Coleman v. American Red Cross
| Decision Date | 24 June 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 93-1130,93-1130 |
| Citation | 23 F.3d 1091 |
| Parties | Cheryl COLEMAN; Gerry Coleman, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. AMERICAN RED CROSS; American Red Cross Blood Services--Southeastern Michigan Region, Defendants-Appellees, Paul Lentz, M.D.; Thomas J. Schnitzer, M.D., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Jonas Sniokaitis (argued and briefed), Cummings, McClorey, Davis & Acho, Livonia, MI, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Daniel G. Wyllie (argued), Margaret A. Costello (briefed), Dykema & Gossett, Detroit, MI, Bruce M. Chadwick, Kathleen A. Behan, Arnold & Porter, Washington, DC, for defendants-appellees.
Before: GUY and RYAN, Circuit Judges, and CONTIE, Senior Circuit Judge.
RYAN, Circuit Judge (pp. 13-19), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.
RALPH B. GUY, Jr., Circuit Judge.
Plaintiffs, Cheryl and Gerry Coleman, appeal the district court's dismissal of their negligence action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). The court dismissed their claim against the American Red Cross because it found that they had violated a discovery protective order. The plaintiffs also contend on appeal that the district court erred: (1) in applying the wrong standard to preclude the discovery of relevant information; and (2) in prohibiting the plaintiffs from obtaining discovery of documents located at the Red Cross' national headquarters. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
This case is now before us for a third time. See Coleman v. American Red Cross, 979 F.2d 1135 (6th Cir.1992); Coleman v. American Red Cross, No. 91-1421 (6th Cir. Aug. 12, 1991). The issues raised on appeal involve substantially the same events that were outlined in Coleman, 979 F.2d at 1135. Thus, for purposes of this analysis, we only need to briefly summarize the facts.
On August 15, 1984, Cheryl Coleman received a blood transfusion at the University of Michigan Hospital. The blood Mrs. Coleman received had been donated to the Red Cross six days earlier. That blood apparently contained the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), the virus that causes Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS). Mrs. Coleman's blood tested positive for HIV antibodies in September 1988.
The Colemans then filed an action, claiming that the Red Cross was negligent in failing to screen out the infected donor and in failing to test the donor's blood after collecting it. During discovery, the Colemans requested the donor's name and address, but the Red Cross refused to provide this information. Eventually, the district court ordered the Red Cross to furnish the donor's records to the Colemans but with all information that would identify the donor redacted. Coleman v. American Red Cross, 130 F.R.D. 360, 363 (E.D.Mich.1990).
The Red Cross subsequently delivered several donor information cards to the Colemans. On one of the cards, the Red Cross inadvertently failed to redact the donor's social security number. The Coleman's attorney immediately hired a private investigator who was able to determine the donor's name and address from information he obtained as a result of having the social security number.
When the Red Cross learned of this, it moved for a protective order to prevent the Colemans and their attorney from using this information. The district court ordered the Colemans and their attorney to turn over any documents containing the donor's name and enjoined them from using the information for any purpose, including using the name to bring an action against the donor.
The Colemans appealed this order, arguing that the district court erred by enjoining them from suing the donor. We agreed, finding that the district court had abused its discretion by prohibiting the Colemans from bringing a separate proceeding against the donor. Coleman, 979 F.2d at 1141. We remanded to the district court for further proceedings.
When the case returned to the district court, the Red Cross filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 41(b). In support of its motion, the Red Cross claimed that it was substantially prejudiced by the Colemans' intentional violation of the protective order. The district court found that the facts supported this assertion and entered an order to dismiss the complaint. The Colemans then filed this appeal.
Under Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, when a plaintiff fails to comply with any order of the court, the defendant may move for dismissal of the action. 1 Court orders imposing sanctions under this rule are reviewable only for abuse of discretion. Carter v. City of Memphis, Tenn., 636 F.2d 159, 161 (6th Cir.1980).
