Coleman v. COURT OF APPEALS, DIV. NO. TWO, ETC.

• Decision Date: 30 June 1980
• Docket Number: No. CIV-78-0367-D.,CIV-78-0367-D.
• Citation: 550 F. Supp. 681
• Parties: Matilda K. COLEMAN, Bob R. Schick, Carol Schick, John Keefer, Ethel Keefer, Dr. Nazih Zuhdi, Homer J. Young, Dr. Michael Duffy, John D. Briscoe, John M. Briscoe, V.G. Burnell, the City of Guthrie, Oklahoma, Kay-Bee Investment Company, Plaintiffs, v. The COURT OF APPEALS, DIVISION NUMBER TWO OF the STATE OF OKLAHOMA, the Honorable Kenneth D. Bacon, Robert Neptune and Paul W. Brightmire, Judges of the said Court, the City of Oklahoma City, a municipal corporation, and the City Council of Oklahoma City, Oklahoma: Mayor Patience Latting, Bob McCoy, Eric Groves, Bill H. Bishop, Harold McEwen, Ben Tipton, Jerry Gilbert, Jack Cornett, and Merl McCollum; and the City/County Health Department, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Oklahoma

550 F. Supp. 681

Matilda K. COLEMAN, Bob R. Schick, Carol Schick, John Keefer, Ethel Keefer, Dr. Nazih Zuhdi, Homer J. Young, Dr. Michael Duffy, John D. Briscoe, John M. Briscoe, V.G. Burnell, the City of Guthrie, Oklahoma, Kay-Bee Investment Company, Plaintiffs, v. The COURT OF APPEALS, DIVISION NUMBER TWO OF the STATE OF OKLAHOMA, the Honorable Kenneth D. Bacon, Robert Neptune and Paul W. Brightmire, Judges of the said Court, the City of Oklahoma City, a municipal corporation, and the City Council of Oklahoma City, Oklahoma: Mayor Patience Latting, Bob McCoy, Eric Groves, Bill H. Bishop, Harold McEwen, Ben Tipton, Jerry Gilbert, Jack Cornett, and Merl McCollum; and the City/County Health Department, Defendants.

No. CIV-78-0367-D.

United States District Court, W.D. Oklahoma.

June 30, 1980.

Bob R. Schick, pro se.

Lucia Todd Allen, Jan Eric Cartwright, Atty. Gen., and Manville T. Buford, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daniel T. Brummitt, Oklahoma City, Okl., for defendants.

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

DAUGHERTY, District Judge.

This is an action brought by Plaintiffs under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for injunctive and declaratory relief arising out of Defendants' alleged violations of Plaintiffs' constitutional rights to due process of law and equal protection of the laws. It is asserted that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction of this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343.

It appears from the Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint that all of the Plaintiffs in this case except the City of Guthrie, Oklahoma (Guthrie) are the owners of land surrounding a proposed garbage landfill in northwest Oklahoma City. Plaintiff Guthrie allegedly obtains a large portion of its water supply from the creeks which drain the area of the proposed landfill. The operator of the proposed landfill was denied a permit to operate a landfill facility by the City Council of Oklahoma City and this decision was upheld on appeal by the Oklahoma County District Court. Said decision was appealed to the Oklahoma Supreme Court where it was assigned to the Defendant Court of Appeals, Division II (Court of Appeals). On September 6, 1977, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Oklahoma County District Court and remanded the case with directions that the permit should be granted.¹ Plaintiffs then unsuccessfully sought to intervene in Case No. 50,553 to obtain a rehearing. After exhausting their state court remedies, Plaintiffs brought this action wherein they seek injunctive relief restraining the Court of Appeals and its judges from issuing the mandate in Case No. 50,553 and the City Council of Oklahoma City (City Council) from issuing the permit for the landfill pursuant to the order of the Court of Appeals and a declaration that the judgment of the Court of Appeals is void. In this connection, Plaintiffs contend in essence that the Oklahoma County District Court and Court of Appeals did not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal lodged by Central Oklahoma Sanitary Landfill (Central) of the City Council's denial of Central's permit application, thereby rendering the mandate of the Court of Appeals void. Secondly, Plaintiffs assert that they were denied due process of law in the state proceedings.

Pursuant to Rule 56, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Defendants Court of Appeals and its judges and the Defendants City of Oklahoma City (City), City Council and the individual members thereof and the City/County Health Department (Health Department) have filed herein separate Motions for Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs have also filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. Said Motions are supported by Briefs and numerous exhibits, and response Briefs have been filed by the parties opposing the respective Motions. On March 24, 1980, the Court conducted a hearing on the foregoing Motions.

In support of their Motion, Defendants Court of Appeals and Judges Kenneth D. Bacon, Robert Neptune and Paul W. Brightmire assert that the Oklahoma County District Court and Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to hear the appeal of Central; that the Plaintiffs were afforded such due process to which they were entitled; and that the judges of the Court of Appeals are immune from civil action of this nature by virtue of the doctrine of judicial immunity.

