Cole v. Cole Tomato Sales, Inc.
Decision Date | 13 March 1975 |
Citation | 293 Ala. 731,310 So.2d 210 |
Parties | In re Docia Earline COLE, as Administratrix of the Estate of C. F. Cole, Jr. v. COLE TOMATO SALES, INC., et al. Ex parte COLE TOMATO SALES, INC., et al. SC 1023. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Izas Bahakel, Birmingham, for respondent, Circuit Judge William C. Barber.
This is an original petition for mandamus which seeks to have this Court order Circuit Judge William Barber to modify or rescind his order compelling the petitioners to produce certain documents. This Court granted a rule nisi. The trial judge has answered, and oral arguments have been heard. We now deny the petition for a peremptory writ of mandamus.
Briefly stated, the facts are as follows: Docia Earline Cole, as administratrix of
the estate of her late husband, C. F. Cole, Jr., filed an action on 5 August 1974, in the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, in which she alleged that her late husband died on 22 June 1973, and that at the time of his death, he was an officer, director and stockholder (29% Of the capital stock) of a corporation known as Cole Tomato [293 Ala. 733] Sales, Inc. She alleged, upon information and belief, that C. F. Cole, Sr. Produce, Inc. was merged with Cole Tomato Sales, Inc., and were being operated as one corporate entity. She also claimed her late husband was entitled to $5,000 as compensation at the time of his death and that this sum had not been paid. She also alleged as follows:
The administratrix asked the court to determine the profits of the corporation, that an accounting be made to determine what her late husband was entitled to receive as profits or dividends. She also asked that a receiver be appointed to run the business until it could be dissolved and the assets distributed as provided by law.
Motions to dismiss the complaint were filed by C. F. Cole, Sr. Produce Company, Inc. and Cole Tomato Sales, Inc. and James Cole. The court denied each motion to dismiss.
On 17 October 1974, the administratrix filed a motion to require the production of documents under Rule 34, ARCP. The items requested were as follows:
Defendants' counsel advised them not to respond to the motion to produce, and the trial court, on 1 November, 1974, entered an order compelling production of the documents within one week. Defendants filed this original petition for mandamus on 5 November 1974, and claims that the order permits discovery outside the scope of Rule Judge William Barber answered the rule nisi and says that there was no request made by the petitioners for a protective order under Rule 26(c), ARCP, to limit or prohibit discovery, and defendants should not be permitted to raise for the first time, by petition for writ of mandamus, matters which might have been, but were not raised in the Circuit Court. Regarding the complaint that Mrs. James Cole was not a party to the action, Judge Barber said:
26(b), ARCP, that it permits an invasion of the privacy of James Cole and his wife, and that James Cole's wife is not a party to the action. Both James Cole and his wife allege that to permit the discovery will cause them immediate and irreparable injury. This Court issued a rule nisi.
The whole concept of our new procedural rules is that they will secure 'the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.' Rule 1, ARCP.
Petitioner's counsel, during oral argument, stated that the administratrix had not built a pier (stated a cause of action) in order to begin fishing (discovery). The mandate of Rule 1 that we construe all the rules to 'secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action' is probably the most important mandate in the rules.
As was said in Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181, 83 S.Ct. 227, 230, 9 L.Ed.2d 222, 225--6 (1962):
Conley v. Gibson (1957), 355 U.S. 41, 48, 78 S.Ct. 99, 103, 2 L.Ed.2d 80. The Rules themselves provide that they are to be construed 'to secure a just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."
The discovery rules must be broadly and liberally construed. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 67 S.Ct. 385, 91 L.Ed. 451 (1947).
Rule 26(c) provides the efficient procedural device for limiting or prohibiting discovery. The petitioners did not avail themselves of it. Consequently, we deny their request for the extraordinary relief of mandamus.
Peremptory writ of mandamus denied.
Petitioners for the first time on application for rehearing raise the point that the original request filed by the plaintiff for production asked the defendant 'to respond within 14 days.'
In brief, on application for rehearing, petitioners claim:
'THERE IS NO ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT ALLOWING A SHORTER TIME OF 14 DAYS IN THIS CASE. THE MOTION TO
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