Coleman v. Aycock
| Decision Date | 22 September 1969 |
| Docket Number | No. GC 6538.,GC 6538. |
| Parties | Joe Nathan COLEMAN, Willie Lee Hazelwood, Aline Hunter, and William H. Scott, Plaintiffs, v. C. B. AYCOCK, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
Reuben V. Anderson and Fred Banks, of Anderson, Banks & Nichols, Jackson, Miss., Jonathan Shapiro, New York City, for plaintiffs.
Irby Turner, Jr., James T. Bridges, Jr., Belzoni, Miss., Will S. Wells, Asst. Atty. Gen. of Mississippi, Jackson, Miss., for defendants.
Plaintiffs, Joe Nathan Coleman, Willie Lee Hazelwood, Aline Hunter and William H. Scott, Negro resident citizens of the City of Belzoni, Humphreys County, Mississippi, brought this class action on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, against certain elected and appointed officers of said county and city.
Humphreys County is situated in the Mississippi Delta. The population of the county is 19,093, of which 13,300, or approximately 69% is black.1 Belzoni is the county seat of the county, and has a population of 4142 of which 2528, or approximately 61% is black.2 Belzoni was chartered in 1895.
Plaintiffs, at least two of whom (Coleman and Hunter) were residents of Belzoni at the time the action was filed, contend that defendants have been, are and will be enforcing racial discrimination and segregation in the use of public facilities under color of law or custom and usage. The facilities, the use of which is the subject of this action include, inter alia, the courthouse, jail, hospital, swimming pools, parks, and streets. Plaintiffs complain also of discrimination in the rendition of certain public services by the municipality, such as sewerage, garbage disposal, police protection, etc.
Jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, 1355, 1357, 2072, 2201, 2202, 2281, and 2294; also 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 1983 and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 241, particularly Title II and III thereof.
Plaintiffs seek to enjoin defendants from practicing, under color of law, racial discrimination in the operation of public facilities and in the furnishing of municipal and other services to citizens of the community. Plaintiffs invoke the Due Process and Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, the Fifth Amendment and Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution.
After a trial to the Court, the submission of briefs, and argument of the counsel, the case is before the Court for its decision.
The controlling principles of law are well settled. The Fourteenth Amendment requires that government at all levels treat all citizens alike, regardless of race, color, or creed. Slaughter-House Cases (U.S.), 16 Wall. 36, 67-72, 21 L.Ed. 394, 405-407 (1873); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307-308, 25 L.Ed. 664 (1880). This command bars segregation in public facilities, Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S. Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954)3; and racial equality in the provision of governmental services. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 652-653, 86 S.Ct. 1717, 16 L.Ed.2d 828 (1966).
The charge of the complaint is broad and encompasses practically all public facilities operated by the county and city and many of the services rendered by the municipality. For the sake of clarity, the Court will discuss these facilities and services by appropriate groups.
At the outset, however, the Court must consider several questions raised by defendants as to the parties to the suit.
PLAINTIFFS. At the trial of the case, only two plaintiffs testified. One of these was Joe Nathan Coleman. At the time the suit was filed he lived in the City of Belzoni. When the case was tried he resided in the county, but outside the city. Coleman did not own taxable property in the City of Belzoni. He was a tenant rather than a home owner. The argument is made that as Coleman does not own property situated in Belzoni upon which he pays taxes, and did not complain in his testimony of inadequate or discriminatory municipal services or facilities, he is not entitled to any relief against the City of Belzoni; that since he is not entitled to relief, neither is the class which he claims to represent. The same argument is made as to Aline Hunter, the other plaintiff who testified in the case. Mrs. Hunter is not a property owner in the city, and her rented home is on one of the paved streets in the Negro section of town.
The evidence does not show the residence of the other plaintiffs. Defendant contends, therefore, that as plaintiffs, Coleman and Hunter, are not entitled to any relief against the City of Belzoni, and the residence of the other plaintiffs is not shown by the evidence, plaintiffs have failed to sustain their standing in the case as to the City of Belzoni.
All plaintiffs are members of the black race — plaintiff Coleman resided in the City of Belzoni when the suit was filed, and continues to reside in the County of Humphreys. Plaintiff Hunter resided in the City of Belzoni when the suit was filed and was living there when the case was tried. The action is bottomed on the charge that defendants, including those representing the City of Belzoni, acting under color of law, have practiced and continue to practice discrimination in providing public facilities and municipal services, on the basis of race. It is clear that plaintiffs have standing to prosecute the action. They have "such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the Court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions". Baker v. Carr, 1962, 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S.Ct. 691, 703, 7 L.Ed.2d 663.4 That plaintiffs are not property owners and, therefore, not taxpayers is not decisive of their standing.5
In the case sub judice, being members of the Negro race, residents of community, comprising the county and city, they have standing to challenge the inferiority of municipal services provided by the city officials to the black community of the city.
