Cole v. Flathead County
| Decision Date | 13 March 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. 88-407,88-407 |
| Parties | Ruth M. COLE, and the Cole Ranch, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. FLATHEAD COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Montana, et al., Defendants and Respondents. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
Patrick M. Springer, Kalispell, for plaintiffs and appellants.
Ted O. Lympus, Flathead County Atty., Jonathan B. Smith, Deputy County Atty., Kalispell, Samuel M. Warren, Worden, Thane & Haines, P.C., Missoula, for defendants and respondents.
Ruth M. Cole and the Cole Ranch appeal from an order of the District Court, Eleventh Judicial District, Flathead County, granting summary judgment against them on their claim against the county. The judgment was granted in part because the Coles had failed to file an answer brief opposing the motion within the time provided by Rule 2, Montana Uniform District Court Rules.
After the order for summary judgment was granted, Ruth M. Cole and the Cole Ranch (Coles) moved the District Court to reconsider its order and requested oral argument. The District Court denied the motion for reconsideration, relying in part on its local rule, which in effect denies oral argument on motions unless oral argument is specifically applied for with sufficient points to show the District Court that briefs alone are insufficient to advise it fully of the parties' contentions.
This opinion treats of the interplay between Rule 56, M.R.Civ.P., Rule 2, Montana Uniform District Court Rules, and the local rule regarding oral argument.
The issues for review are:
1. Whether the time provisions of Rule 2, Montana Uniform District Court Rules (MUDCR) are applicable to a motion for summary judgment under the provisions of Rule 56, M.R.Civ.P.;
2. Whether a party is entitled to rely upon the setting of a hearing for oral argument upon a motion for summary judgment; and,
3. Whether there is conflict between the Montana Uniform District Court Rules, the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure and the local Policies and Procedures of the Eleventh Judicial District Court, which relate to granting oral argument on motions before the District Court.
The facts of this appeal are primarily procedural and deal with the filing dates of the pleadings and the application by the District Court of the Uniform District Court Rules, its local policy and the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure.
The case arises from the alleged tortious conduct by agents of Flathead County in connection with the criminal prosecution of the plaintiff, Ruth Cole, which resulted in a mistrial in the Flathead County Justice Court. The Flathead County Attorney chose not to retry the matter, and the charges were dismissed.
Motions for summary judgment were filed by the defendants on February 8, February 11, and February 29, 1988. These motions were granted on April 28, 1988, by the court, on the grounds that the plaintiffs had not filed a responsive brief to the motions within the ten days prescribed by Rule 2, MUDCR. On May 9, 1988, the plaintiffs filed a motion to set aside the order granting summary judgment to the defendants and requested oral argument. On June 6, 1988, the District Court denied the plaintiffs' motion. Thereupon, this appeal followed.
Are the time provisions of Rule 2, MUDCR, applicable to motions for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56, M.R.Civ.P.?
The MUDCR became effective June 1, 1987. Rule 2, at issue in this case, is as follows:
Rule 2. Motions.
(a) Upon filing a motion or within five days thereafter, the moving party shall file a brief. The brief may be accompanied by appropriate supporting documents. Within ten days thereafter the adverse party shall file an answer brief which also may be accompanied by appropriate supporting documents. Within ten days thereafter, movant may file a reply brief or other appropriate responsive documents.
(b) Failure to file briefs. Failure to file briefs may subject the motion to summary ruling. Failure to file a brief within five days by the moving party shall be deemed an admission that the motion is without merit. Failure to file an answer brief by the adverse party within ten days shall be deemed an admission that the motion is well taken. Reply briefs by movant are optional, and failure to file will not subject a motion to summary ruling.
(c) Oral argument. The court may order oral argument sua sponte or upon application of a party.
(d) When motion deemed submitted. Unless oral argument is ordered or unless the time is enlarged by the court, the motion is deemed submitted at the expiration of any of the applicable time limits set forth above without supporting briefs having been filed.
