Coleman v. Garrison

• Decision Date: 30 September 1974
• Citation: 327 A.2d 757
• Parties: Doris Mae COLEMAN et al., Plaintiffs, v. George H. H. GARRISON and Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., a corporation of the State of Delaware, Defendants.
• Court: Delaware Superior Court

Page 757

327 A.2d 757

Doris Mae COLEMAN et al., Plaintiffs, v. George H. H. GARRISON and Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., a corporation of the State of Delaware, Defendants.

Superior Court of Delaware, New Castle County.

Sept. 30, 1974.

Joseph S. Yucht, Balick & Yucht, Wilmington, for plaintiffs.

Rodney M. Layton, Jane R. Roth, Richards, Layton & Finger, Wilmington, for defendant Garrison.

Howard M. Handelman, William J. Alsentzer, Jr., Bayard, Brill & Handelman, Wilmington, for defendant Wilmington Medical Center.

OPINION

BUSH, Judge.

Plaintiffs have brought an action for damages alleging that the defendants improperly performed a certain sterilization operation upon the person of the plaintiff, Doris Mae Coleman. Plaintiffs ask for damages including, inter alia, support for their new child, by virtue of the fact that the plaintiff, Doris Mae Coleman, subsequently became pregnant and delivered another son to the Coleman family.

The defendant, Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., moved in this Court to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint on the ground that plaintiffs do not have a recognizable cause of action. The Superior Court denied the defendant's motion. See 281 A.2d 616 (Del.Super.Ct.1971).

The moving defendant appealed the decision to the Supreme Court who advised the lower court to put the opinion in a fresh posture. See 298 A.2d 320 (Del.Supr.Ct.1972).

Therefore, the defendant and plaintiffs entered into a new briefing schedule in this Court with respect to defendant's motion to dismiss in order that the issues raised may be considered anew in light of the Supreme Court's directive. Concurrently the defendant, Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., has also moved in the alternative for summary judgment.

On October 7, 1966, the plaintiff, Doris Mae Coleman, gave birth to a son. The defendant, George H. H. Garrison, M.D., attended the birth at the Wilmington Medical Center, Inc. Plaintiffs maintain that prior to the birth, Mrs. Coleman discussed with Dr. Garrison the desirability and feasibility of sterilization of Mrs. Coleman for therapeutic purposes and/or socio-economic considerations.

On October 8, 1966, Dr. Garrison performed at the Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., an operation known as a bilateral tubal ligation upon Mrs. Coleman. Plaintiffs allege that Dr. Garrison was assisted in the operation by agents of the Wilmington Medical Center, Inc.

Subsequent to the operation, Mrs. Coleman became pregnant and a child was born to her on October 26, 1968, without complications.

Plaintiffs allege in their complaint the following causes of action: (1) negligent treatment in the performance of the operation and also in post-operative procedures; (2) negligent treatment in failing to correctly appraise Mr. and Mrs. Coleman of the consequences of the operation; (3) the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as being applicable to the plaintiff, Doris Mae Coleman; (4) negligent and careless misrepresentation; (5) breach of contract.

As a result of the aforesaid causes of action, plaintiffs have demanded special, general and exemplary damages for the following:

1. The pain, suffering and discomfort of Doris Mae Coleman as a result of her last pregnancy;

2. The cost of a tubal ligation;

3. The loss to Leroy B. Coleman of the comfort, companionship, services and consortium of Doris Mae Coleman;

4. The deprivation to Ella Mae Coleman, Leroy B. Coleman, Jr., Larry Edward Coleman, Linda Marie Coleman, and Thomas Phillip Coleman of the amount of care and support which they would have received had the last child not been born in 1968;

5. Medical expenses incurred by Mr. and Mrs. Coleman as result of the 1968 pregnancy of Mrs. Coleman;

6. Care and maintenance for the child born to Mr. and Mrs. Coleman in 1968.

The primary issue in this case is whether a cause of action exists against defendants assuming that fault on their part led to the birth of an 'unplanned', yet normal and healthy child.

A review of cases which have ruled on this or similar issues leads to the conclusion that unwarranted difficulty has been encountered in an attempt to judicially weigh the 'value' of a new life as opposed to physical and monetary costs of bearing and raising a child. This 'balancing' concept has been founded primarily on the 'special benefit' rule requiring mitigation of damages where equitable if the injury to it has also conferred some advantage. Restatement of the Law of Torts, § 920.

In applying the 'balancing' formula cited above, several courts have reached the conclusion that public policy prevents a ruling, absent legislation, that the value of human life could ever be outweighed by any 'damages' attributable to the birth of a child. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967); Stewart v. Long Island College Hospital, 35 A.D.2d 531, 313 N.Y.S.2d 502 (1970) Off. 30 N.Y.2d 695, 332 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1972); Shaheen v. Knight, 11 D. and C.R.2d 41 (Pa.1957); Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex.Civ.App.1973).

Notwithstanding the decisions above, other jurisdictions have held that such a cause of action exists: Jahnson v. Anderson, 230 So.2d 503 (Fla.App.1970); Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal.App.2d 303, 59 Cal.Rptr. 463 (1967). Furthermore, in so ruling, one court has openly invited a 'balancing' of interests and held that the extent of damages should be determined by a jury in light of the particular circumstances involved. Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich.App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971).

It is the view of this Court that there should be no cause of action so established as to allow damages for 'wrongful life.' The preciousness of human life should not be held to vary with the circumstances surrounding birth. To make such a determination would, indeed, raise the unfortunate prospect of ruling, as a matter of law, that under certain circumstances a child would not be worth the trouble and expense necessary to bring him into the world. It is not difficult to understand the reluctance of many distinguished jurists to find that the birth of a child is an injury for which plaintiff should deserve an award of damages.

That is not to say, however, that the plaintiff has not suffered a recognizable injury where avoidable pregnancy has resulted from faulty medical procedure. To the contrary, a ruling that no recognizable cause of action could exist under such circumstances would leave the medical profession virtually immune from liability for improper treatment of patients justifiable seeking to avoid pregnancy.

A more appropriate resolution of the difficulties presented, and the one hereby adopted, is to view the action as one for 'wrongful pregnancy' rather than one for 'wrongful life' thereby limiting the scope of the injury to the very real expenses, and obvious difficulties attending the unexpected pregnancy of a woman.

Limitation of the cause of action in such a manner is valid since to do otherwise, would be to invite unduly speculative and ethically questionable assessments of such matters as the emotional affect of a birth on siblings as well as parents, and the emotional as well as pecuniary costs of raising an unplanned and, perhaps, an unwanted child in varying family environments. Speculative damages are, quite simply, not recoverable in this State. See Laskowski v. Wallis, 205 A.2d 825 (Del.Supr.1964); Henne v. Balick, 1 Storey 369, 146 A.2d 394 (Del.Supr.1958).

Furthermore, this Court does not find it reasonable for a defendant to be assessed damages representing support for a child when the plaintiffs choose to raise the child even where other lawful alternatives are available. In so doing, the plaintiff-parents are thus indicating that the benefits at least in their particular case, outweigh any hardship or expense incident to the raising of the child.

In summary, this Court finds that ...