Coleman v. Wilson, Civ. S-90-0520 LKK JFM.

• Decision Date: 13 September 1995
• Docket Number: No. Civ. S-90-0520 LKK JFM.,Civ. S-90-0520 LKK JFM.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
• Parties: Ralph COLEMAN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Pete WILSON, et al., Defendants.

912 F. Supp. 1282

Ralph COLEMAN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Pete WILSON, et al., Defendants.

No. Civ. S-90-0520 LKK JFM.

United States District Court, E.D. California.

September 13, 1995.

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Warren E. George Jr., McCutchen Doyle Brown and Enersen, San Francisco, CA Michael W. Bien, Rosen Bien and Asaro, San Francisco, CA.

Richard L. Goff, Amelia A. Craig, Heller Ehrman White and McAuliffe, San Francisco, CA.

Karl S. Mayer, Attorney General's Office of the State of California, San Francisco, CA.

Catherine I. Hanson, California Medical Association, San Francisco, CA.

Ann M. Hansen, Seltzer and Cody, Oakland, CA.

ORDER

KARLTON, Chief Judge Emeritus.

Plaintiffs, state prisoners who suffer from serious mental disorders, brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the mental health care provided at most institutions within the California Department of Corrections is so inadequate that their rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution are violated. Plaintiffs also raised a claim under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and prospective injunctive relief.

The named defendants are Pete Wilson, Governor of the State of California, Joseph Sandoval, Secretary of the Youth and Corrections Agency of the State of California, James Gomez, Director of the California Department of Corrections, Nadim Khoury M.D., Assistant Deputy Director for Health Care Services for the California Department of Corrections, and John S. Zil, M.D., Chief of Psychiatric Services for the California Department of Corrections. All named defendants are sued in their official capacity.

The matter was referred to Chief Magistrate Judge John F. Moulds pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302(c)(17). On October 22, 1991, Judge Moulds recommended certification as a class action pursuant to Rules 23(b)(1)(A), 23(b)(1)(B), and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. On November 14, 1991, those findings and recommendations were adopted by this court, and a class was certified consisting of "all inmates with serious mental disorders who are now or who will in the future be confined within the California Department of Corrections (except the San Quentin State Prison, the Northern Reception Center at Vacaville and the California Medical Facility-Main at Vacaville)." (Order filed November 14, 1991, at 4-5.)

On June 6, 1994, the magistrate judge issued findings and recommendations on plaintiffs' § 1983 claims.¹ On July 25, 1994, defendants filed objections to the findings and recommendations ("Objections").² On September 13, 1994, plaintiffs filed a response to defendants' objections ("Plaintiffs' Response"). Plaintiffs' response was accompanied by declarations of Michael Bien (Bien Declaration) and Donald Specter (Specter Declaration) with appended exhibits. On November 7, 1994, defendants filed a closing brief ("Defendants' Closing Brief"), raising various evidentiary issues.

On March 25, 1995, this court remanded the matter to the magistrate judge because he had resolved the matter on constitutional grounds without first addressing the statutory claim. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, et al., 485 U.S. 439, 445, 108 S.Ct. 1319, 1323, 99 L.Ed.2d 534 (1988). Plaintiffs then moved to dismiss the Rehabilitation Act claim and the matter was returned to this court. Defendants were given an opportunity to comment on the terms and conditions of dismissal and plaintiffs were granted an opportunity to respond. Thereafter the Rehabilitation Act claim was dismissed and this court again turned to consideration of the merits.

Having concluded that the briefing on this matter exhausts the issues and thus resolution without oral argument is appropriate, see L.R. 230(h), the court now disposes of the matter. The court turns first to the evidentiary issues raised by defendants. The court then considers their objections to the magistrate judge's proposed findings and recommendations.

I. EVIDENTIARY ISSUES

Defendants move to strike all of the exhibits appended to the Specter Declaration pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 802 on the grounds that they are hearsay. Defendants also seek to strike exhibits B, H, I, J, and K pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 404(a) arguing that these exhibits constitute inadmissible character evidence. Finally, defendants contend that all of the exhibits are more prejudicial than probative and that they should therefore be stricken pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 403.

