Cole v. Riley

• Decision Date: 19 October 2007
• Docket Number: 1050662.
• Citation: 989 So.2d 1001
• Parties: R.W. COLE et al. v. Bob RILEY, Governor of the State of Alabama, et al.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

989 So.2d 1001

R.W. COLE et al. v. Bob RILEY, Governor of the State of Alabama, et al.

1050662.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

October 19, 2007.

Order Overruling Rehearing March 7, 2008.

Shannon L. Goessling and Katherine D. Jordan, Southeastern Legal Foundation, Inc., Atlanta, Georgia; and D.M. Samsil, Birmingham, for appellants.

Troy King, atty. gen., and Margaret L. Fleming, asst. atty. gen., for appellees.

Ted Pearson, Birmingham, for amicus curiae United States Business & Industrial Council, in support of the appellants.

William D. Coleman and Arden R. Pathak of Capell & Howard, P.C., Montgomery, for amicus curiae Montgomery Area Chamber of Commerce, in support of the appellees.

COBB, Chief Justice.

This appeal presents the issue whether the practice by the Alabama Department of Public Safety ("ADPS") of offering the written portion of driver's license examinations in multiple languages violates the Alabama Constitution. The appellants, R.W. Cole, J.P. Hendrick, Thomas F. Schenzel, Stuart Shipe, and Charles Van Brock (hereinafter referred to collectively as "Cole"), are all members of the nonprofit organization "ProEnglish" based in Arlington, Virginia. Cole sued Bob Riley, Governor of the State of Alabama, and W.M. Coppage, director of ADPS, in their official capacities (hereinafter referred to collectively as "Riley"), in the Montgomery Circuit Court after Sandoval v. Hagan, 197 F.3d 484 (11th Cir.1999), a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit holding that "English-only" driver's license tests violate the disparate-impact regulations of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, was reversed by the United States Supreme Court on the grounds that Title VI did not create a private right of action for individual plaintiffs. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 121 S.Ct. 1511, 149 L.Ed.2d 517 (2001).¹ Cole argued to the Montgomery Circuit Court that because the United States Supreme Court had reversed the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Sandoval, the district court's determination in Sandoval that a policy of English-only driver's license testing violates Title VI has no precedential value. Cole argued that Alabama's current practice of offering the written portion of the driver's license test in languages other than English should cease because, he says, the practice violates Amendment No. 509, Alabama Constitution 1901, which was ratified by the voters of Alabama in 1990, and which is now codified as Art. I, § 36.01, Ala. Const. 1901(Off.Recomp.) ("Amendment No. 509"). Amendment No. 509, which establishes English as the official language of Alabama, provides:

"English is the official language of the state of Alabama. The legislature shall enforce this amendment by appropriate legislation. The legislature and officials of the state of Alabama shall take all steps necessary to insure that the role of English as the common language of the state of Alabama is preserved and enhanced. The legislature shall make no law which diminishes or ignores the role of English as the common language of the state of Alabama.

"Any person who is a resident of or doing business in the state of Alabama shall have standing to sue the state of Alabama to enforce this amendment, and the courts of record of the state of Alabama shall have jurisdiction to hear cases brought to enforce this provision. The legislature may provide reasonable and appropriate limitations on the time and manner of suits brought under this amendment."

(Emphasis added.)

Riley filed a motion for a summary judgment on the grounds that Sandoval remains binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit, which includes Alabama, because the United States Supreme Court's reversal was on a purely procedural ground; that federal law requires that states provide meaningful access to driver's license examinations for people with limited English proficiency; and that Amendment No. 509 does not require that written driver's license examinations be administered only in English.

In his response to Riley's summary-judgment motion, Cole stated:

"This is a very simple case involving two very straightforward questions of law— namely, (a) whether the State's current policy of giving its driver's license exam in multiple languages violates Ala. Cons. Art. I, § 36.01, and (b) if so, whether the Alabama Constitution is overridden by federal law."

Cole made no evidentiary submissions to the trial court.

