Coleman v. Floyd

• Decision Date: 28 October 1912
• Citation: 150 S.W. 703,105 Ark. 300
• Parties: COLEMAN v. FLOYD
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

150 S.W. 703

105 Ark. 300

COLEMAN v. FLOYD

Supreme Court of Arkansas

October 28, 1912

Appeal from Carroll Circuit Court, Western District; J. S. Maples Judge; affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

Charles D. James, for appellants.

Festus O. Butt, for appellees.

1. The cause should have been dismissed ab initio by the circuit court for want of jurisdiction. Regardless of the truth of the facts upon which Lula Coleman based her appeal, her appeal was irregular, the same not having been taken within six months from the rendition of the final order or judgment of the probate court, as required by the statute. Acts 1909 p. 957. The filing of the bond required by the act is jurisdictional, and without it the probate court had no jurisdiction to grant the appeal. 93 Ark. 263; 137 S.W. 804. The affidavit and prayer for appeal is personal to the appellant, and can not be made by the attorney. See Act; 5 Ark. 32; 21 Ark. 93; 27 Ark. 599; 42 Ark. 183; 65 Ark. 419.

2. If it be conceded that Lula Coleman's appeal was regular and that the circuit court had jurisdiction over it, it lost that jurisdiction when it dismissed her appeal before making the other appellants parties.

Charles D. James, for appellants in reply.

In the judgment wherein the court finds against Lula M. Coleman, it especially provides that "dismissing the appeal of Lula M. Coleman herein shall not in any way prejudice the rights of Walcott H. Darrow et al., on their motion to be made parties thereto." No objection was made nor exception saved to this order. Appellees can not now be heard to object. 59 Ark. 215; 61 Ark. 515; 62 Ark. 543; 70 Ark. 197.

No motion having been filed in the circuit court to dismiss the appeal from the probate court because no bond was filed by Mrs. Coleman and because she did not take her appeal within six months, etc., such objections were waived by appellees and will not be considered on appeal. 77 Ark. 103; 71 Ark. 242; Id. 436; Id. 555; 55 Ark. 217; Id. 174; 50 Ark. 102; 46 Ark. 103; 75 Ark. 312; 74 Ark. 557; Id. 88.

OPINION

FRAUENTHAL, J.

This is an appeal from a judgment admitting to probate the last will and testament of Emeline D. Triggs. The proponent of the will is R. G. Floyd, administrator of her estate with the will annexed, representing the legatees therein; and the present contestants and appellants are her collateral heirs. The purported will was executed on February 1, 1908, and the testator died in May, 1909. On July 26, 1909, the probate court made an order admitting said will to probate in common form, without notice to interested persons, and without their being made parties in that court.

On July 26, 1910, one Lula M. Coleman, claiming to be an heir by adoption of the said Emeline D. Triggs, appealed to the circuit court from said judgment of the probate court admitting said will to probate. The appeal was taken by the attorney of said Lula M. Coleman, who was then a nonresident of the State, making an affidavit in form prescribed by law for such appeal. The appeal was then filed and docketed in the circuit court. On the 8th day of February, 1911, the present appellants filed in the circuit court a motion asking that they be made parties to said appeal, and therein stated that they were the collateral heirs of said Emeline D. Triggs, and alleged that the purported will was not her last will and testament. On June 26, 1911, said appellants filed an amended motion to be made parties to the appeal, in which they stated that they contested the probate of the will upon the grounds (1) that the instrument offered for probate did not constitute a will, and (2) that it was not regularly and legally probated, (3) that it was not properly and legally attested and published by the testator as her will, and (4) because it had been obtained by fraud and undue influence, and the testator was of unsound mind at the time of its execution.

Thereupon the appellees filed a demurrer to, and a motion to strike from the files, said motion of appellants to be made parties, upon the ground that the circuit court was without authority to make the appellants parties to said appeal. Without then passing upon said motion, the court proceeded to hear the appeal of said Lula M. Coleman, and found that she was not legally adopted by the deceased, Emeline D. Triggs, and that she was therefore not a party in interest, and had no cause or right to appeal from said judgment of the probate court. The court thereupon entered a judgment dismissing the appeal of said Lula M. Coleman, and in said judgment it is further recited that the dismissal of her appeal should not in any way prejudice the rights of the present appellants on their motion to be made parties thereto. No appeal was taken from the judgment finding that said Lula M. Coleman was not a party in interest, that she had no right to appeal from the judgment of the probate court admitting said will to probate, and ordering a dismissal of her appeal.

Thereupon the court overruled the demurrer and motion of appellees attacking the right of appellants to be made parties to the appeal from the probate court, and entered an order making them parties to that appeal. To this action of the court the appellees duly objected and properly saved their exceptions.

The cause then proceeded to trial upon the grounds of the contest made by appellants, and resulted in a verdict finding that the purported will was the last will and testament of said Emeline D. Triggs; and the circuit court then rendered judgment admitting said will to probate. From that judgment those persons who had been made parties to the appeal in the circuit court have alone appealed.

It is contended by counsel for appellees that the circuit court was without authority to make appellants parties to the appeal taken by Lula M. Coleman from the judgment of the probate court, and erred in so doing; and for this reason they urge that the judgment should be affirmed. If this contention is correct, then it would not be necessary to note the various assignments of error made by appellants for reversing the judgment of the circuit court, because, if the appellants had no right to be made parties to the appeal from the judgment of the probate court, then that judgment admitting the will to probate would be in full force and effect, for the reason that the appeal therefrom taken by Lula M. Coleman, the only proper party thereto, was dismissed, and that judgment of dismissal has not been appealed from. The question as to whether or not appellants could be made new parties to the appeal which had been taken by Lula M. Coleman from the judgment of the probate court was, we think, sufficiently raised by appellees in the circuit court. That question was passed upon by the circuit court when it overruled appellees' demurrer to the motion of appellants to be made parties, and exception was then properly preserved to that adverse ruling. Nor are the appellees precluded from having this question passed upon in this appeal because they did not pray a cross appeal to this court from the judgment of the circuit court admitting the will to probate. The judgment thus rendered by the circuit court was in favor of appellees, and the effect thereof as to them was therefore the same as if appellants had been denied the right to be made parties in that court; for the result of a denial to make them parties would have left the judgment of the probate court admitting the will to probate in full force. And, if we hold that this question should not be decided upon this appeal for the reason that...