In the past, we have upheld the use of "dismissals as a sanction for failing to comply with discovery orders because it accomplishes the dual purposes of punishing the offending party and deterring similar misconduct by future litigants." Taylor v. Medtronics, Inc., 861 F.2d 980, 986 (6th Cir.1988) (citations omitted). In response to the argument that a party should not be required to suffer harm for an attorney's derelictions, the Supreme Court stated:
There is certainly no merit to the contention that dismissal of petitioner's claim because of his counsel's unexcused conduct imposes an unjust penalty on the client. Petitioner voluntarily chose this attorney as his representative in the action, and he cannot now avoid the consequences of the acts or omissions of this freely selected agent. Any other notion would be wholly inconsistent with our system of representative litigation, in which each party is deemed bound by the acts of his lawyer-agent and is considered to have "notice of all facts, notice of which can be charged upon the attorney."
Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 633-34, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 1390, 8 L.Ed.2d 734 (1962) (citation omitted).
Despite the Supreme Court's unequivocal language, this court, like many others, has been extremely reluctant to uphold the dismissal of a case merely to discipline an attorney. Buck v. United States Dep't of Agric., 960 F.2d 603, 608 (6th Cir.1992); Shepard Claims Serv. v. William Darrah & Assoc., 796 F.2d 190, 195 (6th Cir.1986). In Carter we stated that the "dismissal of an action for an attorney's failure to comply is a harsh sanction which the court should order only in extreme situations showing 'a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct by the plaintiff.' " 636 F.2d at 161 (emphasis added) (quoting Silas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 586 F.2d 382, 385 (5th Cir.1978)). We also noted in Carter that "[d]ismissal is usually inappropriate where the neglect is solely the fault of the attorney." Id. See also Carver v. Bunch, 946 F.2d 451, 454 (6th Cir.1991); Patton v. Aerojet Ordnance Co., 765 F.2d 604, 607 (6th Cir.1985).
In Patterson v. Township of Grand Blanc, 760 F.2d 686, 688 (6th Cir.1985), we reversed a dismissal, adjudging that sanction to be "extremely harsh in that it deprives a plaintiff of his day in court due to the inept actions of his counsel[.]" Patterson relied upon Carter, which reversed a dismissal under Rule 41(b) because, while plaintiff's counsel had been inept, the plaintiff was blameless. We implicitly found that a potential claim against the plaintiff's attorney did not overcome the harm that the plaintiff would suffer from dismissing the action. See also Lolatchy v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 816 F.2d 951 (4th Cir.1987) (); Carter v. Albert Einstein Medical Cent., 804 F.2d 805 (3d Cir.1986) (). Thus, although the Link principle remains valid, see National Hockey League v. Metro. Hockey Club, 427 U.S. 639, 96 S.Ct. 2778, 49 L.Ed.2d 747 (1976), we have increasingly emphasized directly sanctioning the delinquent lawyer rather than an innocent client.
Here, all of the wrongful conduct must be attributed to counsel; the Colemans did not engage in any culpable conduct themselves. Even the district court itself noted that the "[d]efendants do not claim that plaintiffs participated directly in the investigation which culminated in discovering the identity of the purported donor." (App. 64.) Admittedly, the attorney's actions in this case were more egregious than in the cases previously discussed; however, this does not mandate that the attorney's conduct be imputed to the Colemans.
The Red Cross argues that it was substantially prejudiced by the violation of the protective order. Previously, in reversing the district court's order that prohibited the Colemans from suing the donor, we noted that "the district court did not commit error in concluding that donor disclosure could imperil the safety and adequacy of the national blood supply." Coleman, 979 F.2d at 1139. The genesis of this observation, however, was whether or not the court could consider the impact on the blood supply in fashioning its order. In no way did we endorse any substantive finding as to whether donor disclosure would imperil the blood supply. Thus, we now look for the first time to see if the defendants actually were prejudiced when the Colemans learned of the donor's identity.
There is no evidence that the Colemans have used, or could use, the donor's identity to directly prejudice the Red Cross insofar as this litigation is concerned. As proof of its having been prejudiced, the Red Cross points to a drop in blood donations, which it attributes to the publicity surrounding our previous decision. 2 This publicity, it claims, spawned fear among the public; fewer people are donating blood because now they fear possible liability. In response, the Colemans noted that even prior to...
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