Cole v. Cole
| Decision Date | 31 December 1857 |
| Citation | 37 Tenn. 57 |
| Parties | JEMIMA COLE v. WILLIAM COLE. |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
FROM LINCOLN.
The complainant, by her next friend, filed this bill in the chancery court of Fayetteville, to have the marriage with the defendant declared void, on the ground that she was incapable of making said contract from insanity of mind. At the August term, 1857, Chancellor Ridley dismissed the bill. The complainant appealed.
John M. Bright, for the complainant; W. F. and Ed. Cooper, for the defendant.
This bill was filed on the 11th of October, 1857, in the chancery court of Lincoln county, to rescind a contract of marriage consummated between the parties on the 16th March, 1847, upon the ground of the insanity of the complainant at the time. The chancellor dismissed the bill upon the facts, and the case is here by appeal.
At the time of the marriage the complainant was about forty-six, and the defendant about fifty-two, years of age. He was a widower with a family of children, and she was a widow without children. She had been twice married-- first to Thornton, and then to Reddick. Thornton died about the year 1836, a short time after the death of his two children by the complainant, leaving her all his property, consisting of a plantation, twelve or fifteen slaves, etc. She married Reddick in 1840, and after living together a week or two they disagreed perhaps about her property, and she abandoned him. Each filed their bills for a divorce in the chancery court at Huntsville, and in June, 1845, a divorce was granted upon his bill, on the ground of abandonment, and hers was dismissed. In neither of their bills was any issue made upon her mental condition. She removed to Tennessee, and settled in Lincoln county, in 1844 or 1845, where she purchased a farm, on which she placed her slaves and other property, and continued to manage the same until her marriage with defendant.
This bill is based upon the allegation that she was of unsound mind at the time of the marriage, as well as before and afterwards, and a volume of proof was taken, both in Alabama and Tennessee, on both sides upon this question. The contradiction and conflict usual in investigations of this kind, where the mind is the subject and opinions are evidence, is to be found in the proof.
Marriage, by our law, is a civil contract, and may be avoided, like any other contract, for want of sufficient mental capacity in the parties. If the mind is unsound at the time, it is incapable of consent, and that is an essential element in all contracts.
In the dark ages, when there was thought to be something sacred and mysterious in the matrimonial relation, and its civil was almost obliterated by its spiritual character, the marriage of persons of unsound mind was held valid. Blackstone, in 2d volume of his Commentaries, 438, 439, says this was “a strange determination, since consent is absolutely requisite to matrimony, and neither idiots nor lunatics are capable of consenting to anything.” The test question in all such cases is whether the party is capable of making any binding contract. The identity of the doctrine that unsoundness of mind vitiates this as well as all other contracts is well established. But every consideration of policy and humanity admonishes us that a contract so essentially connected with the peace and happiness of individuals and families, and the well-being of society, should not be annulled on this or any other ground, not clearly made out. The consequences, in many cases, would be most deplorable. The rights of property would be unsettled and the peace of families destroyed, to say nothing about the effects upon the innocent offspring. The annulment of other contracts would only affect property; but this would do that, and more--it would tell upon the happiness, character, and peace of the parties. The appalling character of these consequences is well calculated to impress the courts with the solemn duty of requiring a clear case for the application of the general principle to this delicate and important contract. It is, however, only a civil contract, and must stand or fall by the usual tests applicable to contracts.
It is not every unsoundness that will avoid a contract. The degree necessary to produce this effect is fixed by the law, and must be made out by proof. All persons of lawful age are presumed to be capable of contracting, until the contrary is made to appear. So, sanity is presumed, and if the contrary is alleged, it must be proved by the party imputing it. If a state of permanent insanity is once shown, the burden of proof shifts, and a lucid interval must be proved by the other side. But the rule is different in a case of temporary insanity, depending on some exciting cause not in perpetual action.
The general rule is, “that those who have not the regular use of their understanding, sufficient to deal with discretion in the common affairs of life, or the weakness being so considerable as to amount to derangement, are incapable of contracting a...
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