Rackley v. Board of Trustees of Orangeburg Reg. Hosp., Civ. A. No. AC-887.
| Decision Date | 17 February 1965 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. AC-887. |
| Citation | 238 F. Supp. 512 |
| Parties | Janelle RACKLEY, a minor, by her mother and next friend, Gloria Rackley, and Gloria Rackley, Plaintiffs, v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF the ORANGEBURG REGIONAL HOSPITAL, a body public, and H. F. Mabry, Director of the Orangeburg Regional Hospital, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
Matthew J. Perry, Lincoln C. Jenkins, Jr., Columbia, S. C., Jack Greenberg, James M. Nabritt, III, Michael Meltsner, New York City for plaintiffs.
Charlton B. Horger, Orangeburg, S. C., and David W. Robinson, Columbia, S. C., for defendants.
Class action1 by Negro plaintiffs to enjoin the Director and Board of Trustees of Orangeburg Regional Hospital "from continuing to enforce the policy, practice, custom, and usage of maintaining and operating segregated hospital facilities on the basis of race."
Plaintiffs, who were not inpatients of the defendant hospital when the 1961 incidents occurred and which precipitated this controversy originally sought a preliminary and permanent injunction to enjoin alleged segregation procedures complained of which allegedly existed throughout the hospital.2 The District Court, upon motion, struck so much of plaintiffs' complaint as referred to "separate ward and room facilities for patients" on the basis that there was no contention that either plaintiff had sought such facility "or that there was any need for such facilities in this case." The Circuit Court of Appeals, in reversing, stated that "the complainants should not be required to prosecute a separate suit for each activity or department of the hospital." Rackley v. Board of Trustees of Orangeburg Regional Hospital, 310 F.2d 141, 143 (4th Cir.1962). Accordingly, the direction to this Court is to make a determination anent the alleged practices throughout the hospital because "constitutional deprivations ought not to be adjudicated * * * piecemeal * * *." Id. at 142.
The District Court struck paragraph 6 of the Complaint which made reference to the contribution of Federal funds to this county hospital. The Court of Appeals reinstated.
Also left for determination of this Court is the question of whether or not this is a valid class action.
Because of its jurisdictional overtones, and because it is a threshold consideration, the validity of this class action will first be discussed.
Certain admitted facts have occurred since the institution of suit in 1962 which defendants contend effectively bar the equitable relief sought. These facts have to do with the "changed residence" of plaintiffs.
Plaintiff Gloria Rackley is the wife of L. G. Rackley; infant plaintiff Jamelle Rackley his adopted daughter.
L. G. Rackley, husband and adoptive father, respectively, of plaintiffs, was not living in the Orangeburg area at the time the incident out of which this controversy arose occurred in 1961, was not living in Orangeburg when suit was filed in 1962 — during the scholastic year 1961-62 he was taking a doctorate in Oklahoma — upon completion he obtained a teaching position in Florida, which he apparently still holds. He is not now, and has not, since this action was instituted, resided in Orangeburg, or in South Carolina.
The two plaintiffs now reside in Virginia, where Gloria Rackley has a teaching contract for the current school year. Minor plaintiff lives with her.
Defendants' contend that because no person or persons "similarly situated" have intervened as parties plaintiff, that this suit is to be considered as one by two non-residents only, contend that because the domicile of the wife and minor child is that of the husband, see Deese v. Hundley, 232 F.Supp. 848, 849 (W.D. S.C.1964); Hair v. Hair, 10 Rich.Eq. 163, 176 (S.C.1858), coupled with the actual residence of plaintiffs, they have no standing to sue for injunctive relief because the hospital was created "to provide hospital facilities for the residents of Orangeburg County."
Defendants, who admitted plaintiffs' residence as being Orangeburg County when the Answer was filed in 1962, have not sustained the burden of showing that the "residence" or "domicile" of plaintiffs has changed. They point out that "an injunction looks to the future," Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 165, 63 S.Ct. 877, 882, 87 L.Ed. 1324 and because plaintiffs are not now in "actual residence" in Orangeburg County, they feel they have no standing for equitable relief. Under the facts and circumstances here appearing, such position is untenable.
Initially there is no showing that plaintiffs have any intention of abandoning Orangeburg, S. C. as their domicile. True, the husband and adoptive father of plaintiffs now lives in Florida, and the plaintiffs are in Virginia. But where is there a showing on intention to change domicile? In order for a change of domicile to be effectuated, there must be a moving coupled with an intention to establish a new domicile. The old domicile must be abandoned without intent to return. 28 C.J.S. Domicile § 13a, pp. 30-32. And, a domicile that is established is not relinquished by a temporary absence, however long continued. 28 C.J.S. Domicile § 13b, p. 32.
The record before the Court shows that the time the instant suit was commenced, Mrs. Rackley was employed as a public school teacher in Orangeburg, S. C. In October 1963, she was dismissed from her teaching position because of her participation in certain public demonstrations in Orangeburg and Charleston, S. C., some of which resulted in her being arrested. Subsequently she commenced suit against the Trustees of Orangeburg School District No. 5, asserting that dismissal for the reasons stated violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and seeking, among other things, reinstatement to her position as a public school teacher.3
Deposition testimony reveals that Mrs. Rackley has retained ownership of her home on Whittaker Parkway in Orangeburg.
Pendency of her suit for reinstatement as a public school teacher and her continued ownership of real estate in Orangeburg negatives any inference or conclusion that she has abandoned her residence in Orangeburg. 28 C.J.S. Domicile § 13b.
The fact that plaintiffs seek relief not only for themselves but for other persons similarly situated is of significance in determining their standing to maintain this action. McSwain v. Board of Education, 138 F.Supp. 570 (E.D.Tenn.1956); Potts v. Flax, 313 F.2d 284, 288, n. 4 (5th Cir.1963); 15 Am.Jur.2d Civil Rights § 75.
In McSwain, supra, the Court held that a class action to enjoin alleged denial of constitutional rights with regard to the public schools would not be rendered moot merely because the students who originally brought the class action were no longer enrolled in the schools.
Note also Henry v. Greenville Airport Commission, 284 F.2d 631 (4th Cir.1960) wherein the Court permitted a Negro from Michigan to bring a class action to enjoin the segregation of facilities at the Greenville, S. C. Airport.
There is no evidence but that plaintiffs expect to return to Orangeburg when Civil Action No. 8458 is disposed of; and there is every reasonable inference of such intent. See note 3, supra.
Defendants have admitted that the Orangeburg Regional Hospital is the only hospital in Orangeburg County. The racial policies of the defendants affect the entire population of that county. Negro citizens have a common interest in these policies, and under Rule 23(a) (3), plaintiffs are permitted to maintain this action on their own behalf and on behalf of all other Negroes in the county. Gantt v. Clemson College, 320 F.2d 611, 614 (4th Cir.1963), cert. den. 375 U.S. 814, 84 S.Ct. 46, 11 L.Ed.2d 49.
Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiffs, as representatives in a class action within the meaning of Rule 23(a) (3) Fed.Rules Civ. Proc., have standing to seek injunctive relief.
The next question goes to the heart of this controversy. Are plaintiffs entitled to a permanent injunction?
There is an overabundance of evidence to support plaintiffs' demands that a permanent injunction issue.
First of all, the testimony of the Administrator of defendant hospital shows on its face that the hospital practices a policy of segregating the races. The Administrator, Mr. Henry Filmore Mabry, was asked:
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