Coleman v. Brown

• Decision Date: 10 April 2014
• Docket Number: No. CIV. S-90-520 LKK/DAD (PC),CIV. S-90-520 LKK/DAD (PC)
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
• Parties: RALPH COLEMAN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. EDMUND G. BROWN, JR., et al., Defendants.

RALPH COLEMAN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. EDMUND G. BROWN, JR., et al., Defendants.

No. CIV. S-90-520 LKK/DAD (PC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DATED: April 10, 2014

ORDER

In ongoing sequelae to defendants' January 7, 2013 motion to terminate this action (hereafter "termination motion")(ECF No. 4275), two additional motions brought by plaintiffs for enforcement of court orders and affirmative relief are before the court.¹ On May 9, 2013, plaintiffs filed a motion related to housing and treatment of mentally ill inmates placed in segregation units in California's prison system (ECF No. 4580). On May 29, 2013, plaintiffs filed a motion related to use of force and disciplinary measures against members of the plaintiffclass (ECF No. 4638).

The matters at bar were also tendered as grounds for denying defendants' termination motion. See Corr. Pls. Opp. To Defs. Motion to Terminate, filed Mar. 19, 2013 (ECF No. 4422) at 58-65; 87-91.² The court denied the termination motion by order filed April 5, 2013, see Coleman v. Brown, 938 F.Supp.2d 955 (E.D.Cal. 2013), and separately set an evidentiary hearing on plaintiffs' motions. In relevant part, evidentiary hearing on plaintiffs' motions commenced on October 1, 2013, continued over twenty-eight court days and concluded on December 9, 2013.³ Following the filing of closing briefs and responses thereto by the parties, the matters were submitted for decision.⁴

Because the plaintiffs relied in part on the matters considered in this order, the court holds that this order is a further demonstration that the order denying the motion to terminate was properly denied.

Plaintiffs' motions present two questions: First, have defendants sufficiently remedied Eighth Amendment violations in use of force, disciplinary measures, and segregated housing relative to class members, which were identified in the court's1995 decision on the merits of plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment claims? Second, if the answer to the first question is no, what additional remedial measures are required to end ongoing Eighth Amendment violations in these areas?

At the outset, the court wishes to recognize the overall significant progress the defendants have made relative to providing constitutionally required care to the plaintiffs' class. Indeed, though defendants' motion to terminate was clearly premature, recognition of the progress made is important. Nonetheless, for the reasons discussed below, the answer to the first question is no. The answer to the second question is determined by what the Eighth Amendment requires when seriously mentally ill individuals are incarcerated.

The very difficult questions presented by the motions at bar are a consequence of the fact that California incarcerates tens of thousands of seriously mentally individuals in its state prison system.⁵,⁶ As of September 2013, there were 33,259 inmatesidentified in the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation's (CDCR) outpatient mental health population. Pls. Ex. 2303.⁷ The number of mentally ill inmates represents approximately 28.25% of the inmate population housed in CDCR's prison institutions.⁸ These inmates received mental health care through the CDCR's Mental Health Services Delivery System (MHSDS), which provides four levels of mental health care. An understanding of the treatment criteria for each level of mental health care is necessary to resolution of the motions at bar.⁹

All members of the plaintiff class suffer from serious mental disorders. The Correctional Clinical Case Management System (CCCMS) provides mental health services to seriously mentally ill inmates with "stable functioning in the general population, Administrative Segregation Unit (ASU) or Security Housing Unit (SHU)" whose mental health symptoms are under control or in "partial remission as a result of treatment." Pls. Ex. 1200, MHSDS Program Guide, 2009 Revision, at 12-1-7. In September 2013, 28,360 mentally ill inmates were at the Correctional Clinical Case Management (CCCMS) level of care. Pls. Ex. 2303.

The remaining three levels of mental health care are for seriously mentally ill inmates who, due to their mental illness, are unable to function in the general prison population. The Enhanced Outpatient Program (EOP) is for inmates with "acute onset or significant decompensation of a serious mental disorder." Pls. Ex. 1200 at 12-1-7, 12-1-8. EOP programs are located in designated living units at "hub institution[s]." Id. at 12-1-8. In September 2013, 4,538 mentally ill inmates were at the Enhanced Outpatient Program (EOP) level of care. Pls. Ex. 2303.

