervisory powers to consider whether the trial court properly determined that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to proximate cause. In response, the defendants contend that: (1) the Appellate Court's judgment was correct because public policy considerations do not support the imposition of liability on the defendants under the circumstances of the present case; (2) this court should not invoke its supervisory powers because the record is inadequate for review; and (3) the trial court properly concluded that there are no genuine issues of material fact because the alleged negligent lack of security was not the proximate cause of the attack. We agree with the plaintiff.
As a preliminary matter, we set forth the applicable standard of review. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rocco v. Garrison, 268 Conn. 541, 548-49, 848 A.2d 352 (2004).
The test for determining legal duty is a two-prong analysis that includes: (1) a determination of foreseeability; and (2) public policy analysis. Jaworski v. Kiernan, 241 Conn. 399, 406-407, 696 A.2d 332 (1997). The plaintiff claims that imposing such a duty does not offend public policy because creating an exception in cases where victims know their attackers is illogical. We agree, but before addressing policy concerns regarding the imposition of a duty of care on specific types of defendants, we must first determine under the foreseeability prong whether a duty existed according to law, absent other considerations.7 We conclude that it did.
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 405.
In the present case, the defendants' lot was located in the nightclub area of New Haven, a major Connecticut city. The defendants conducted business during the evening hours, at a time when many people would be seeking parking for the purpose of attending the clubs in the surrounding area. According to Sullivan's report,
It seems quite foreseeable that, under these circumstances, an attack on a patron of the premises could occur, whether spontaneously or as precipitated by an argument at one of the neighboring nightclubs. It also is probable that the presence of a parking attendant would have decreased the likelihood that such an attack would occur. Indeed, Sullivan makes these very conclusions in his report.
Additionally, the defendants' reliance on the fact that the attack was intentional and therefore constituted an intervening cause is unavailing because, in Stewart v. Federated Dept. Stores, Inc., 234 Conn. 597, 609, 662 A.2d 753 (1995), this court: (1) affirmed a judgment against a parking garage owner on whose unattended premises a woman was murdered; and (2) expressly disavowed any...
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