The trial court recognized Cole's failure to offer evidence indicating that English-only testing for driver's licenses is necessary to preserve and enhance English as the common language or that testing in multiple languages is leading to the erosion of English as the common language of the State of Alabama. The trial court entered a summary judgment for Riley; in its summary-judgment order the trial court stated, in pertinent part:

"The Court, therefore, need not decide what Title VI or its regulations require, nor whether they are valid. Rather, [Cole's] claim can be resolved by reference to Amendment 509 itself, which provides that `English is the official language of the state of Alabama.' This makes English Alabama's official language—not its only language. Even the organization of which [Cole is] a part— ProEnglish—states on its website that `Official English doesn't mean "English only."' (Defs.' Ex. 10.) Moreover, nowhere does Amendment 509 mandate English-only driver's license testing.

"[Cole has] submitted no evidence to establish that, as a factual matter, English-only driver's license testing is `necessary' to preserve and enhance the role of English as the State's common language. Nor [has he] proved the contrary—that multiple-language testing has, as a factual matter, led to the erosion of English as the State's common language."

Cole appealed.

Our standard of review for a summary judgment is settled:

"In reviewing the disposition of a motion for summary judgment, `we utilize the same standard as the trial court in determining whether the evidence before [it] made out a genuine issue of material fact,' Bussey v. John Deere Co., 531 So.2d 860, 862 (Ala.1988), and whether the movant was `entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.' Wright v. Wright, 654 So.2d 542 (Ala.1995); Rule 56(c), Ala. R. Civ. P. When the movant makes a prima facie showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to present substantial evidence creating such an issue. Bass v. SouthTrust Bank of Baldwin County, 538 So.2d 794, 797-98 (Ala.1989). Evidence is `substantial' if it is of `such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved.' Wright, 654 So.2d at 543 (quoting West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So.2d 870, 871 (Ala. 1989)). Our review is further subject to the caveat that this Court must review the record in a light most favorable to the nonmovant and must resolve all reasonable doubts against the movant. Wilma Corp. v. Fleming Foods of Alabama, Inc., 613 So.2d 359 (Ala.1993); Hanners v. Balfour Guthrie, Inc., 564 So.2d 412, 413 (Ala.1990)."

Hobson v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 690 So.2d 341, 344 (Ala.1997).

We summarize the facts as follows: the written examination for an Alabama driver's license was administered in multiple foreign languages from the 1970s to 1991. After the ratification of Amendment No. 509, ADPS implemented a policy of giving written driver's license examinations exclusively in English, and it withheld from those taking the tests access to any kind of foreign-language interpretative aids or translators. Accommodations for deaf, disabled, and illiterate applicants remained available.

In 1996, Martha Sandoval, on her own behalf and on behalf of those similarly situated, sued L.N. Hagan, then acting director of ADPS, in the United States District Court of the Middle District of Alabama, claiming that ADPS's policy of offering written driver's license tests exclusively in English violated the national-origin protections contained in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court ruled in favor of Sandoval. Sandoval v. Hagan, 7 F.Supp.2d 1234 (M.D.Ala. 1998). After the district court's decision in Sandoval, ADPS reinstated the practice of administering the written portion of the driver's license test in foreign languages. That practice continues to this date. Presently, ADPS offers the written portion of the driver's license test in 12 foreign languages, including Spanish, Vietnamese, Korean, Chinese, Japanese, French, Arabic, German, Russian, Thai, Farsi, and Greek.

Hagan appealed the district court's decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. That court upheld the lower court's decision, stating: "[W]e can find no error in the district court's conclusion of law that the English-only policy evinces an unlawful disparate impact based on national origin." Sandoval v. Hagan, 197 F.3d at 510. James Alexander, the ADPS director at the time the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit issued its opinion, petitioned the United States Supreme Court for certiorari review. The Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Sandoval, addressing only the issue whether Title VI created a private right of action and concluding that such a right does not exist for the individual: "[W]e have found no evidence anywhere in the text to suggest that Congress intended to create a private right to enforce regulations promulgated under § 602 [of Title VI]." Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 291, 121 S.Ct. 1511.

After a careful examination of the record, we note that Riley, in support of his motion for a summary judgment, attached his answers to Cole's interrogatories, which indicated that permitting individuals of limited English proficiency to take the written portion of the Alabama driver's license test in...