In support of their Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants City, City Council and the individual members thereof, and the Health Department assert that the Oklahoma County District Court and Court of Appeals decision was not void for want of jurisdiction; that Plaintiffs had an opportunity to correct any procedural defect by appeal at the state court level; and that Plaintiffs were afforded due process in the proceedings below.

In support of their Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs contend that the Oklahoma County District Court lacked jurisdiction to hear Central's appeal of the City Council's denial of its landfill permit application. Plaintiffs further contend that as the Oklahoma County District Court lacked jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals' judgment is void and the attempt by the Court of Appeals to mandate a void judgment deprived Plaintiffs of due process of law and equal protection.

Upon consideration of the Motions for Summary Judgment and the related Briefs and exhibits before the Court, it appears that no genuine issue of material fact is present in this case. Therefore, this case may be disposed of by way of summary judgment. See Rule 56, supra.

The Court notes at the outset that Plaintiffs have joined the individual judges of the Court of Appeals in this action. However, it is well settled that judges of courts of superior or general jurisdiction are not liable in a civil action for their judicial acts even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction and are alleged to have been done maliciously. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967); Johnson v. Reagan, 524 F.2d 1123 (9th Cir. 1975); Potter v. LaMunyon, 389 F.2d 874 (10th Cir.1968); Town of Hopkins v. Cobb, 466 F.Supp. 1215 (D.S.C.1979); Atchley v. Greenhill, 373 F.Supp. 512 (S.D.Tex.1974), aff'd, 517 F.2d 692 (5th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 915, 96 S.Ct. 1115, 47 L.Ed.2d 320 (1976). Thus, judicial immunity is a defense to an action brought against a judge pursuant to the civil rights statute. See Stump v. Sparkman, supra; Pierson v. Ray, supra; Town of Hopkins v. Cobb, supra; Atchley v. Greenhill, supra.

The purpose of judicial immunity is to protect judges from the distraction, harassment and intimidation of actions against them for the exercise of their duties. The proper remedy for litigants who feel wronged by an adverse judgment is through the appellate process. Pierson v. Ray, supra; Town of Hopkins v. Cobb, supra. There is a split of authority concerning whether judicial immunity shields judges from actions seeking only injunctive relief.² The purpose of judicial immunity, however, is not served by protecting a judge from actions for damages while exposing him to an action for injunctive relief. Town of Hopkins v. Cobb, supra; Zimmerman v. Spears, 428 F.Supp. 759 (W.D.Tex. 1977), aff'd, 565 F.2d 310 (5th Cir.1977); Atchley v. Greenhill, supra. Therefore, the Court finds as a matter of law that Plaintiffs' action against Defendants Kenneth D. Bacon, Robert Neptune and Paul W. Brightmire is barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity.

In the instant case, Plaintiffs seek to collaterally attack a state court judgment on the grounds that the state courts lacked jurisdiction. A decree of a court must be void on its face to be subject to collateral attack for lack of jurisdiction. Springer v. Townsend, 336 F.2d 397 (10th Cir.1964); Choctaw & Chickasaw Nations v. City of Atoka, 207 F.2d 763 (10th Cir.1953); Scoufos v. Fuller, 280 P.2d 720 (Okl.1954). To be void on its face a judgment must show from the record that the court lacked jurisdiction over the parties, jurisdiction over the subject matter, or jurisdiction to render the judgment. Scoufos v. Fuller, supra. However, in a collateral attack upon a judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, there is a presumption in favor of the validity of the judgment and the existence of all necessary jurisdictional facts. Lowman v. Falsetti, 335 F.2d 632 (5th Cir.1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 966, 85 S.Ct. 659, 13 L.Ed.2d 560 (1965); Choctaw & Chickasaw Nations v. City of Atoka, supra. It is clear that a court has the power to determine its own jurisdiction and an error in that determination will not render the judgment void. Only in the rare instance when there is a clear usurpation of power will a judgment be rendered void. Lubben v. Selective Service System Local Board No. 27, 453 F.2d 645 (5th Cir.1972).

From the record before the Court in this case, it appears without dispute that on March 23, 1976, at a meeting of the City Council Central's application for a landfill permit covering certain land located near N.W. 164th and N. Rockwell was denied. Central then appealed the City Council's decision to the Oklahoma County District Court³ pursuant to 12 Okl.Stat.1971 § 951 which provides as follows:

"A judgment rendered, or final order made, by any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions, and inferior in jurisdiction to the district court, may be reversed, vacated or modified by the district court except where an appeal to some other court is provided by law."

The City Council argued before the Oklahoma County District Court that the denial of a landfill permit application was a legislative function rather than a judicial function and therefore an appeal could not be taken to the district court under § 951. However, the Oklahoma County District Court disagreed and specifically found in its "Decision of Appeal" filed on December 22, 1976, that it had jurisdiction of Central's appeal pursuant to § 951. Upon appeal of the Oklahoma County District Court's decision...