Jennings v. Chicago, RI & P. Ry. Co.
| Decision Date | 11 September 1930 |
| Citation | 43 F.2d 397 |
| Parties | JENNINGS v. CHICAGO, R. I. & P. RY. CO. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota |
O'Brien, Horn & Stringer, of St. Paul, Minn., for defendant.
Tautges, Wilder & McDonald, of Minneapolis, Minn., for plaintiff.
The suit, which is one for damages for personal injuries caused by alleged violation of the Boiler Inspection Act, was tried at Winona, Minn., on June 19th of this year, and resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff of $42,500. The defendant claims that the verdict is so excessive as to require a new trial unless a reduced amount is accepted. The plaintiff contends that the verdict was not as large as it might well have been.
Under the rule in Public Utilities Corporation v. McNaughton (C. C. A.) 39 F. (2d) 7, if a verdict is so excessive as to be erroneous, the correction of the error lies with the trial court upon a motion for a new trial and is not subject to review by the Court of Appeals, unless, possibly, where the overruling of such a motion is claimed to be an abuse of discretion. It is no more the province of this court, however, to weigh the evidence or determine the credibility of the witnesses, than it is of the appellate court, and the only question to be considered is whether there is substantial evidence to sustain the amount of the verdict.
If a verdict in a personal injury case is in excess of what could fairly be said to be sustained by substantial evidence, taking the view of it most favorable to the plaintiff, then it, or at least so much of it as is unsupported, is attributable to passion, prejudice, or sympathy on the part of the jury. Courts have properly tried to keep verdicts in cases such as this within the bounds of reason and to some extent in harmony with verdicts in similar cases tried in the same state or district.
Jennings had been employed by the defendant company since 1902. At the time of the accident — on November 26, 1928 — he was an engineer with seniority rights dating from 1910, which were sufficient to keep him regularly employed, and his earnings were, on an average, something more than $300 a month. He was then 48 years of age and a strong, well man. On that day he was operating an engine. The reach rod broke, causing the reverse lever to fly backwards and strike him on his left leg between the hip and knee, and causing a compound comminuted fracture of the thigh bone. In an unsuccessful attempt to save his leg, he was kept in the hospital for more than six months in Pratt, Kan., and during that period suffered intense pain. The leg became infected; he was delirious for a considerable portion of the time, and was given opiates. On May 30, 1929, he was taken to Chicago for examination by the defendant's chief surgeon. On the 17th day of July, 1929, it was determined that his leg could not be saved, and it was amputated at a point which leaves a sufficient stump to permit the use of an artificial leg. The injury and subsequent treatment resulted, naturally, in loss of weight, strength, and appetite, and produced nervousness and inability to sleep. There was an infection in the stump after amputation, and Jennings was not discharged from the hospital until September 7, 1929. About September 11, 1929, a slight operation was performed on the stump by the defendant's surgeon at Pratt, Kan., and some pus was drained off. There was still some slight draining from the stump at the time of trial, showing that at that time some infection was still present. This infection and the fact that the stump was not in suitable condition for the use of an artificial limb made it difficult, if not impossible, for Jennings to use one at the time of the trial. There is a dispute in the testimony of the experts as to whether he ever will be able to use comfortably an artificial leg, and it seems to be conceded that he will need some further operation on the stump before he can do so. Such an operation would perhaps not incapacitate him for long and would cost not to exceed $400. I think a finding that he could never use an artificial leg would not be justified by substantial evidence.
There is no claim that Jennings was able to work at any gainful occupation prior to the time of the trial, which was...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Martin v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co.
...Act. Kelly v. Railroad, 241 U.S. 491. (10) The judgment in this case is not excessive. Woods v. Terminal Ry. Co., 8 S.W.2d 922; Jennings v. Railroad, 43 F.2d 397; Johannes v. Laundry Co., 274 S.W. 377; Stein v. Rainey, 286 S.W. 53; Skinner v. Davis, 271 S.W. 992. OPINION Ragland, J. This is......
-
Werthan Bag Corp. v. Agnew, 11578
...L.Ed. 748. This is particularly significant with respect to damages in tort actions for personal injuries." In Jennings v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., D.C.Minn., 43 F.2d 397, Judge Sanborn stated that, on the motion for a new trial for excessiveness of the verdict, "the only question to be......
-
Harrison v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co.
...excessive. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Remel, 48 S.W.2d 548, 185 Ark. 598, certiorari denied, 53 S.Ct. 85, 287 U.S. 634; Jennings v. Railroad Co., 43 F.2d 397; Woods Ry. Co., 8 S.W.2d 922, certiorari denied, 49 S.Ct. 94, 278 U.S. 649. Bradley, C. Ferguson and Hyde, CC., concur. OPINION......
-
Cole v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co.
...69 F.2d 779; Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad Company v. Linehan, 8 Cir., 66 F.2d 373; Jennings v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company, D.C., 43 F.2d 397; Russell v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 316 Mo. 1303, 295 S.W. 102, c. d. 275 U.S. 551, 48 S.Ct. 114, 72 L.E......