Coleman v. Coker

• Decision Date: 23 January 1959
• Citation: 8 McCanless 310,321 S.W.2d 540,204 Tenn. 310
• Parties: Thomas M. COLEMAN and American Casualty Company, etc. v. Sarah Biddie COKER. 8 McCanless 310, 204 Tenn. 310, 321 S.W.2d 540
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Page 540

321 S.W.2d 540

Thomas M. COLEMAN and American Casualty Company, etc. v. Sarah Biddie COKER.

8 McCanless 310, 204 Tenn. 310, 321 S.W.2d 540

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

Jan. 23, 1959.

Howard, Davis, Boult & Hunt, John T. Conners, Jr., Nashville, for plaintiffs in error.

Claude W. Callicott, Nashville, for defendant in error.

BURNETT, Justice.

This is a workmen's compensation case arising under Section 50-901 et seq., T.C.A. The trial judge found that the death of the employee arose out of and in the course of his employment and thus awarded compensation to the widow. An appeal has been seasonably perfected, briefs filed and arguments heard. We now have the matter for determination.

Coleman is in the general contracting business in Nashville and the named insurance company is his insurance carrier. Coleman employed Joe Richard Coker, a carpenter, shortly before August 29, 1957. Coker had only been employed a few days before his death. He was employed through the Carpenter's Union without any prior investigation on the part of the employer as to his previous physical disabilities. He at the time of his employment, was asked no questions nor made no representations as to his previous physical disabilities. On the date of the death it is found by the trial judge that the man died of a heart attack which was due to aggravation by strain, effort and exertion of his work, of this pre-existing condition. The finding of the trial judge was this, that the death was due to angina pectoris, a pre-existing ailment or disease which was aggravated by the strain, effort and exertion in his work.

The plaintiff in error in this appeal assigns three errors to-wit: (1) there was no evidence to support the court; (2) the court erred in holding the injuries were accidental arising out of and in the course of his employment; and (3) the court erred in not dismissing the suit because the deceased's death was brought about by reason of the willful misconduct of the deceased 'in refusing to follow his doctor's instructions.'

It is conceded by the plaintiff in error that this Court:

'* * * is committed to the proposition of law that an employee who dies in the course of his employment as a result of a heart attack, although suffering from a previous heart disease, is covered under the Workmen's Compensation Act even if the result was produced by ordinary exertion and usual strain of the work.'

Counsel cite as the most extreme case in which this Court has decided this question the case of Nashville Pure Milk Co. v. Rychen, Tenn., 322 S.W.2d 432. There are numerous other related cases which are reported upon which this principle and proposition is based. Some of these will hereinafter be referred to. Some of these cases in which we have determined that if the physical activity and exertion of an employee's work aggravates a pre-existing heart condition, precipitates the fatal heart attack, and thus hastens his death, such death is the result of accident arising out of and in the course of the employment within the meaning of our Workmen's Compensation Law. Patterson Transfer Co. v. Lewis, 195 Tenn. 474, 260 S.W.2d 182; Heron v. Girdley, 198 Tenn. 110, 277 S.W.2d 402; Cambria Coal Co. v. Ault, 166 Tenn. 567, 64 S.W.2d 18; Lucey Boiler & Mfg. Corp. v. Hicks, 188 Tenn. 700, 222 S.W.2d 19.

We long ago likewise adopted the rule (a very salutary one) that the employer takes the employee as he finds him when he employs him. This Court in Swift & Co. v. Howard, 186 Tenn. 584, 212 S.W.2d 388, 391, said:

'When an employer employs a workman he takes him as he is and assumes the risk of having a weakened condition aggravated by some injury which might not hurt or bother a perfectly normal, healthy person. If the injury is the proximate cause of the disability, i. e., excites and aggravates a previous weakened condition then the employer is liable.'

In the present case it is shown that some 18 months prior to the death of Mr. Coker a very noted heart specialist in Nashville had diagnosed Mr. Coker's condition and had informed him at the time that he was not to do any hard work and was to keep off of liquor and follow a certain diet, etc. He was told at that time that doing the work that he was doing at the time of his death might cause his death. This doctor testifying in this lawsuit after the death of Mr. Coker testifies that his death was due to this heart trouble and that 'it is my opinion that it unquestionably precipitated the attack.' That is when he was asked what effect the exertion of this work had on his previous condition.

He was asked what he meant by the word 'precipitated' and the Court injected, 'Brought it on', and then the doctor answered: 'Yes sir'.

This unquestionably is very strong material evidence that the fatal heart attack was caused by the work in which Mr. Coker was engaged. There was no evidence to the contrary. Thus it is that the first two assignments of error above must be overruled because the evidence clearly shows that this deceased was working for this employer at the time and that the work that he was doing precipitated or brought on a condition from which he died. Thus there is material and ample evidence to support the finding and basis of the trial judge's holding that this was a compensable case.

The issue argued most strenuously in the briefs and at the Bar of this Court is that the death of Mr. Coker was brought about by his 'willful misconduct' as that term is used in Section 50-910, T.C.A.

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