If oral argument is ordered, the motion will be deemed submitted at the close of argument unless the court orders additional briefs, in which case the motion will be deemed submitted as of the date designated at the time for filing the final brief.
(e) In the event of conflict, the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure shall control. Time computation shall be governed by Rule 6(a), M.R.Civ.P. (Emphasis added.)
In this case, the defendants moved the court for summary judgment in their favor, pursuant to Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P. That rule is in accord with its federal counterpart, and with respect to subsequent procedures provides:
Rule 56(c). Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least 10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages. (Emphasis added.)
The purpose and effect in Montana of Rule 56, M.R.Civ.P. are well-settled. Its purpose is to dispose promptly of actions in which there is no genuine issue of fact. Silloway v. Jorgenson (1965), 146 Mont. 307, 406 P.2d 167. The formal issues presented by the pleadings are not controlling and the District Court must consider the evidentiary materials listed in Rule 56(c), and any other evidentiary matter to determine whether there exists a genuine issue of material fact. Hager v. Tandy (1965), 146 Mont. 531, 410 P.2d 447. Oral testimony at the hearing may properly be considered on motions for summary judgment. Citizens State Bank v. Duus (1969), 154 Mont. 18, 459 P.2d 696; Daniels v. Paddock (1965), 145 Mont. 207, 399 P.2d 740. If genuine issues of fact exist, an order deciding the fact issues on a motion for summary judgment is improper. Hull v. D. Irvin Transport (1984), 213 Mont. 75, 690 P.2d 414. We have held that a district court did not err by allowing defendants later to submit briefs and argue plaintiffs' summary judgment motion when defendant's counsel originally overlooked the motion. Todd v. Berner (1984), 214 Mont. 263, 693 P.2d 506.
Since the purpose of summary judgment is to encourage judicial economy by eliminating unnecessary trials, a grant of summary judgment is proper only where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The movant has the burden of showing a complete absence of any genuine issue as to all facts considered material in light of the substantive principles that entitle the movant to a judgment as a matter of law, and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the offer of proof are to be drawn in favor of the opposing party. Cereck v. Albertsons, Inc. (1981), 195 Mont. 409, 637 P.2d 509.
Of course, when the record, as made by the movant, discloses no genuine issue as to any material fact, the burden then shifts to the party opposing the summary judgment motion to present evidence of a material and substantial nature raising a genuine issue of fact. Mayer Bros. v. Daniel Richard Jewelers, Inc. (Mont.1986), 726 P.2d 815, 43 St.Rep. 1821.
When all is said and done, the essential question for the District Court in deciding a motion for summary judgment either for the plaintiff or for the defendant is whether there exists a genuine issue of material fact. That inquiry does not admit of decision merely on a technical point, such as whether briefs have been filed on time.
We had a similar question before this Court, before the adoption of the MUDCR, in Krusemark v. Hansen (1980), 186 Mont. 174, 606 P.2d 1082. In that case, a local district court rule provided that if a reply brief had not been filed within a ten-day period, the motion was deemed well taken. Relying on the local rule, the District Court had granted summary judgment. On appeal, this Court said:
Rule 56(c) contemplates that the adverse party can file opposing materials up to the day of the hearing. Since Rule 3 would deny this right to an adverse party who has not filed a timely brief, it cannot be applied to Rule 56 motions.
Rule 3 is also inconsistent with the basic function of the trial court in reviewing motions for summary judgment. Rule 56 places the burden of proof on the moving party to establish the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. [Citing authority.] The court has a duty under Rule 56 to deny a motion for summary judgment when there is any doubt whether a factual question exists. [Citing authority.] Rule 3 undermines the court's function to the extent that it deflects the court's attention from considering whether factual disputes exist and directs it solely to the question of whether a reply brief has been filed within the ten day period permitted by Rule 3.
The defendants in this case contend that Krusemark is not applicable because that case preceded the adoption of...
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