Colby v. Foxworthy
Decision Date | 05 December 1907 |
Docket Number | 15,330 |
Citation | 114 N.W. 174,80 Neb. 239 |
Parties | LUCY A. COLBY, APPELLANT, v. MARY J. FOXWORTHY, APPELLEE. [*] |
Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
APPEAL from the district court for Lancaster county: EDWARD P HOLMES, JUDGE. Reversed with directions.
REVERSED.
Flansburg & Williams, for appellant.
L. C Burr, contra.
EPPERSON C. DUFFIE and GOOD, CC., concur.
This is an action for the foreclosure of a mortgage, and for the fourth time appears in this court. See 64 Neb. 216, 72 Neb. 378, 78 Neb. 288. A history of the case is given in the opinion by Mr. Commissioner ALBERT in 78 Neb. 288, 110 N.W. 857. Since then a new trial has been had, resulting in a judgment for defendant. Plaintiff again appeals.
It is contended by defendant that the rules announced in the opinion in 72 Neb. 378, supra, became the law of the case, and terminate the issues now involved in her favor. But the issues there involved and disposed of are no longer in the case, and it will be impossible to apply the law there announced to the case in hand. The court then construed a certain amended petition, holding that it stated a cause of action, and that the alleged spoliation of the instrument sued on would not avoid the contract. No doubt the rules announced became the law of the case; but they ceased to operate on any issue in this case upon the withdrawal of the amended petition before the last trial. In commenting upon the opinion filed in this case (72 Neb. 378), the learned commissioner said: As to the first and second propositions, no doubt exists but that they were established as the law of the case. However, we find nothing in the first opinion concluding that the alleged alteration was made after the execution of the note and mortgage. It is true, the trial court had found that such was the case, and the finding was mentioned in the opinion as a fact, but the sufficiency of the evidence was never determined by this court; instead, the case was remanded for further proceedings. It cannot be said that it was established as the law of the case that the word "gold" was inserted in the bond and mortgage after its execution. It was not so considered in the third opinion, wherein it was determined that a judgment could not at that time be predicated upon the findings made on the first trial. The lower court saw fit to grant a new trial, and, having done so, the district judge was required to make his findings from the evidence there adduced. There are three rules established as the law of this case: (1) That, if the word "gold" was inserted by the mortgage after the execution and delivery of the mortgage and bond, it was a material alteration; (2) that the defendant by the payment of the interest coupons from time to time was not estopped from alleging a material alteration; and (3) the findings of fact at the first trial cannot be adopted by the trial court. These eliminate all issues existing prior to the last trial, and confine our inquiry here to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the judgment rendered.
The bond in controversy is a printed form with blanks for amount, date, etc. Before the word "dollars" a blank line was filled, so that it now reads: "I promise to pay the sum of eight hundred and no-100 gold dollars," etc. The words and figures "eight hundred and no-100" were filled in with pen and ink, and the word "gold" stamped in the blank with a rubber stamp. In like manner a blank in the mortgage was filled out. The defendant asks the court to regard the inserting of the word "gold" as an obvious alteration, and to cast upon the plaintiff the burden of proving that it was made before the execution of the contract. It may properly be called an obvious alteration; that is, it is obvious that the word "gold" was inserted. It was no part of the form upon which the contract was written, nor was it necessary to make a complete contract between the parties. But we cannot agree with the defendant as to the rule of evidence she invokes. It is unnecessary to review the conflicting authorities as to the burden of proof in such cases. This court held in Dorsey v. Conrad, 49 Neb. 443, 68 N.W. 645, "Where a written instrument shows upon its face a material and obvious alteration, the presumption of law is that such alteration was made before the instrument was finally executed and delivered." It would seem from this that, unless the instrument itself indicated an alteration after its execution, and in the absence of extraneous evidence, the party seeking to enforce the instrument would prevail. It also follows that the party alleging a material alteration carries the burden of proving it. This, we think, is the better rule and in accord with the weight of authority. In Hagan v. Merchants & Bankers Ins. Co., 81 Iowa 321, 46 N.W. 1114, it is said: See, also, Fudge v. Marquell, 164 Ind. 447, 72 N.E. 565; Wilson v. Hayes, 40 Minn. 531, 4 L. R. A. 196, 42 N.W. 467; National Bank v. Fecncy, 12 S.D. 156, 46 L. R. A. 732, 737, 80 N.W. 186. In McClintock v. State Bank, 52 Neb. 130, 71 N.W. 978, it was held, in a case wherein the note itself did not disclose the alteration, that the burden of proof is upon the party alleging the alteration. Such is the rule also where the presumption is that a change appearing upon the face of the instrument was made at or before its execution. 2 Cyc. 234, note 92, pp. 239, 240, note 18. No witnesses were called at the last trial, and the evidence there given consisted of depositions, the testimony given by witnesses at former trials, and written instruments, and, under the rule announced in Faulkner v. Sims, 68 Neb. 299, 94 N.W. 113, and Roe v. Howard County, 75 Neb. 448, 106 N.W. 587, we have examined the evidence and arrived at an opinion uninfluenced by the decision of the district court.
There is a conflict in the evidence. The defendant produced the testimony of Miss Dowden, who, when the loan was made, was employed as a clerk in the mortgagee's office. She also negotiated the loan for defendant. She testified positively that she read the bond and mortgage immediately before they were signed, and that the word gold was not therein. Defendant herself gave testimony on two occasions. First, in 1899, she testified in reference to the bond and mortgage In 1906 the defendant gave her deposition, in which she said: Contrary to the defendant's testimony, we find the depositions of John West and E. C. Jones. The former was a clerk in the office of the mortgagee. He prepared the papers in controversy, and says: ...
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