Cole v. Neaf, 17522.
Citation | 334 F.2d 326 |
Decision Date | 21 July 1964 |
Docket Number | No. 17522.,17522. |
Parties | Edna Ruth COLE, Appellant, v. G. Joseph NEAF, an Individual, and G. Joseph Neaf, Public Administrator for St. Louis County, Missouri, et al., Appellees. |
Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit) |
Richard B. Dempsey of Eaker, Dempsey, Heath & Dempsey, Clayton, Mo., made argument for the appellant and filed brief.
John J. Stewart, Clayton, Mo., made argument for the appellees and filed brief with Thomas P. Howe of Howe, LeMay, Dunlop, Stewart & Quillin, Clayton, Mo., and Donald J. Stohr, Asst. County Counselor, and also Joseph Moore, Asst. County Counselor, Clayton, Mo.
Before VAN OOSTERHOUT, BLACKMUN and MEHAFFY, Circuit Judges.
VAN OOSTERHOUT, Circuit Judge.
This is an appeal by plaintiff Edna Ruth Cole, formerly Edna Ruth Bullock, from final judgment dismissing her malicious prosecution action against G. Joseph Neaf, individually and as Public Administrator for St. Louis County, Missouri, and against the United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company, surety upon his administrator's bond. Judge Meredith's well-considered opinion fairly setting out the facts, the issues and the reasons why the action should be dismissed is reported at 221 F.Supp. 875.
Jurisdiction, based upon diversity of citizenship, is established. This cause of action arose in Missouri and hence the law of that state controls.
Plaintiff's husband, James Bullock, died on December 17, 1958, of gunshot wounds which the coroner's report states were fired by parties unknown. Plaintiff, who had married James Bullock on June 28, 1958, was named sole beneficiary in three policies of life insurance aggregating $64,500 issued by Prudential Insurance Company, General American Life Insurance Company and Aid Association for Lutherans. Mrs. Cole was pressing the insurance companies for payment of their policies.
Each of said companies in March 1959 filed interpleader actions in the federal court depositing the proceeds of their policies. All named plaintiff and defendant as claimants and the companies, other than Prudential, also named Gertrude Duerbeck, an aunt of insured who prior to Bullock's marriage was a named beneficiary. Orders were entered in each of the interpleader suits in April 1959 accepting the deposit and discharging each insurance company from further liability and enjoining defendant claimants from instituting suit against the insurance companies upon their respective policies. Subsequently, after trial, the court in the interpleader actions determined plaintiff was entitled to the proceeds of the policies.
It is plaintiff's claim that Neaf wrongfully instigated the Prudential interpleader action and that he wrongfully continued prosecution of the other interpleader actions and that such conduct constituted malicious prosecution entitling plaintiff to damages sustained.
It is undisputed that Neaf as public administrator had properly been appointed administrator of Bullock's estate as required by Missouri law. Neaf in April 1959 filed answer in each of the interpleader actions, claiming the proceeds of the insurance policies for the estate upon the ground that plaintiff as named beneficiary was disqualified because she is guilty of complicity in the intentional killing of her husband.
The case was tried to the court without a jury. Judgment of dismissal, based upon fact-findings, was entered. This appeal followed.
As a basis for reversal, plaintiff urges the trial court committed error in the following respects:
1. In determining that Neaf had not instigated the Prudential suit.
2. In determining that Neaf had not wrongfully continued prosecution of the General American and Aid Association for Lutherans suits.
3. In refusing to permit plaintiff to amend pleadings to conform with proof.
4. In finding that malice was not established.
5. In permitting improper cross-examination of plaintiff.
The trial court correctly states the basic Missouri law governing malicious prosecution actions as follows:
The court based its dismissal upon its finding that elements (1), (2) and (4) above set out are not established. Elements (3), (5) and (6) were established.
We have chosen to give first consideration to point (4) relating to the court's finding that malice was not established, as we regard such issue to be dispositive of this appeal. Without doubt, malice is an essential element of plaintiff's cause of action. Unless plaintiff has established that the court's fact-finding against her on the malice issue is clearly erroneous, an affirmance is required.
The trial court determined that plaintiff had established that the charges against her contained in defendants' answers in the interpleader actions were made without probable cause. This finding was based upon the court's view that the failure of the officers to charge or the grand jury to indict plaintiff on charges of complicity in the murder made a prima facie case of want of probable cause and that such prima facie case had not been rebutted by Neaf except as it bears on malice. Additionally, the court stated, "We cannot say as a matter of fact that defendant Neaf honestly believed that plaintiff was guilty of the facts charged." 221 F.Supp. 875, 880.
Plaintiff's position is that where, as here, lack of probable cause is established, the burden shifts to defendant to show lack of malice. Stubbs v. Mulholland, 168 Mo. 47, 67 S.W. 650, 658; Kvasnicka v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 350 Mo. 360, 166 S.W.2d 503, 514, cited by the plaintiff, support her position.
In Kvasnicka, the court states:
166 S.W.2d 503, 514.
The Missouri cases cited by Judge Meredith fully support his view of the law as stated in his opinion as follows:
"While plaintiff correctly states that malice may be inferred from want of probable cause, Stubbs v. Mulholland, supra; explained in Kvasnicka v. Montgomery Ward & Co., supra, still `the inference of malice from want of probable cause is one of fact to be drawn by the jury, but the jury are not required to find it merely because they find want of probable cause.\'" 221 F.Supp. 875, 881.
Such is also the law generally. Wheeler v. Nesbitt, 24 How. 544, 65 U.S. 552, 16 L.Ed. 765; Renda v. International Union, United A., A. & A. I. Wkrs., 366 Mich. 58, 114 N.W.2d 343, 362; 54 C.J.S. Malicious Prosecution § 43; 34 Am.Jur., Malicious Prosecution §§ 160, 167.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals in Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Anderson, 206 Ky. 600, 268 S.W. 311, 312, aptly states:
"If the law imputed malice from want of probable cause alone, then there would be no distinct requirement of malice, but want of probable cause would be the sole element necessary."
Here the court was the fact-finder. The court's finding on the malice issue reads:
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