Colby Haberdashers, Inc. v. Bradstreet Co.
| Decision Date | 29 May 1929 |
| Citation | 267 Mass. 166,166 N.E. 550 |
| Parties | COLBY HABERDASHERS, Inc., v. BRADSTREET CO. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Exceptions from Superior Court, Suffolk County; Frederick J. MacLeod, Judge.
Action by Colby Haberdashers, Inc., against the Bradstreet Company. On defendant's exceptions to the denial of its motion for a directed verdict, its refusal of request for instructions and to certain rulings in the admission of evidence. Exceptions sustained, and judgment for defendant.
A. J. Berkwitz, of Boston, for plaintiff.
P. B. Buzzell and C. B. Barnes, Jr., both of Boston, for defendant.
This was an action for libel. The declaration alleged that the plaintiff had a large mercantile trade and up to about December 10, 1925, had enjoyed good financial reputation, was able to procure a fair amount of credit and had a good volume of business at Taunton, Massachusetts; that about December 10, 1925, the defendant, whose business it is to disseminate information to subscribers with some of whom the plaintiff did business and enjoyed a large credit, falsely, maliciously, without taking proper precautions to ascertain the truth, but in fact for the purpose of injuring the plaintiff published the following report: -which it caused to be broadcast and circulated. These words in parenthesis ‘(meaning said fire had been improperly set for improper motives)’ were inserted after the word ‘closed,’ and the words in parenthesis ‘(when in fact no insurance was carried)’ were inserted after ‘insurance.’ The declaration charged that the statement was intended to bring the plaintiff into contempt and ridicule and that it did so whereby the plaintiff was injured. At the trial it was agreed that in fact insurance was carried. There was evidence that the plaintiff did business in a store occupied also by a corporation, Colby Clothiers, upon the first floor of a building in Taunton. The floor above was occupied by another corporation, Colby Toyland. On December 5, 1925, an overheated electric flat iron on a bench in Toyland set fire to the wooden bench and to some toys beneath it. The fire was quickly extinguished, but not before the heat had released four sprinkler heads in a sprinkler system, from which considerable water escaped to the floor below and caused damage to the stock in Colby Clothiers and Colby Haberdashers, Inc. The report as published was sent from Taunton to the defendant's office at Boston, and, without examination or further consideration there, was sent out in the usual course of its business to subscribers, who, at any time previously, had asked information about Colby Haberdashers, Inc., or who, after December 10, inquired in regard to it. The report was written by one York, the agent of the defendant in charge of obtaining information in the district which includes Taunton, whose duty it was to inform himself with regard to the standing of those doing business in the district and to prepare and send in reports thereon. There was testimony, uncontradicted, but for the jury to accept or reject as they deemed proper, that all fires in business premises were reported. There was contradicted evidence that soon after the plaintiff began business in Taunton in October, 1924, York had a heated discussion with London, treasurer of the plaintiff, who had refused information in regard to its credit; that York had threatened to make him trouble; and that, after the fire, some one with a voice like York's had telephoned to London that he told him that he would regret the earlier incident ‘And now is an opportunity to prove it to you.’
It was properly taken for granted at the trial that the publication was privileged. R. J. Todd Co. v. The Bradstreet Co., 253 Mass. 138, 148 N. E. 369;Doane v. Grew, 220 Mass. 171, 107 N. E. 620, L. R. A. 1915C, 774, Ann. Cas. 1917A, 338. The plaintiff contended that York was actuated by malice in preparing and sending in the report; that the defendant was responsible for his action, and that in consequence the privileged occasion was no justification for the publication. The defendant at the conclusion of the evidence moved that a verdict for the defendant be directed. This motion was denied. Certain of the defendant's requests for instructions were not given. The jury found for the plaintiff. The case is before us upon exceptions to the denial of the motion; to the refusal of the requests; and to certain...
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...words of the offending item are incapable of a defamatory meaning, innuendo will not make them so. See Colby Haberdashers, Inc. v. Bradstreet Co., 267 Mass. 166, 166 N.E. 550 (1929). The innuendo cannot be used to enlarge the natural meaning of the words actually used. Lambert v. Providence......
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...Consequently, the context in which a seemingly harmless comment is made is always to be considered. Colby Haberdashers v. Bradstreet Co., 267 Mass. 166, 170, 166 N.E. 550, 551 (1929). 8. "The fact that the adjectives in [G.L. c. 214, § 1B] are in the disjunctive rather than cumulative natur......
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