The fact that Coleman moved outside the city into the county area, after the suit was filed, does not defeat his right nor the right of members of the class represented by him to prosecute the suit. Rackley v. Board of Trustees of Orangeburg Regional Hospital, E.D.S.C. 1965, 238 F.Supp. 512, 515; McSwain v. Board of Education, E.D.Tenn. 1956, 138 F.Supp. 570.
It is clear to the Court that plaintiffs Coleman and Hunter have standing to prosecute this action against the City of Belzoni, in their own behalf and for the benefit of other black citizens of the community, similarly situated.
DEFENDANTS. The defendants are the Mayor and members of the Board of Aldermen of the City of Belzoni, and its Engineer, Clerk and Chief of Police. The Mayor, Clerk and Chief of Police held their respective positions when the case sub judice was filed, and no question is presented as to their status in the case. The complaint named W. J. Lea, S. L. Reed, W. L. Solomon, Jr., O. R. Bridges and T. N. Turner, defendants in their official capacities, as members of the Board of Aldermen, and summons for them was issued as members of the Board. The summons was served on T. N. Turner, Jr., instead of T. N. Turner, the former being the Board member, The summons was served on W. J. Lea and S. L. Reed. W. L. Solomon, Jr. and O. R. Bridges were not in fact members of the Board, and instead of serving them with process the Marshal served the summons on the members of the Board who succeeded them. These new members are Lamar Griffin and Jack Peden. The Engineer named in the summons had been succeeded in office, and the Engineer active at the time was served by the Marshal rather than the one named in the summons. Defendants contend that the said active members of the Board and the active Engineer of the city are not properly before the Court, as they were not named in the complaint or summons as party defendants. T. N. Turner, Jr., member of the Board, appeared and defended the action, and thus the question as to service upon him is solved.
It is admitted that Lamar Griffin and Jack Peden were members of the Board of Aldermen, and James Barron was the City Engineer when they were served with the summons. The complaint sued the members of the Board of Aldermen and City Engineer in their official capacities as officials of the city. Rule 25(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, provides for the substitution of parties. The rule provides:
"(2) When a public officer sues or is sued in his official capacity, he may be described as a party by his official title rather than by name; but the court may require his name to be added."
It is apparent in the case sub judice that the real defendants are the officials of the city, rather than the individuals who hold the offices. Instead of serving ex-officials with the summons, the Marshal served the individuals holding the respective offices.
While the summons named the individuals said to be incumbent officials at the time, it is clear that the summons was directed to the party or parties actually holding the office. In such a case, the name of the official can and should be treated as surplusage. The purpose and intent of the rule has been satisfied.
The Court is of the opinion and so finds that it is proper to substitute Jack Peden and Lamar Griffin, members of the Board, for W. L. Solomon, Jr. and O. R. Bridges, former members, and James Barron, City Engineer, for E. L. Young, as parties defendant, by their respective official titles.6 The other three members of the board, being a majority thereof, and other city officials appeared and defended the action.
There can be no prejudice by permitting the substitution to be made at this time.
When the suit was filed Mrs. J. Alfred Able was a member of the Board of Supervisors of...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Jones v. Diamond
...Aff'd in part, 5 Cir. 1972, 456 F.2d 819, Cert. denied, 404 U.S. 866, 92 S.Ct. 83, 30 L.Ed.2d 110 (1971); Coleman v. Aycock, 304 F.Supp. 132 (N.D.Miss.1969) (Greenville ordered to desegregate jail); Patterson v. Hopkins, 350 F.Supp. 676 (N.D.Miss.1972), Aff'd, 5 Cir. 1973, 481 F.2d 640 (ord......
-
Schumann v. McGinn
...penalty for fleeing to escape arrest. Deadly force may be used only when life itself is endangered or great bodily harm is threatened.' 304 F.Supp. 132. The decision was grounded almost entirely, however, upon a Louisiana statute. Although the courts have overwhelmingly favored the common-l......
-
Charleston Acad. of Beauty Culture, Inc. v. West Virginia Human Rights Comm'n
...steering and segregation are legal error. Petitioners cite a 1969 case from the Northern District of Mississippi, Coleman v. Avcock, 304 F. Supp. 132 (N.D. Miss. 1969), for the proposition that only "forced segregation" is unconstitutional. (See Petition of Appeal, p. 76, citing Coleman, 30......
-
Park View Heights Corp. v. City of Black Jack
...the reason and necessity therefor are clearly established. Castro v. Beecher, 386 F.Supp. 1281, 1284 (D.Mass.1975); Coleman v. Aycock, 304 F.Supp. 132, 140 (N.D.Miss.1969). For an injunction to issue the right must be clear and the injury impending or threatened so as only to be averted by ......
-
Municipal Service Suits, Local Public Services and Service Equality
...protection. Two earlier cases of similar circumstances saw district courts decide in favor of the cities involved. In Coleman v. Aycock (304 F. Supp. 132N. D. Miss. 1969), the City of Belzoni, Mississippi, had a population 4,142 with 61 per cent blacks. The court found no racial dassificati......