Cole v. City of Port Arthur
| Decision Date | 16 July 2014 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13-CV-176 |
| Parties | CORY COLE, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF PORT ARTHUR, TEXAS, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas |
Pending before the court is Defendant City of Port Arthur, Texas's ("Defendant" or "the City") Motion for Summary Judgment (#14). The City seeks summary judgment as to Plaintiff Cory Cole's ("Cole") claims brought pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., and the Texas Whistleblower Act ("TWA"), TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 554.001 et seq. Having reviewed the pending motion, the submissions of the parties, the pleadings, and the applicable law, the court is of the opinion that Defendant's motion should be granted.
On February 21, 2013, Cole filed suit in the 58th Judicial District Court of Jefferson County, Texas. Defendant removed the case to federal court on March 22, 2013. Cole alleges that at certain times during his employment as a patrol officer for the Port Arthur Police Department, he was denied the use of his compensatory time ("comp time") when requested or within a reasonable time thereafter in violation of the FLSA. He also claims that he was subjected to retaliation in violation of the FLSA and the TWA after reporting the alleged denials of his comp time.
On October 31, 2013, the City filed the instant motion for summary judgment, arguing that Cole cannot maintain a comp time claim under the FLSA because there is no evidence that he lost any comp time. Defendant also maintains that Cole was refused comp time off on particular occasions because it would have unduly disrupted the operations of the police department and that, in any event, Cole was always given comp time off within a reasonable time after his request. The City also contends that summary judgment is appropriate as to Cole's FLSA retaliation claim because there is no evidence that he suffered an adverse employment action, the reasons for the City's employment decisions were legitimate and reasonable, and there is no evidence of "but-for" causation. With regard to Cole's TWA claim, Defendant asserts that summary judgment is warranted because Cole did not report the alleged protected activity to an appropriate law enforcement authority in good faith, did not sustain an adverse employment action, cannot establish causation, and cannot demonstrate that he filed suit or initiated the City's internal grievance procedures in a timely manner.
In response, Cole insists that summary judgment is not appropriate, as he was wrongfully denied the use of his comp time off on unspecified occasions prior to August 2011, on August 13, 2011, September 26, 2011, and October 15-16, 2011. He also lists several instances of alleged retaliation.
Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment shall be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). The party seekingsummary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Technical Automation Servs. Corp. v. Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp., 673 F.3d 399, 407 (5th Cir. 2012); QBE Ins. Corp. v. Brown & Mitchell, Inc., 591 F.3d 439, 442 (5th Cir. 2009). Where a defendant moves for summary judgment on the basis of an affirmative defense and, thus, bears the ultimate burden of persuasion, "evidence must be adduced supporting each element of the defense and demonstrating the lack of any genuine issue of material fact with regard thereto." Terrebone Parish Sch. Bd. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 310 F.3d 870, 877 (5th Cir. 2002); see United States v. Renda Marine, Inc., 667 F.3d 651, 659 (5th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1800 (2013); Exxon Corp. v. Oxxford Clothes, Inc., 109 F.3d 1070, 1074 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 915 (1997). To warrant judgment in its favor, the movant "'"must establish beyond peradventure all of the essential elements of the defense."'" Martin v. Alamo Cmty. Coll. Dist., 353 F.3d 409, 412 (5th Cir. 2003) (emphasis in original) (quoting Chaplin v. NationsCredit Corp., 307 F.3d 368, 372 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting Fontenot v. Upjohn Co., 780 F.2d 1190, 1194 (5th Cir. 1986))); accord Addicks Servs., Inc. v. GGP-Bridgeland, LP, 596 F.3d 286, 293 (5th Cir. 2010).
"A fact is material only if its resolution would affect the outcome of the action . . . ." Wiley v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 585 F.3d 206, 210 (5th Cir. 2009); accord Poole v. City of Shreveport, 691 F.3d 624, 627 (5th Cir. 2012); Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Farese, 423 F.3d 446, 454 (5th Cir. 2005). "Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). "An issue is ' genuine'if it is real and substantial, as opposed to merely formal, pretended, or a sham." Bazan ex rel. Bazan v. Hidalgo Cnty., 246 F.3d 481, 489 (5th Cir. 2001) (emphasis in original). Thus, a genuine issue of material fact exists "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; accord Poole, 691 F.3d at 627; Bayle v. Allstate Ins. Co., 615 F.3d 350, 355 (5th Cir. 2010); Wiley, 585 F.3d at 210; EMCASCO Ins. Co. v. Am. Int'l Specialty Lines Ins. Co., 438 F.3d 519, 523 (5th Cir. 2006).
