Cole v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 25 March 1945
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 1186.
• Citation: 59 F. Supp. 443
• Parties: COLE v. CHICAGO, ST. P., M. & O. RY. CO.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota

59 F. Supp. 443

COLE v. CHICAGO, ST. P., M. & O. RY. CO.

Civil Action No. 1186.

District Court, D. Minnesota, Fourth Division.

March 25, 1945.

Robt. J. McDonald and William H. DeParcq, both of Minneapolis, Minn., for plaintiff.

James J. Giblin, Asst. U. S. Atty., of St. Paul, Minn., for defendant.

BELL, District Judge.

This is an action to recover damages resulting from personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff in the roundhouse of the defendant at Minneapolis, Minnesota, on October 25, 1943. At the time of the accident the plaintiff was a member of the Railroad Operating Battalion of the United States Army; and, with the employees of the defendant, was engaged in making an inspection of a diesel motor. An effort was being made to detect an oil leak in the "blower" that had been reported by the road crew. Employees of the defendant in charge of the work undertook to find the leak by the application of air pressure. The roundhouse airline was attached to the motor and eighty to ninety pounds pressure suddenly applied. The blower was so constructed as to resist not to exceed eight to ten pounds pressure. When the air was applied, a heavy piece of metal was blown from the equipment with great force striking and injuring the plaintiff.

The act of negligence alleged was the application of air under high pressure to the motor by the employees of the defendant when they knew, or by the exercise of ordinary care should have known, that the motor would not resist such pressure and that it was likely to result in injury to the plaintiff and others on the premises.

The defendant denied negligence. Under a contractual relation between the defendant and the United States, the latter is required to respond for any damages for which the defendant is held liable.

A verdict for $58,725.25 was returned for the plaintiff. Defendant's motion for an order setting aside the verdict and judgment entered thereon and directing that a judgment notwithstanding the verdict of the jury be entered in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff; or, in the alternative, that said verdict and judgment be vacated and set aside and a new trial granted was submitted to the court on briefs on February 20, 1945.

The evidence in this case clearly and conclusively proved the liability of the defendant to the plaintiff. There was no prejudicial error in the instructions or in rulings on the reception or exclusion of evidence. A discussion of these phases of the case would be a work of supererogation.

The size of the verdict presents the only question for the court on the consideration of the defendant's motions. The verdict was large indeed, but the plaintiff sustained serious multiple injuries. His right eye was completely destroyed and the eyeball must be removed to save the left eye. His hearing was eighty per cent lost. The nasal bones were fractured and misplaced. There was a loss of sensation in the right side of the face, concussion and brain injury, nystagnus on looking to either side, headaches, dizziness, ringing in the ears, scar from the bridge of the nose extending over the right eye, severe pain and suffering. These injuries in the main are permanent. He was hospitalized for four months, has been unable to engage in any gainful occupation, and has a disability rating by the United States of eighty per cent.

The plaintiff was thirty-seven years of age, strong, healthful, active, and energetic before the accident and had an expectancy of more than thirty years. He had been employed by a railroad company as a helper, repairer, and carpenter for eight years prior to the accident. For five years before his enlistment in the Railroad Operating Battalion in October, 1942, he earned slightly over two thousand dollars a year. During the last year of this period, he earned from two hundred forty to two hundred forty-eight dollars a month. He received an honorable discharge from the Army April 30, 1944. He finished one year in high school and is scantily equipped to engage in any occupation other than one requiring manual labor, and the evidence is very conclusive that he never can reengage in the railroad service. The plaintiff was entitled to a substantial award.

It is elementary that when the jury has returned a verdict the evidence and all inferences that reasonably can be drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the decision of the jury. Tennant v. Peoria & Pekin Union Railway Company, 321 U.S. 29, 64 S.Ct. 409, 88 L.Ed. 520; Lumbra v. United States, 290 U.S. 551, 54 S.Ct. 272, 78 L.Ed. 492; Gunning v. Cooley, 281 U.S. 90, 50 S.Ct. 231, 74 L.Ed. 720; Ætna Life Insurance Company v. McAdoo, 8 Cir., 115 F.2d 369; Garrett Construction Co. v. Aldridge, 8 Cir., 73 F.2d 814; Adams v. Barron C. Collier, Inc., 8 Cir., 73 F.2d 975; Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad Co. v. Linehan, 8 Cir., 66 F.2d 373. In the Tennant case the court said 321 U.S. 29, 64 S.Ct. 412: "* * * The focal point of judicial review is the reasonableness of the particular inference or conclusion drawn by the jury. It is the jury, not the court, which is the fact-finding body. It weighs the contradictory evidence and inferences, judges the credibility of witnesses, receives expert instructions, and draws the ultimate conclusion as to the facts. The very essence of its function is to select from among conflicting inferences and conclusions that which it considers most reasonable. * * * That conclusion, whether it relates to negligence, causation or any other factual matter, cannot be ignored. Courts are not free to reweigh the evidence and set aside the jury verdict merely because the jury could have drawn different inferences or conclusions or because judges feel that other results are more reasonable."

The amount of the damages in an action for personal injuries is a question of fact for the determination of the jury and ordinarily courts will adhere to the well-established rule that this function of the jury should not be invaded by the court. Fairmount Glass Works v. Cub Fork Coal Co., 287 U.S. 474, 53 S.Ct. 252, 77 L.Ed. 439; Tennant v. Peoria & Pekin Union Railway Company, supra; Ætna Life Insurance Company v. McAdoo, supra; Terminal Railroad Ass'n v. Farris, 8 Cir., 69 F.2d 779; Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad Company v. Linehan, 8 Cir., 66 F.2d 373; Jennings v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company, D.C., 43 F.2d 397; Russell v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 316 Mo. 1303, 295 S.W. 102, c. d. 275 U.S. 551, 48 S.Ct. 114, 72 L.Ed. 421; Hurst v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co., 280 Mo. 566, 219 S.W. 566, 10 A.L.R. 174; Avance v. Thompson, 320 Ill.App. 406, 51 N.E.2d 334, 341. In the case last cited the court said: "As a court of appeals, in passing upon the question of alleged excessive damages, we can neither speculate nor conjecture as to how plaintiff's financial status might be affected in the future by business booms or depressions; by the uncertainties of the labor situation after the war, or how his earnings might be affected by his expenses away from home, taxes, work clothing, union dues, social security and old age pension. We assume that the jury took these matters into consideration in arriving at their verdict and that the trial court did the same in entering the remittitur. Nor can we in a personal injury case reduce the amount of the verdict to a matter of mathematical computation. De Fillippi v. Spring Valley Coal Co., 202 Ill.App. 61. Nor can we compute the earning capacity of the amount awarded plaintiff at any given rate of interest. Apparently counsel for defendant expects this court to do all this. We do not find...