Mental Health Crisis Beds (MHCBs) are for mentally ill inmates in psychiatric crisis or in need of stabilization pending transfer either to an inpatient hospital setting or a lower levelof care. Pls. Ex. 1200, Program Guide at 12-1-8. MHCBs are generally licensed inpatient units in correctional treatment centers or other licensed facilities. Id. at 12-1-9. Stays in MHCBs are limited to not more than ten days. Id. at 12-5-1.¹⁰ Finally, several inpatient hospital programs are available for class members. With one exception¹¹ the inpatient programs are operated by the Department of State Hospitals (DSH). Id. at 12-1-9. Some of those programs are on the grounds of state prisons, while others are in existing state hospitals.

In addition to the foregoing, resolution of the motions at bar turns on understanding the nature of the inquiry before the court. In relevant part, in 1995 this court found that "seriously mentally ill inmates [are] being treated with punitive measures by the custody staff to control the inmates' behavior without regard to the cause of the behavior, the efficacy of such measures, or the impact of those measures on the inmates' mental illnesses." Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F.Supp. 1282, 1320 (E.D.Cal. 1995). The court also found that "mentally ill inmates are placed in administrative segregation and segregated housing without any evaluation of their mental status, because such placement will cause further decompensation, and because inmates are denied access to necessary mental health care while they are housed in administrative segregation and/or segregated housing." Id. at 1320. Finally, the court found that "weapons are used oninmates with serious mental disorders without regard to the impact of those weapons on their psychiatric condition, and without penological justification." Id. at 1323.¹²

In analyzing the merits of plaintiffs' claims, the court applied the well-settled principle that "[a]n Eighth Amendment violation is comprised of both an objective component and a subjective component." Id. at 1298 (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). The objective component turns on whether the alleged deprivations are "sufficiently serious" to constitute the "'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain'" proscribed by the Eighth Amendment. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981)). The findings in the preceding paragraph formed the objective component of the Eighth Amendment violations at issue.

The subjective component of an Eighth Amendment violation requires a finding that the defendants have a "sufficiently culpable state of mind". Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298 (citing Rhodes). This requires the court "to assess whether the conduct at issue is 'wanton.'" Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F.Supp. at 1321 (quoting Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1527 (9^th Cir. 1993))

The "baseline" mental state for "wantonness" is "deliberate indifference." Id. As a general rule, the deliberate indifference standard applies where the claim is thatconditions of confinement cause unnecessary suffering. Id. In contrast, the "malicious and sadistic" standard applies to claims arising out of the use of force to maintain order. Seeid.

Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F.Supp. at 1321-22 (quoting Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1527-28). The Eighth Amendment violations at bar were all predicated on findings that defendants' policies and practices governing the use of force, punitive measures, administrative segregation and segregated housing constituted deliberate indifference to class members' serious mental illnesses and the serious and substantial harms to members of the plaintiff class caused by use of such measures. See Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F.Supp. at 1319-1323.¹³

Defendants now oppose plaintiffs' motion concerning use of force and disciplinary measures on the ground that there is no pattern and practice of malicious and sadistic use of force against mentally ill inmates. See Defs.' Opp'n to Motion Related to Use of Force and Disciplinary Measures, filed July 24, 2103 (ECF No. 4704) at 8. To some extent, this aspect of defendants' opposition may have been invited by some of the arguments advanced by plaintiffs in their motion.¹⁴ Regardless, thequestion of whether defendants' policies and practices prevent or fail to prevent force applied maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm, see Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320 (1986), is not before this court.¹⁵

First, application of that standard to the claims at bar was rejected by the court in 1995. While a different claim or changed circumstance might justify application of that standard, that appears not to be the case here. Accordingly, the law of the case doctrine applies to the instant motion. See, e.g. Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 (1983).

Second, as the court discussed in its order denying defendants' motion to terminate this action, once an Eighth Amendment violation is found and injunctive relief ordered, the focus shifts to remediation of the serious deprivations that formed the objective component of the identified Eighth Amendment violation. See Coleman v. Brown, 938 F.Supp.2d at 988. Remediation can be accomplished by compliance with targeted orders for relief or by establishing that the "violation has beenremedied in another way." Id. To the extent the subjective component...