Exhibits A, C, D, E, G, H, I, J, and K to the Specter declaration are documents filed in this court or the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Gates v. Deukmejian, CIV S-87-1636 LKK JFM P 1988 WL 92568 (E.D.Cal.). While the court can take judicial notice of court records, see Escobar-Ramos v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 927 F.2d 482, 485 n. 3 (9th Cir.1991), three factors have led to the conclusion that the documents will be disregarded in resolving plaintiffs' § 1983 claims. First, the Gates litigation involves conditions of confinement at California Medical Facility, an institution not included in the class in the instant action. Second, the Gates case is governed by the consent decree entered into by the parties to that action in December 1989. Resolution of issues in that action is thus determined with reference to the standards set forth in that decree while resolution of the instant action turns on standards applicable to claims made under the Eighth Amendment. Finally, to the extent that the evidence from Gates is offered to support appointment of a special master it is unnecessary; for the reasons discussed in this order, the record in this action, standing alone, supports such appointment.

Exhibit B is a letter from defendant James Gomez to Allen Breed, the court-appointed mediator in Gates. The letter contains statements about the instant action; it is an admission by a party to this action and thus is not hearsay. Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2). Nor is exclusion of the letter pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 403 or 404(a) warranted. Defendants' motion to strike will be denied as to Exhibit B to the Specter declaration.

Exhibit F is an excerpt of a transcript of proceedings from the 1993 trial in Madrid v. Gomez, No. C-90-3094 TEH (N.D.Cal.). The court can take judicial notice of this transcript. Escobar-Ramos, 927 F.2d at 485 n. 3. Plaintiffs contend that this transcript is admissible pursuant to Fed. R.Evid. 106 to augment a portion of the transcript from Madrid appended to defendants' objections. Defendants' exhibit is cumulative of evidence already in the record in this action. (See Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings (RT) at 28:44-48.) The court has not, therefore, considered the transcript tendered by plaintiffs in connection with the de novo review of this record. Accordingly, defendants' motion to strike will be granted as to Exhibit F.

Exhibit L is a letter from defendants' counsel to plaintiffs' counsel concerning possible stipulations to modify the time limits set forth in the magistrate judge's findings and recommendations. Plaintiffs have offered this letter to support their argument that defendants' objection to those time limits is premature. The letter is of such limited relevance to the issues before the court that it will not be considered.

In their reply brief, defendants also move to strike the deposition excerpts of employees of the California Department of Corrections and of defendants' experts, Drs. Koson and Dvoskin.³ The magistrate judge permitted plaintiffs to submit deposition excerpts of CDC employees, including consultants, as admissions of party opponents. (RT at 16:189.) The excerpts were admitted subject to other applicable evidentiary objections. (Id.) The magistrate judge allowed defendants to file objections to the tendered deposition excerpts. (Id.) He also permitted defendants the option of augmenting the deposition excerpts or calling each deponent as a live witness at trial. (Id.) Defendants now renew their objection, overruled by the magistrate judge, that plaintiffs have not made a showing required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 32 sufficient to support admission of the excerpts and that admission of the excerpts is not authorized by any of the provisions of Fed.R.Civ.P. 32.

Defendants proceed from the assumption that the admissibility of depositions is governed in the first instance by Fed. R.Civ.P. 32. As has been observed, however, "the Federal Rules of Evidence . . . provide the general rules regarding the use at trial of depositions. . . . Rule 32 defines some circumstances in which a deposition is admissible, leaving most issues of admissibility to the Federal Rules of Evidence." 8A Wright, Miller & Marcus, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2141, at 157, § 2142, at 158 (1994); see United States v. International Business Machines Corp., 90 F.R.D. 377, 384 (S.D.N.Y.1981) (Fed.R.Civ.P. 32 and Fed. R.Evid. 804 "are independent bases for the admission of a deposition.").⁴

As a general matter, admissibility of deposition testimony is resolved under the hearsay rule. Angelo v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc., 11 F.3d 957, 962 (10th Cir. 1993). The deposition excerpts at issue here were offered as admissions of party-opponents pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(C) and (D). Those subsections provide that "a statement⁵ is not hearsay if . . . offered against a party and it is . . . (C) a statement by a person authorized by the party to make a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by the party's agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship." Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(C), (D)....