Roe v. City of Missoula

• Decision Date: 08 December 2009
• Docket Number: No. DA 07-0257.,DA 07-0257.
• Citation: 221 P.3d 1200,2009 MT 417,354 Mont. 1
• Parties: Brad and Adina ROE, Robert Hanneman, Douglas Miller, Dana Tatum, f/k/a Dana Skiftun, Corey Williamson and Michael George, and Geoffrey Easton, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY OF MISSOULA, acting through the Members of the MISSOULA CITY COUNCIL, John Engen, Heidi Kendall, Ed Childers, Ann Kazmierczak, Stacy Rye, Lou Ann Crowley, Jerry Ballas, Myrt Charney, Bob Lovegrove, Jack Reidy Clayton Floyd, Jr., Missoula County, Missoula County Clerk and Recorder, Defendants and Appellees.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

221 P.3d 1200

2009 MT 417

354 Mont. 1

Brad and Adina ROE, Robert Hanneman, Douglas Miller, Dana Tatum, f/k/a Dana Skiftun, Corey Williamson and Michael George, and Geoffrey Easton, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY OF MISSOULA, acting through the Members of the MISSOULA CITY COUNCIL, John Engen, Heidi Kendall, Ed Childers, Ann Kazmierczak, Stacy Rye, Lou Ann Crowley, Jerry Ballas, Myrt Charney, Bob Lovegrove, Jack Reidy Clayton Floyd, Jr., Missoula County, Missoula County Clerk and Recorder, Defendants and Appellees.

No. DA 07-0257.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs October 22, 2008.

Decided December 8, 2009.

For Appellants: Thomas C. Orr; Orr Law Offices, P.C.; Missoula, Montana.

For Appellees: Douglas J. Wold; Wold Law Firm, P.C.; Polson, Montana.

Justice JIM RICE delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 Brad Roe, Adina Roe, and other named plaintiffs (Roes) appeal two orders of the Fourth Judicial District Court, in and for Missoula County. The first order granted summary judgment to the City of Missoula on Roes' claim seeking declaratory judgment that the Missoula City Council (City Council) may not unilaterally undertake review of applications for exemption from subdivision review. The second order granted summary judgment to the City on Roes' constitutional and "tortious violation of statutory duties" claims. We affirm.

¶ 2 We restate the issues as follows:

¶ 3 Did the District Court err by granting the City's motions for summary judgment without expressly concluding that no genuine issues of material fact existed?

¶ 4 Did the District Court err by granting summary judgment to the City on Roes' claim seeking declaratory judgment that the City Council was not authorized to unilaterally undertake review of applications for exemption from subdivision review?

¶ 5 Did the District Court err by granting summary judgment to the City on Roes' claims of "tortious violation of statutory duties," equal protection, takings, and the right of participation?

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶ 6 The claims at issue arise from the City Council's action of unilaterally initiating review of applications seeking an exemption from requirements of the Montana Subdivision and Platting Act (MSPA) for relocation of a common boundary line or lot aggregation, instead of allowing the review to be conducted as provided by the Missoula City Subdivision Regulations (City Regulations).

¶ 7 The procedure, pursuant to the City Regulations, for review of requests seeking exemptions from the MSPA for land divisions within the City of Missoula, was initiated by filing an application with the Missoula City Attorney. The City Attorney reviewed the applications for the existence of circumstances requiring referral of the request to the City Council for further review. A primary consideration of the City Attorney's review was whether a proposed boundary line relocation or lot aggregation would increase the number of lots. As a matter of practice, if the number of lots upon approval of the application would be the same or less than the number of existing lots, the City Attorney generally approved the exemption application and referred the application to the Department of Public Works and Missoula City/County Office of Planning and Grants for final approval.

¶ 8 In March of 2004, Brad and Adina Roe submitted an application to relocate the boundary line on a rental property they own at 636 Evans Avenue in the City of Missoula. Brad and Adina Roe's property consists of two long and narrow contiguous lots, each approximately 30 feet by 130 feet, located within the University area. The lots share a common boundary running north and south, with a house straddling the common boundary, and each lot has access to both the street and alley. Brad and Adina Roe's application sought to move the common boundary ninety degrees, relocating the boundary so the house no longer straddled it. This would result in two, relatively square lots, with the northern lot having access only to the alley, and the southern lot having access only to the street. A consequence of the boundary relocation would be the creation of one vacant lot capable of being sold separately and serving as a building site.

