Cole v. State

• Decision Date: 26 March 1886
• Citation: 102 N.Y. 48,6 N.E. 277
• Parties: COLE v. STATE.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

102 N.Y. 48

6 N.E. 277

COLE

v.STATE.

Court of Appeals of New York.

March 26, 1886.

DANFORTH, J., dissenting

D. O'Brien, Atty. Gen., for the State.

J. Rider Cady, for respondent.

RAPALLO, J.

This appeal must be determined on the facts found by the board of claims, and the conclusions of law stated by them in their decision, and excepted to by the state. Even if there should be found in the opinions of the members of the board any views in which we do not concur, that would not be ground of reversal, provided we concur in their conclusions of law.

Various points were argued by the learned attorney general in support of the appeal, to which we will refer, but the main ground upon which he claimed, upon the argument, that the decision of the board of claims should be reversed, was that the act of 1885 (chapter 238) contravened section 19 of article 3 of the constitution of this state, which provides that ‘the legislature shall neither audit nor allow any private claim or account against the state, but may appropriate money to pay such claims as shall have been audited and allowed according to law.’ This being the principal point urged, we will first give it our attention.

The act of 1885 (chapter 238, § 1) enacts that the acts and services of Chester L. Cole, while acting as captain of the port of the city of New York, and of 11 other persons named in the act, while acting as harbor masters of the same port, ‘actually performed by them from and including May 24, 1883, to and including May 24, 1884, are hereby, respectively, ratified, legalized, and confirmed.’ Section 2 enacts that ‘jurisdiction is hereby conferred upon the board of claims to hear, audit, and determine the claims of the persons named in section one hereof, or of their legal representatives, for a reasonable compensation for such services rendered, and for expenditures incurred by said individuals, respectively, as acting captain of the port of New York and harbor masters of the port of New York, from and including the twenty-fourth day of May, 1883, to and including the twenty-fourth day of May, 1884.’ It is apparent that the act does not come within the prohibition against the auditing by the legislature of any private claim. The act does not purport to audit the claims. This the legislature could not do, however just the claim or however legal it might be if preferred against an individual. The constitution prohibits the legislature from exercising the power of itself auditing claims, which is in its nature judicial, but provides for the payment of claims which shall have been audited or allowed according to law; thus recognizing the power of the legislature to provide by law for the auditing and allowing, by some appropriate tribunal, of claims against the state.

It is contended, however, that the act does come within the prohibition against allowing claims against the state. It must be observed that the act of 1885 does not even assume to allow these claims. It simply submits them to the arbitrament of the board of claims, a judicial body established for the purpose of passing upon claims against the state. It gives jurisdiction to that tribunal to hear and determine those claims, but does not dictate how it shall decide upon them. The only limitation upon the power of the board to decide is that it shall confine itself to a reasonable compensation for services performed and expenses incurred during the year specified. Under the authority conferred by the act, that tribunal, if it deemed the claims unjust, might have rejected them in toto. The power to hear and determine, includes power to reject as well as to allow. Construing the constitutional restriction literally, it was not violated by giving to the board jurisdiction to hear and determine. The enactment was consequently purely legislative, and in no sense an exercise of judicial power.

It is contended, however, that the enactment was violative of the spirit and intent of the constitutional prohibition, if not of its letter; that it was intended, not merely to prevent the legislature from itself acting judicially in passing upon private claims, but from passing any law under which a private claim could be recognized by or established against the state, however just and equitable it might be, unless it was founded on a legal liability which could be enforced by the courts of justice against an individual or a corporation. We find no such restriction upon the legislative power in the state constitution. The act establishing the board of claims (Laws 1883, c. 205, amended by Laws 1884, c. 60) confers upon the board jurisdiction to hear, audit, and determine all private claims which shall have accrued within two years, except such as are barred by existing statutes. But that restriction was imposed by the legislature, and is subject to modification by it.

The statute of limitations and other legal defenses are, under the general law, available to the state as against a private claim preferred to the board of claims; and, as a general rule, it has been considered that the authority of the board is confined to the allowance of legal claims. But can it be maintained that it would be beyond the power of the legislature, in special cases wherein its judgment, justice, and right demanded it, to give power to the board of claims to disregard defenses strictly legal? We are unable to find in the constitution anything which deprives the legislature of the power of giving to the board of claims, or any other proper tribunal, jurisdiction to hear and determine claims against the state which are founded in right and justice, solely for the reason that they could not be enforced against an individual in the courts. Power to disregard the limitation as to time was exercised in chapter 204 of the Laws of 1884, which enacted that the claim of James Galloway before the board of claims should be exempted from the limitation contained in the act of 1883, (chapter 205;) and by chapter 418 of the Laws of 1884 exclusive jurisdiction was conferred upon the board of claims to audit and allow the claims of owners of diseased cattle slaughtered to prevent the spread of contagious diseases, though it is by no means clear that for the public safety the legislature might not require the destruction of such cattle without making compensation. Where the creation of a particular class of liabilities is prohibited by the constitution, it would of course be an infraction of that instrument to pass any law authorizing their enforcement; but, in the absence of any such prohibition, there is no good reason why the state should be powerless to do justice or to recognize obligations which are meritorious and honorary, and to provide tribunals to pass upon them. The legislative power is sufficient, even as between individuals, to afford new remedies and to create liabilities not before existing, where they are based upon general principles of justice.

As a general rule, money expended or services rendered by one individual for the benefit of another, but without his request or authority, do not create a legal liability on the part of the person benefited to make compensation. But a law which should provide that in every such case if the party benefited ratifies the acts of the other, and accepts the benefits, he should be liable, would be free from objections so far, at all events, as it should apply to future transactions. Where the legislature is dealing with the imperfect obligation arising from such a state of facts, it seems to us that it does not transcend its powers by passing a law affording a remedy even in respect to past transactions, where the state adopts the acts, and is the party to make the compensation, and no right of individuals which are protected by the constitution are invaded.

In this point of view, it is material to consider the nature of the claim which the board of claims was empowered by the act of 1885 to hear and determine, and the determination which it made. The office of captain of the port was created by chapter 436 of the Laws of 1860. Section 1 of that act authorized the appointment of a captain of the port to hold office for three years, and section 2 prescribed his duties, which were to prosecute for all violations of law in respect to the harbor of New York; to provide suitable accommodations at the piers, slips, and basins in said harbor, for the lading and discharging of vessels; and to designate anchoring grounds for vessels in said harbor. Section 3 authorized the appointment of 11 harbor masters to assist the captain in the discharge of his duties. Section 6 provided that all fines and penalties...