Once a proper motion has been made, the nonmoving party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials in the pleadings but must present affirmative evidence, setting forth specific facts, to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322 n.3 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256; Distribuidora Mari Jose, S.A. de C.V. v. Transmaritime, Inc., 738 F.3d 703, 706 (5th Cir. 2013); Bayle, 615 F.3d at 355; EMCASCO Ins. Co., 438 F.3d at 523. "[T]he court must review the record 'taken as a whole.'" Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)); see Riverwood Int'l Corp. v. Emp'rs Ins. of Wausau, 420 F.3d 378, 382 (5th Cir. 2005). All the evidence must be construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and the court will not weigh the evidence or evaluate its credibility. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150; Downhole Navigator, LLC v. Nautilus Ins. Co., 686 F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 2012); EEOC v. Chevron Phillips Chem. Co., LP, 570 F.3d 606, 615 (5th Cir. 2009); Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co. v. Reyna, 401 F.3d 347, 350 (5th Cir. 2005). The evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, with all justifiable inferences drawn and all reasonable doubts resolved in his favor. Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 562 (2004) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255); Cotroneo v. Shaw Env't & Infrastructure, Inc., 639 F.3d 186, 192(5th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 22 (2012); Tradewinds Envtl. Restoration, Inc. v. St. Tammany Park, LLC, 578 F.3d 255, 258 (5th Cir. 2009). The evidence is construed "'in favor of the nonmoving party, but only where there is an actual controversy, that is, when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts.'" Boudreaux v. Swift Transp. Co., Inc., 402 F.3d 536, 540 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)).
Furthermore, "only reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party can be drawn from the evidence." Mills v. Warner-Lambert Co., 581 F. Supp. 2d 772, 779 (E.D. Tex. 2008) (citing Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 469 n.14 (1992)); accord Cannata v. Catholic Diocese of Austin, 700 F.3d 169, 172 (5th Cir. 2012). "If the [nonmoving party's] theory is . . . senseless, no reasonable jury could find in its favor, and summary judgment should be granted." Eastman Kodak Co., 504 U.S. at 468-69; accord Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Simmons, 543 F. Supp. 2d 582, 584-85 (S.D. Miss.), aff'd, 293 F. App'x 273 (5th Cir. 2008). The nonmovant's burden is not satisfied by "'some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,' by 'conclusory allegations,' by 'unsubstantiated assertions,'" by speculation, by the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute, or "by only a 'scintilla' of evidence." Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 (quoting Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 586; Hopper v. Frank, 16 F.3d 92, 97 (5th Cir. 1994); Davis v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 14 F.3d 1082, 1086 (5th Cir. 1994)); accord Stauffer v. Gearhart, 741 F.3d 574, 581 (5th Cir. 2014); Thibodeaux v. Vamos Oil & Gas Co., 487 F.3d 288, 294-95 (5th Cir. 2007). "Unsubstantiated assertions, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation are not sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment." Brown v. City of Houston, 337 F.3d 539, 541 (5th Cir. 2003); accord Firman v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 684 F.3d 533, 538 (5th Cir.2012); RSR Corp. v. Int'l Ins. Co., 612 F.3d 851, 857 (5th Cir. 2010); see Hockman v. Westward Commc'ns, LLC, 407 F.3d 317, 332 (5th Cir. 2004).
Summary judgment is mandated if the nonmovant fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to his case on which he bears the burden of proof at trial. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 507 U.S. 584, 590 (1993); Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322; EMCASCO Ins. Co., 438 F.3d at 523; Cutrera v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. State Univ., 429 F.3d 108, 110 (5th Cir. 2005); Patrick v. Ridge, 394 F.3d 311, 315 (5th Cir. 2004). "[W]here the nonmoving party fails to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial,...
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