¶ 9 After receiving complaints from neighboring property owners about Brad and Adina Roe's application, members of the City Council instructed the City Attorney to turn the application over to the Council. The City Attorney thus did not have an opportunity to review the application pursuant to the City Regulations and determine whether to either forward it to the Department of Public Works and Missoula City/County Office of Planning and Grants for final approval or forward it to the City Council for further review. The City Council conducted hearings on Brad and Adina Roe's proposed boundary line relocation and on July 12, 2004, rejected the exemption request on the basis that it was an attempt to improperly evade subdivision review.

¶ 10 On August 19, 2004, Brad and Adina Roe filed suit against the City, seeking a declaratory judgment that the City had violated review procedures under the City Regulations, and bringing multiple claims and a request for issuance of a writ of prohibition or mandate based thereon. Brad and Adina Roe claimed they were damaged by the City Council's intervention in the review process because their application would have been approved, as it did not increase the number of lots. The District Court bifurcated the claim for a declaratory judgment from the remaining claims.

¶ 11 In the following months, other parties filed similar applications for exemption from the MSPA and City Regulations for boundary line relocations or lot aggregations,¹ and the City Council denied those by the same procedures and on the same basis as they had denied Brad and Adina Roe's application. These denials resulted in the filing of eight additional lawsuits.² The District Court consolidated all nine cases into one.³

¶ 12 The City and Roes both sought summary judgment on Roes' declaratory claim that the City Regulations do not permit the City Council to unilaterally review applications for boundary line relocation or lot aggregation exemptions from subdivision review. The District Court, in its October 4, 2005 Opinion and Order,⁴ concluded the City acted properly by denying all of the applications because none of them qualified for an exemption as either a boundary line relocation or lot aggregation, and granted summary judgment to the City. The City then filed a second motion for summary judgment on the Roes' remaining claims of "tortious violation of statutory duties," equal protection, takings, and the right of participation. The District Court, in its February 7, 2007 Opinion, granted the City's motion.

¶ 13 Roes appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 14 "We review a district court's grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment de novo, using the same criteria applied by the district court under M.R. Civ. P. 56." Corporate Air v. Edwards Jet Ctr., 2008 MT 283, ¶ 24, 345 Mont. 336, 190 P.3d 1111 (citation omitted). Under Rule 56(c), judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Corporate Air, ¶ 24. "A material fact is a fact that involves the elements of the cause of action or defenses at issue to an extent that necessitates resolution of the issue by a trier of fact." Corporate Air, ¶ 24 (quoting Arnold v. Yellowstone Mt. Club, LLC, 2004 MT 284, ¶ 15, 323 Mont. 295, 100 P.3d 137). "The party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden of establishing both the absence of genuine issues of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law." Corporate Air, ¶ 25 (citing Hughes v. Lynch, 2007 MT 177, ¶ 8, 338 Mont. 214, 164 P.3d 913). If the moving party meets this burden, then the "burden ... shifts to the nonmoving party to establish that a genuine issue of material fact does exist." Corporate Air, ¶ 25 (citing Hughes, ¶ 8). If no genuine issues of material fact exist, the district court "then determines whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Corporate Air, ¶ 25 (citing Hughes, ¶ 8). We review a district court's determination of judgment as a matter of law for correctness. Corporate Air, ¶ 25 (citing Hughes, ¶ 8).

¶ 15 Our standard of review pertaining to a declaratory judgment is to determine if the court's interpretation of law is correct. Karlson v. Rosich, 2006 MT 290, ¶ 7, 334 Mont. 370, 147 P.3d 196 (quoting Skinner v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2005 MT 323, ¶ 10, 329 Mont. 511, 127 P.3d 359).

¶ 16 "If we reach the same conclusion as the district court, but on different grounds, we may nonetheless affirm the district court's judgment." Germann v. Stephens, 2006 MT 130, ¶ 21, 332 Mont. 303, 137 P.3d 545 (citing Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Liss, 2000 MT 380, ¶ 25, 303 Mont. 519, 16 P.3d 399).

DISCUSSION

¶ 17 Did the District Court err by granting the City's motions for summary judgment without expressly concluding that no genuine issues of material fact existed?

¶ 18 Roes argue the District Court erred in analyzing the motions for summary judgment because it failed to expressly conclude no genuine issues of material fact existed. The City responds that the court's opinions were "lengthy, detailed and more than adequately state with `particularity' the `rationale' for granting the City summary judgment." Both parties cite Cole v. Flathead Co., 236 Mont. 412, 419, 771 P.2d 97, 101-02 (1989), for the rule that "[a] district court is required under Rule 52(a), M.R.Civ.P. in granting a motion under Rules 12 or 56 to specify the grounds therefore with sufficient particularity as to apprise the parties and the appellate court of the rationale underlying the...