Coleman v. Fortner
| Decision Date | 19 March 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. A02A2119.,A02A2119. |
| Citation | 260 Ga. App. 373,579 S.E.2d 792 |
| Parties | COLEMAN v. FORTNER. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Jenkins & Nelson, Frank E. Jenkins, III, Cartersville, for appellant.
Jones, Thompson & Jones, Eric L. Jones, W. McMillan Walker, Morris S. Robertson, Dublin, for appellee.
Mahala Fortner filed this claim against Albert Coleman for damages arising from an automobile collision. Following a trial, the jury found in favor of Fortner, awarding her $500,000 on her claim. Coleman appeals, arguing that the jury charge on forfeiture of bond was improper, that Fortner's expert was allowed to give inadmissible opinion testimony, and that the trial court erred in entering final judgment nunc pro tunc. After review, and finding the arguments without merit, we affirm.
Coleman lived on Taylor Road, a dirt road that intersected two-lane Gumlog Road. On December 15, 1997, Coleman's tractor-trailer was blocking both lanes of Gumlog Road, either turning from Taylor Road onto Gumlog or attempting to back into Taylor. Fortner's automobile approached, and Fortner, not realizing that the road was blocked until it was too late to stop, collided with the tractor-trailer.1 Coleman was issued a traffic citation, which he did not contest, for failing to stop at a stop sign. (OCGA § 40-6-72(b). He posted a cash bond but failed to appear in court and thereby forfeited the bond.
1. (a) Coleman first contends that the trial court erred by charging the jury that a bond forfeiture constituted negligence per se. He argues that the charge as given allowed the jury to conclude that he was "negligent as a matter of law simply for forfeiting his bond."
The trial court further charged the jury that "where a party is cited for a traffic violation and posts a bond and subsequently forfeits the bond by failing to appear, that party has legally pled guilty and such forfeiture is negligence per se." And, after explaining that Coleman was alleging that Fortner was speeding, which, if true, would also constitute negligence per se, the trial court informed the jury that "[i]t is your duty to decide whether such a violation took place or not."
Under our laws, "[w]here a defendant cited for a traffic violation posts a cash bond according to the schedule set up by court order and fails to appear in court at the term of court and on the day set in the original citation and complaint, then and in that event, such failure shall be construed as an admission of guilt and the cash bond may be forfeited...." OCGA § 40-13-58. In these circumstances, (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Roberts v. Ledbetter, 218 Ga.App. 860(1), 463 S.E.2d 533 (1995). In a civil case this admission of guilt is conclusive if unrebutted, but the defendant can present evidence that he was not negligent despite the plea, and the jury can choose to agree. Gaddis v. Skelton, 226 Ga.App. 325, 326, 486 S.E.2d 630 (1997); see also Cannon v. Street, 220 Ga.App. 212, 213-214(2), 469 S.E.2d 343 (1996).
Thus, contrary to Coleman's argument, the trial court's charge was an accurate statement of the law regarding the effect of the forfeiture.
(b) While Coleman also argues that the trial judge was required to instruct the jury that the forfeiture was a circumstance to be weighed along with the other evidence, see Gaddis, supra, 226 Ga.App. at 326, 486 S.E.2d 630, such a conclusion is inherent within the instruction and the jury charge viewed as a whole expressly included this concept. In reviewing a claim of error for refusal to charge, we must determine whether the request was entirely correct and accurate, adjusted to the pleadings, law, and evidence, and not otherwise covered in the general charge. Lee v. Bartusek, 205 Ga. App. 551(1), 422 S.E.2d 570 (1992). Here, we discern no error in the trial court's refusal to give Coleman's requested charge on forfeiture because the trial court fully and fairly charged the jury on the issue. "It is no longer necessary to give the exact language of requests to charge when the same principles are fairly given to the jury in the general charge of the court." (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Shirley v. State, 245 Ga. 616, 619(3), 266 S.E.2d 218 (1980).
2. Coleman also asserts as error the trial court's admission of testimony by Fortner's accident reconstruction expert about deposition testimony given by Coleman's reconstruction experts.2 Our review of the record, however, finds this argument misleading and meritless. Coleman complains that on several instances the trial court allowed Fortner's expert to give improper expert testimony regarding the contents of his experts' depositions over his objection. We have reviewed each of the instances and find that on each occasion the trial court sustained the objection and properly limited the expert's testimony. In one of the complained-about instances, upon sustaining an objection, the trial court further elaborated during sidebar that, "I know that [the expert] has the right to rely on other people's, other experts or other data in making his determination but what this seems to be heading towards, is allowing him to critique another person's opinion when they have not given that opinion in Court and I see that as a problem."
In another instance, upon Coleman's objection, during sidebar with counsel, the trial court instructed Fortner that, "[w]hat the witness may say [is] that he bases...
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Burdette v. Mcdowell, A12A1773.
...requested charge on forfeiture because the trial court fully and fairly charged the jury on the issue.” Coleman v. Fortner, 260 Ga.App. 373, 375(1)(b), 579 S.E.2d 792 (2003). The court charged the jurors that the bond forfeiture was, “not conclusive evidence that the individual was negligen......
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Sigal v. Sigal.
...to make them conform to the truth,” OCGA § 15–1–3(6); see also Head v. Yeomans, 189 Ga. 335, 6 S.E.2d 704 (1939); Coleman v. Fortner, 260 Ga.App. 373(3), 579 S.E.2d 792 (2003), the nunc pro tunc action as to the gradual transition provision in the decree here did not serve to conform the de......
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In re Estate of Love
...had no motive to distort the truth. Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed.1979), p. 84. 11. (Citation omitted.) Coleman v. Fortner, 260 Ga.App. 373, 375(1)(b), 579 S.E.2d 792 (2003). 12. See Waddill, supra at 808(4), 240 S.E.2d 129. 13. See OCGA § 19-3-1. 14. Wright, supra at 395(1), 494 S.E.2d 23......
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Harrison v. the State., A11A0548.
...an additional instruction, even if that additional instruction were accurate, does not amount to error. See Coleman v. Fortner, 260 Ga.App. 373, 375(1)(b), 579 S.E.2d 792 (2003). Here, the trial court instructed the jury, in pertinent part: Any person who is knowingly in possession of 28 gr......
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Private sector business records
...was to create evidence for use in the employee’s anticipated sex discrimination lawsuit. 136 However, as stated in Coleman v. Fortner, 579 S.E.2d 792, 260 Ga.App. 373 (2003), an expert, in formulating his opinions, may rely upon the reports of others. 137 See §20.500 . 138 See §24.202 . 139......
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Private Sector Business Records
...was to create evidence for use in the employee’s anticipated sex discrimination lawsuit. 121 However, as stated in Coleman v. Fortner, 579 S.E.2d 792, 260 Ga.App. 373 (2003), an expert, in formulating his opinions, may rely upon the reports of others. 122 See §20.500 . 123 See §24.202 . 124......
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Private Sector Business Records
...was to create evidence for use in the employee’s anticipated sex discrimination lawsuit. 132 However, as stated in Coleman v. Fortner, 579 S.E.2d 792, 260 Ga.App. 373 (2003), an expert, in formulating his opinions, may rely upon the reports of others. 133 See §20.500 . §22.437 Is It Admissi......
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Private Sector Business Records
...was to create evidence for use in the employee’s anticipated sex discrimination lawsuit. 121 However, as stated in Coleman v. Fortner, 579 S.E.2d 792, 260 Ga.App. 373 (2003), an expert, in formulating his opinions, may rely upon the reports of others. 122 See §20.500 . 123 See §24.202 . §22......