Coleman v. Ammons, 14483
Decision Date | 16 May 1952 |
Docket Number | No. 14483,14483 |
Citation | 249 S.W.2d 1014 |
Parties | COLEMAN v. AMMONS et ux. |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Saunders & Thurmond, Tyler, for appellant.
L. F. Sanders, Canton, for appellees.
Appellees have filed a motion for rehearing attacking our original judgment herein reversing and rendering the cause for appellant. A majority is now of the opinion that our original judgment was not correct and that the motion for rehearing should be sustained.
Appellees' trial petition, omitting heading and prayer, was as follows:
The prayer was for $330, plus expense of defense, etc.
Appellee himself testified as to his residence at Edom, Van Zandt County, and as to what happened on the occasion of the signing of the contract of appellant as follows:
'
'
Ammons further testified that he did not get a copy of the contract at the time he signed it; that Mr. Coleman admitted to him that salesman who took the order worked for him, but denied responsibility for what the salesman did. Ammons also testified that Coleman, referring to the salesman, said: 'I have the laws hunting him, he is nothing but a crook.' Ammons was corroborated as to his conversations as to the salesman's representation and guarantee that it would insulate the house against rats, roaches, insects and mice, by his wife and four other disinterested witnesses who heard the conversations. One of the disinterested witnesses, the Justice of the Peace at Edom, testified:
Under such record, appellant Coleman was charged with the representations of his salesman, and sustained the court's findings of liability against Coleman, at least for nominal damages for fraud.
In 20 Tex.Jur. 115, sec. 77, the rule in Texas is correctly stated as follows:
See, also, 20 Tex.Jur., sec. 78, p. 117, id., and Wilson v. Jones, Tex.Com.App., 45 S.W.2d 572, Commission of Appeals (holdings approved by our Supreme Court).
Appellant also asserts that there was insufficient allegation or proof of damages. The evidence shows the insulation to be worthless for the purpose for which Ammons bought it, to wit, that it was proper for and would accomplish the insulation of his building against insects, ants, mice, etc. The trial court found damages by reason of the fraud of the salesman of $275. Coleman, under his contract, was to receive $316.20 plus interest, etc., for the job and the innocent purchaser of said note received some $330 from the Ammons in payment thereof. The material question here is whether the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's findings and judgment for $275. If so, the judgment must be affirmed.
Under the record, the insulation involved in the contract, became a part of Ammons' real property and good only for a purpose for which he had no need of it. The record is bare of testimony that it could be removed or that it added to the value of the property. Accepting the testimony of Ammons and his witnesses as true, as found by the trial court, it was clear that the insulation was of little or no value to him, and sustained the court's finding on the amount of damages ($275) suffered by Ammons.
For the reasons stated, the motion for rehearing is granted, our former judgment set aside, and the judgment below is now affirmed.
Plaintiffs, when approached by defendant's agent, stated among other things that their principal concern in having house insulated was the elimination of rats, mice, bugs and insects, whereupon the agent verbally guaranteed that the system to be installed would absolutely eradicate all such rodents and pests and dffinitely prevent their return to the premises. In reliance on such representations, they say, the contract was signed and installation completed; and the trial court has established the falsity of such statements inducing contract and payment of consideration.
The writing does not cover any warranties of any kind; hence the principle invoked in Distributors Inv. Co. v. Patton, 130 Tex. 449, 110 S.W.2d 47, does not apply. However it does include the proviso: 'It is understood that the entire contract is contained in this agreement and that no verbal or otherwise understanding shall be binding on the contractor'; which recital, it is argued, conclusively estops the house-owner...
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...in which it was said that if the contract was induced by fraud the absence of fraud in its execution was immaterial; Coleman v. Ammons, Tex.Civ.App., 249 S.W.2d 1014, no writ history, in which there was also a vigorous dissent based on the Avery Co., Wright and Patton cases; Roy Klossner Co......
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...101 Tex. 473, 108 S.W. 1165; Note, 21 Tex. Law Review 811, 812; 3 Williston on Contracts (Rev.Ed.), Sec. 811A. But cf., Coleman v. Ammons, Tex.Civ.App., 249 S.W.2d 1014. Texas abandoned its distinction between fraud in the inducement and fraud in the execution in determining the force of me......
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